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Executive summary 
This deliverable collects the main results obtained from evaluations of the piloted safety measures 
selected in earlier phases of the SAFER-LC project. This deliverable reports the descriptions of the 
piloted measures, method and data to evaluate the safety effects of the selected measures, as well 
as the results of evaluations together with their discussion. More detailed information about the 
implementation of the measures and execution of pilots can be found from deliverable D4.3 of the 
SAFER-LC project (Carrese et al., 2019). In some cases, deliverable D4.3 also reports details on 
the development of the measure.  
The main inputs for this deliverable from other SAFER-LC activities originate from Work Package 2 
(WP2), Work Package 3 (WP3) and earlier tasks of WP4. The earlier deliverables of WP4 produced 
implementation guidelines for the pilots (D4.1; SAFER-LC Consortium, 2018a) by providing an 
overview of the major testing environments that were available for piloting in the SAFER-LC project. 
The available pilot test environments ranged from simulation environments to real (or close to real) 
traffic circumstances. Deliverable D4.2 (SAFER-LC Consortium, 2018b) describes the proposed 
evaluation framework including a list of parameters from which the partners could select the most 
appropriate ones for the evaluation of their pilot. The identified Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 
were arranged into five categories: ‘Safety’, ‘Traffic’, ‘Human behaviour’, ‘Technical’, and ‘Business’. 
Finally, the deliverable D4.3 (Carrese et al., 2019) describes the pilot activities carried out in WP4 
by documenting the implementation and execution of pilots in various level crossing environments 
in different countries. 
This deliverable reports the evaluation results of 21 safety measures that were piloted at eight pilot 
sites during the SAFER-LC project. The number of piloted safety measures varied by pilot site and 
the pilot test sites varied from simulation studies to controlled conditions and real railway 
environments. In some cases, the selected measures were not suitable for piloting in a real world 
experimental context and/or the implementation in real railway environment was not feasible, for 
example, due to financial resources, timing of our piloting period and/or lack of suitable pilot site(s). 
Therefore, pilot test sites in the SAFER-LC projects varied from simulation studies to controlled 
conditions and real railway environments. Some of the measures (‘In-vehicle warnings to driver’, and 
‘Additional lights to train front’) were tested in two different environments to collect complementary 
information on their safety effects via two types of installation. 
Due to the nature of the conducted pilots (small-scale pilot tests), it was hardly possible to calculate 
any quantitative estimates for safety effects of the measures in terms of annual reductions in the 
number of LC fatalities and/or accidents based on the results of the pilots. However, since numerical 
estimates of safety effects are needed for cost-benefit calculations (WP5 of the SAFER-LC project), 
the authors made an attempt to draw these estimates based on the applicability of safety measures 
to different LC types, road users and behaviours leading to LC accidents based on pre-existing 
information on the effects of LC safety measures. The authors acknowledge that many uncertainties 
are related to these estimates. However, the assumptions used in the calculations are clearly 
documented and hence the estimates can be easily updated if more detailed statistics or more 
information on safety effects become available. Therefore, a detailed documentation of LC accident 
data (information on additional variables and details) is highly recommended to enable drawing of 
these estimates. 
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Based on the safety potential calculations presented in chapter 5 the piloted measures that were 
estimated to have the highest safety benefits are:  
− Additional lights at the train front, covering measures ‘Additional warning light system at front 
of the locomotive (6.0–12.0%)’ and ‘Improved train visibility using lights (6.0–30.0%)’. This 
measure was estimated to have rather high effectiveness (prevention of 15–30% of relevant 
LC accidents) and target rather large share of LC accidents (19.9−96.3% depending on the 
approach). 
− In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning (4.4–15.0%). It is important to be noted that the 
effectiveness of this measure depends on the usage of the in-vehicle devices. In practice, 
the car driver needs to install the application on a smart mobile device, and location tracking 
should be enabled on this device while driving. Furthermore, the driver needs to allow the 
application to run seamlessly on the background and also notice the visual or auditory 
warning in order to perform the required action on time (e.g. stop before the LC). However, 
these latter requirements are valid for all LC safety measures. 
− Speed bumps and flashing posts (2.0–8.0%). This accident reduction estimate concerns the 
situation where the measure is implemented to passive LCs (where the highest safety effects 
were expected in Dressler et al. 2018).   
− Blinking lights drawing driver attention (Perilight) (2.0–8.0%). This measure is targeted to 
passive LCs. 
Some concerns on applicability of piloted safety measures in different railway environments are listed 
below: 
− Written letters on ground and coloured road marking: Any road marking can only be applied 
on a paved road with an even surface. Thus, the message written on the road does not hold 
for road environments such as gravel roads, cobblestone, tracks etc. Furthermore, these 
measures are not perfectly suitable to countries with snow and long winter with darkness. 
− Noise-producing pavement and speed bumps: These measures are not well suited to gravel 
roads. In addition, these measures are not effective in case of snow. 
− Blinking amber light with train symbol and blinking lights drawing driver attention (Perilight): 
It is important to note that these measures are targeted to passive LCs and require power. 
However, in practice many of passive LCs no mains power is available and thus other 
alternative power sources need to be investigated. The effectiveness of these measures was 
estimated somewhat lower than active LCs with sound and/or light warning since the warning 
in these measures is linked to LC approach and not to actual arrival of train. 
− In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning: This system may not operate satisfactory for LCs 
surrounded by roads on which Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) reception is poor. 
Overall, the safety effect results of the piloted measures are promising. Therefore, it is recommended 
that some of most promising measures will be tested in larger scale real world experiments with well-
planned research designs to obtain more information on their effects (also on long term) on road 
user behaviour and thus on road safety. This would also support the more exact numerical estimation 
of safety effects of the piloted measures. 
The results of this deliverable will serve as input for WP5 that deals with cost-benefit analyses. The 
estimates of safety effects of each measure will be used in cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness 
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calculations and the experiences collected during the piloting will support the drawing of final 
recommendations for the SAFER-LC project. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Objectives of SAFER-LC project 
The main objective of the SAFER-LC project (Safer level crossing by integrating and optimising road-
rail infrastructure management and design) is to improve safety and minimise risks at and around 
level crossings (LCs) by developing a fully integrated cross-modal set of innovative solutions and 
tools for the proactive management and new design of level-crossing infrastructure. These tools will 
enable  
i. Road and rail decision makers to achieve better coherence between both modes,  
ii. Effective ways to detect potentially dangerous situations leading to collisions at LCs as early 
as possible,  
iii. Prevention of incidents at level crossings through innovative design and predictive 
maintenance methods, and  
iv. Mitigation of consequences of incidents/disruptions due to accidents or other critical events.  
The main output of the SAFER-LC project is a toolbox which will be accessible through a user-
friendly interface integrating all the project results and solutions to help both rail and road 
stakeholders improve safety at level crossings. 
The project focuses both on technical solutions and on human processes to adapt infrastructure 
designs to road user needs and to enhance coordination and cooperation between different 
stakeholders from different land transportation modes. The challenge is also to demonstrate the 
acceptance of the proposed solutions by both rail and road users and to implement the solutions 
cost-efficiently. 
Within the project, the objective of Work Package 4 (WP4) is to evaluate the positive and negative 
results of lab tests and field implementations executed within the SAFER-LC project, to draw 
recommendations and lessons learned from the piloting process, and where feasible, to discuss the 
results of evaluations for applicability in different circumstances. These impacts cover, for example, 
safety, usability and user acceptance, railway capacity (possible effects on maximum permitted train 
speed), road capacity (possible effects on car speed limits and/or closure times of level crossing), 
and environmental aspects of piloted safety measures. 
 Purpose of this deliverable 
This deliverable reports the work conducted in Task 4.3 of WP4. This deliverable is a continuation 
to the previous deliverables produced in WP4. These earlier deliverables concerned:  
1. Guidelines for the execution of the pilot tests from data collection and monitoring to the daily 
interaction with the testing partners (Deliverable D4.1), 
2. Description of the evaluation framework to monitor and evaluate the pilot tests (Deliverable 
D4.2), and  
3. Report on the implementation of the pilot tests describing the simulation, controlled and field 
tests (Deliverable D4.3) 
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This deliverable D4.4 collects the main results obtained from evaluations of the piloted safety 
measures selected in earlier phases of the SAFER-LC project. The measures were targeted to 
prevent LC accidents both at passive and active LCs. According to the EU DIRECTIVE 2016/798 
passive LCs are ‘without any form of warning system or protection activated when it is unsafe for the 
user to traverse the crossing’. In active LCs (which can be either manual or automatic) the ‘crossing 
users are protected from or warned of the approaching train by devices which are activated when it 
is unsafe for the user to traverse the crossing’. The protection by the use of physical devices refers 
to half or full barriers or gates whereas the warning by the use of fixed equipment at LCs refers to 
visible devices (lights) or audible devices such as bells, horns, klaxons etc.  
This deliverable reports the descriptions of the piloted measures, the methods and data used to 
evaluate the safety effects of the measures and the results of evaluations. At the end of the report, 
there is a discussion of the obtained results including aspects such as lessons learned during the 
piloting, a list of recommendations and discussion of evaluation results for applicability in different 
circumstances. More detailed information about the implementation of the measures and execution 
of pilots can be found from deliverable D4.3 of the SAFER-LC project (Carrese et al., 2019). In some 
cases, deliverable D4.3 also reports details on the development of the measure.  
At the end of the document, the evaluation results are summarised and some preliminary findings 
on the numerical safety effects of the piloted measures are provided. These are followed by general 
conclusions about the piloting process and evaluation results together with some recommendations. 
The results and recommendations will be used as an input for the applied CBA of the deliverable 
D5.3 and especially in the valuation of the benefits of each piloted safety measure. At the end, the 
CBA results will be used to define the expected business output of each safety measure. 
 Interactions with other activities within the project 
The main inputs for this deliverable from other SAFER-LC activities originate from Work Package 2 
(WP2), Work Package 3 (WP3) and earlier tasks of WP4. Specifically, WP2 produced a list of new 
human-centred low-cost countermeasures to improve the safety of LCs (Dressler et al., 2018). This 
list of safety measures was used by the partners when selecting the measures for piloting in WP4 of 
the SAFER-LC project. Furthermore, during WP3, some of the selected technical solutions were 
further developed as part of the work package. 
The deliverable D2.2 of WP2 (Havârneanu et al., 2018) reports on the methodological framework 
used for the assessment of selected measures from a human factors viewpoint. This framework and 
the related assessment tool will be developed and updated based on the experiences gathered 
during the WP4 piloting and the updates will be reported in deliverable D2.5. The safety effect 
estimation was drafted in cooperation with WP2 to align the results with the ones resulting from the 
evaluation of selected safety measures from a human factors perspective (deliverable D2.4 of the 
SAFER-LC project).  
The earlier deliverables of WP4 produced implementation guidelines for the pilots (D4.1; SAFER-LC 
Consortium, 2018a) by providing an overview of the major testing environments which were available 
for piloting in the SAFER-LC project. The available pilot test environments ranged from simulation 
environments to real (or close to real) traffic circumstances. Deliverable D4.2 (SAFER-LC 
Consortium, 2018b) describes the proposed evaluation framework including a list of parameters from 
which the partners could select the most appropriate ones for the evaluation of their pilot. The 
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identified Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were arranged into five categories: ‘Safety’, ‘Traffic’, 
‘Human behaviour’, ‘Technical’, and ‘Business’. Finally, the deliverable D4.3 (Carrese et al., 2019) 
describes the pilot activities carried out in WP4 by documenting the implementation and execution 
of pilots in various level crossing environments in different countries. 
The results of this deliverable (D4.4) will serve as input for WP5 that deals with the exploitation 
aspects of the SAFER-LC safety measures (or solutions, as they as called in WP5). The estimates 
of safety effects of each measure will be used in cost-benefit or cost-effectiveness calculations and 
the experiences collected during the piloting will support the drawing of final recommendations for 
the SAFER-LC project.  
 Structure of the document 
This deliverable consists of six main chapters: 
− Chapter 1 includes an introduction of the project and purpose of this deliverable together with 
the links to other work conducted during the SAFER-LC project. 
− Chapter 2 introduces the guidance that was provided to pilot test leaders before the piloting 
of safety measure to support their data collection and analysis. 
− Chapter 3 documents the descriptions of piloted safety measures and their evaluation results 
together with the used evaluation method.  
− Chapter 4 summarises the main safety related evaluation results by piloted safety measure. 
− Chapter 5 presents the calculations to estimate the safety potential of each piloted safety 
measure. 
− Chapter 6 provides the main conclusions and recommendations. 
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 Abbreviations and terms 
Abbreviation Description 
AIM Application Platform for Intelligent Mobility 
ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
AV Automated Vehicle 
CAM Cooperative Awareness Message 
C-ITS Cooperative Intelligent Transport Systems 
CPM Collective Perception Messaging 
DENM Decentralized Environmental Notification Message 
DSRC Dedicated Short Range Communication 
DTW Dynamic Time Warping 
ET Encroachment time 
ETA Expected Time of Arrival 
ETSI The European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
FCD Floating Car Data 
G5 Frequency band (5.9GHz) 
GIS Geographic Information System 
GNSS Global Navigation Satellite System 
HFAT Human Factor Assessment Tool 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
LC/LCs Level Crossing / Level Crossings 
LTE Long-Term Evolution 
MAP Mobile Application Part 
MRU Motorised road user 
MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport 
NDS Naturalistic Driving Study 
NLOS Non line-of-sight 
OBU On-board communication Unit 
ROI A region of interest 
RSU Roadside Unit 
SAE Society of Automation Engineers 
SDS Smart Detection System 
SPaT Signal Phase and Timing 
SSH Secure Shell 
STD Standard Deviation 
TTC Time-to-collision 
VACC Instrumented vehicle (“Véhicule d’Analyse du Comportement des Conducteurs”) 
VPN Virtual Private Network 
VRU Vulnerable road user 
V2X Vehicle-to-everything 
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2. GUIDANCE FOR EVALUATION 
 Expected results 
In line with the objectives of the SAFER-LC project, the main objective for piloting the safety 
measures in WP4 was to assess their effect on i) the number of level crossings accidents, and/or ii) 
the railway system recovery time after such incidents by reducing the consequences of the collisions 
and/or the shut down time of railway traffic. In addition, the piloting was done to demonstrate the 
integration of the selected measures (technological and non-technological) in a railway environment 
and to assess their performance in relation to the KPIs defined in deliverable D4.2 of this project 
(SAFER-LC Consortium, 2018b). The evaluation also focussed on the human factors perspective to 
collect information on short- and long-term behavioural safety effects, together with the user 
experience and social perception. These aspects will be investigated as part of the human factors 
assessment to be conducted in WP2. 
In order to obtain all this information, the piloting partners were requested to develop implementation 
and evaluation plans associated with each pilot, including plans for the collection of the required data 
for the evaluation. These plans and the progress of piloting were presented to other partners during 
the SAFER-LC progress meetings and documented in periodical progress reports, which were to be 
updated and sent for review to WP4 task leaders before each progress meeting (every three months; 
September 2018, December 2018, March 2019 and June 2019). The most extensive effort by 
partners was writing the first progress report (September 2018). In the following rounds, the writing 
of the progress reports concentrated on adding complementary information on eventual changes to 
the plans and schedule. The periodic progress reports contained five main sections: 1) Description 
of the measures, 2) Implementation of the measure, 3) Execution of the tests, 4) Evaluation data, 
and 5) Lessons learned. The template of the report is included as part of deliverable D4.3 (Carrese 
et al., 2019). The first section of the progress report concerned the description of the measure. From 
the evaluation viewpoint, this was an important section, since here the pilot test leaders were 
requested to describe details about the piloted measure. This included: 
− Pictures and relevant features of the measure 
− Targeted groups of people (all road users or only some specific group of people such as 
children or elderly), targeted road user behaviour, and targeted LC accidents which could be 
prevented with the implementation of this system 
− Expected safety effects (i.e. how and why the measure is expected to improve LC safety) 
− Applicability of the measure to different LC types (e.g. passive LCs, active LCs with light 
signals, active LCs with barriers and light signals)  
− Circumstances under which the measure is expected to be effective (e.g. during all weather 
and lighting conditions or only during some specific conditions such as during darkness) 
− Previous experiences with similar measures 
The collection and documentation of the above information was targeted to support the pilot test 
leaders in selecting the most suitable study design for the estimation of the effects of their measure. 
 Focus on the evaluation 
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In order to estimate the effectiveness of a specific measure, the pilot test leaders were recommended 
to carry out an evaluation: (1) in a real experimental context (i.e. units are assigned randomly to a 
treated and untreated group to control the potentially confounding factors) and (2) by collecting 
evaluation data both in ‘before’ and ‘after’ conditions. Specifically, the pilot test leaders were 
encouraged to collect control data whenever possible, especially, in before-after studies. The control 
data would allow the separation of the effects of the measure from other simultaneously affecting 
factors. The collection of data on long-term effects of the measure was also encouraged.  
The partners were encouraged to join efforts and collaborate with other partners to pilot the same 
safety measure in different settings and/or countries. In addition, the pilot tests leaders were 
requested to provide information on the implementation process, e.g. what kind of problems were 
encountered and how they were solved, and give advice on issues that should be taken into account 
when planning similar interventions. 
In some cases, the selected measures were not suitable to be piloted in real experimental context 
and/or the implementation in real railway environment was not feasible, for example, due to financial 
resources, timing of our piloting period and/or lack of suitable pilot site(s). Therefore, pilot test sites 
varied from simulation studies to controlled conditions and real railway environments.  
 Quantitative estimates on the reductions of accidents and 
fatalities  
The pilot test leaders were instructed to aim to provide quantitative estimates on safety effects of the 
measures, preferably in terms of annual reductions in the numbers of level crossing fatalities and/or 
accidents. However, it was recognised that providing reliable estimates of annual fatality and/or 
accident reductions in small-scale pilot tests is hardly possible. Since some quantitative results are 
needed for the cost-benefit analysis, the pilot test leaders were advised to make an expert evaluation 
of the safety issue the implemented measure aims to address, and provide some estimates on the 
safety effects (on annual numbers of level crossing fatalities) if the measure would be implemented 
on a large scale (e.g. covering all potential implementation locations). 
The list of KPIs, defined in earlier phases of WP4 (SAFER-LC Consortium, 2018b), supported the 
estimation of safety effects. The pilot test leaders could review this list and select the series of 
appropriate indicators in order to assess the effectiveness of the implemented safety measures. 
Taking into account that level crossing accidents are relatively infrequent, some indicators may be 
less meaningful to collect during the piloting.  
In order to have a sufficient number of accidents for the evaluation, data from a period of several 
years is typically required. However, the differences in accident frequencies between the before and 
after periods cannot then be solely explained by the treatments implemented, but by other external 
factors as well. Consequently, alternative methods are required to evaluate the impact of these 
measures while avoiding the influence of unknown variables. For example, risky LC user behaviours 
are more frequent than accidents. Therefore, the investigation of risky LC behaviours provides more 
data for evaluating the effectiveness of implemented measures. Risky behaviour can be evaluated 
by field investigators' observations, but it is usually assessed through video recordings, which are 
less obtrusive and enable the replay of events. 
The final list of piloted measures is presented in the beginning of chapter 3 of this deliverable.   
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3. EVALUATION OF MEASURES 
This deliverable reports the evaluation results of 21 safety measures that were piloted at eight pilot 
sites during the SAFER-LC project (Table 1). The number of piloted safety measures varied by pilot 
site and the pilot test sites varied from simulation studies to controlled conditions and real railway 
environments. Some of the measures (‘In-vehicle warnings to driver’, and ‘Additional lights to train 
front’) were tested in two different environments to collect complementary information on their safety 
effects via two types of installations. An additional test site was planned in Turkey, but as the project 
developed, it had to be put on hold in April 2019 due to political reasons external to the consortium. 
In addition, the results of the pilot test on ‘Monitoring and remote maintenance’ conducted in Aachen 
test site by NTNU were not available for this deliverable due to a human resource issue. 
Table 1. List of piloted safety measures by pilot site. 
Pilot site Safety measures 
Driving simulator of DLR • Blinking lights drawing driver attention 
• Improved train visibility using lights 
• Noise-producing pavement 
• Sign ‘Look for train’ 
Driving simulator of SNCF • Coloured road marking 
• Funnel effect pylons 
• Rings 
• Traffic lights 
• Speed bump and flashing pylons 
• Proximity message via in-car device 
Two simulation environments (VTT) • V2X messaging system between automated vehicles 
(AVs) and passive LCs 
Aachen test site (multiple partners) • Smart detection system 
• Early detection and hazard information 
• Smart communication system 1 
• Smart communication system 2 
CEREMA Rouen (CEREMA&NTNU) • Monitoring and remote maintenance 
Thessaloniki living lab  
(CERTH-HIT & DLR) 
• In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning 
Real rail environment (VTT) • Additional warning light system affront of the 
locomotive 
Real rail environment (DLR) • Blinking amber light with train symbol 
• Road marking “ Is a train coming? →” 
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The following subchapters (3.1–3.8) present the piloted safety measures and their evaluation results 
together with the used evaluation method. The evaluation results are combined with a discussion on 
lessons learned, recommendations, applicability of results to different circumstances and 
conclusions. The results are reported by pilot test site in the same order as the pilot sites are 
presented in Table 1. 
 Driving simulator (DLR) 
3.1.1. Piloted safety measures 
All piloted measures share the goal of supporting the safe behaviour of traffic participants at passive 
level crossings. They are especially supposed to improve the probability that an oncoming train is 
detected by the road user by eliciting an early visual checking behaviour to the left and right of the 
level crossing. Since many road traffic participants, especially drivers, tend not to check the 
environment of a level crossing for an approaching train, the following measures will be evaluated: 
− Blinking lights drawing driver attention 
− Improved train visibility using lights 
− Noise-producing pavement 
− Sign ‘Look for train’ 
The measures are mainly targeting fast-moving road users, especially motorised road users, since 
they are involved in the majority of accidents at level crossings. The target behaviour that is 
supposed to be elicited is a shift of the visual attention (executed voluntarily or by automatic capture) 
to the tracks on approach to a LC, such as to enhance the probability of detecting a train if one is 
coming. The exact effect mechanism that underlies the enhanced probability of detection differs 
between the described measures. 
Blinking lights drawing driver attention 
The blinking lights were positioned stationary in the peripheral vicinity of a level crossing (Figure 1) 
and were activated whenever a road user was approaching. The system relies on the same 
psychophysiological effect mechanism as the improvement of the train visibility with additional lights. 
Both measures are assumed to elicit an orientation reaction that can be qualified as involuntary or 
automatic. With a comparable approach Grippenkoven et al., (2016) showed positive short-term 
effects of stationary peripheral blinking lights at passive level crossings on the visual orientation of 
drivers. In the pilot study, the implementation of the blinking peripheral lights (PeriLight) was adapted 
to the situation at the test LC that allowed free view on the tracks already at 240 m and more ahead 
of the LC. Three posts with blinking lights were implemented at the tracks at 40, 60 and 80 m distance 
from the road, to both the left and the right of the LC. The blinking was triggered when the 
participant’s car was 250 m ahead of the LC. The blinking sequence started with the two inner lights 
being activated for 0.1 s, followed by the two lights in between being activated for 0.1 s and, finally, 
the two outermost lights being activated for 0.1 s. After a pause of 0.1 s with all lights out, the 
sequence started again, yielding an impression of the blinking “moving” from the center to the 
periphery on both sides of the road. The blinking continued for 15 s overall.  
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Figure 1. Blinking lights located in the periphery of the level crossing to capture the visual attention 
of road users and increase the probability of detecting an approaching train. This measure relies 
on automatic responses of the human visual system. 
Improved train visibility using blinking lights 
The improvement of the train visibility by using blinking lights relies on a facilitation of the detection 
by enhancing the salience of a locomotive (Figure 2). The additional warning light system was 
positioned at the front of the locomotive. Warning lights integrated in the locomotive are supposed 
to exogenously capture the visual attention of road users by a stimulation of the cones, special 
photoreceptor-cells in the retina of the human eye that are sensitive for a stimulation by e.g. moving 
objects with high contrasts (e.g. blinking lights drawing driver attention). In a study on additional light 
sources to improve the conspicuity of locomotives, Cairney (2003) showed positive effects of the 
installation of additional light sources on railway cars. The lights were installed to the train according 
to the prevailing regulations (e.g. below the headlights). 
The analysis of additional light systems installed on locomotives was a joint initiative by DLR and 
VTT within the project. While VTT pursued the demonstration of the technical system in a real world 
level crossing context, DLR verified the capability of the system to positively influence road users’ 
visual detection of trains in the context of an empiric simulation study.  
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Figure 2. Additional blinking lights that complement the regular triangular lights of a locomotive are 
supposed to improve the detection by road users. This measure relies on automatic responses of 
the human visual system. 
Noise-producing pavement 
The noise and vibration producing pavement elicits a rumble effect when it is driven over (Figure 3). 
It is assumed that this measure will firstly have an impact on motorised road users’ choice of speed. 
If drivers indeed decrease their speed, the time to detect a potentially approaching train would be 
increased. However, it is unclear to what extent a vibration producing pavement really has a 
beneficial effect on visual processes like the early detection of a train. Earlier studies have been 
conducted on rumble strips in the context of level crossings (e.g. Radalj & Kidd, 2005), however, 
their effect on the visual search during the approach towards a level crossing has not been 
investigated sufficiently to date. 
 
Figure 3. Noise-producing pavement and other purposeful alterations of the road surface are 
supposed to influence the driving behaviour of motorised road users during the approach towards 
level crossings. 
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Sign ‘Look for train’ 
The sign look for train directly addresses the road traffic participant with a written message and a 
pictogram. It requires a conscious processing of the content and subsequently a voluntary visual 
search for a train. Since the study was conducted with German participants the messages in the sign 
as shown under Figure 4 was written in German language. The text in the sign asks the road user 
“Kommt ein Zug?” (Is a train coming?). In a comparable setup, the effect of a look for train sign has 
been studied earlier (Noyce & Fambro, 1998). The sign was detected by more than half of the 
participants in their driving study. However, since other measures were studied parallel, it is not clear 
whether the positive effect found for the train detection can be ascribed to the sign. A positive effect 
can be assumed, but has not been proven yet in a methodologically sound way. 
 
Figure 4. The sign which asks the road user to check whether a train in approaching. Pictograms 
and arrows support the messages. 
3.1.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measures 
All four measures were tested in the MoSAIC driving simulator of DLR1. 
A lot of effort was spent on the design of a driving environment the allows studying multiple measures 
in a within subjects experimental design, meaning that the same participant can be confronted with 
multiple measures without making them suspicious that the study is about level crossing safety. A 
long driving course was planned, consisting of both village sections and rural roads between them. 
To distract the participant from the level crossing focus of the study, a secondary task had to be 
completed once while driving through each of the villages in between the LCs. For this, participants 
received a message on a mobile phone, requiring them to execute a small task and send a short 
reply to the enquirer (e.g. “Please find the photo of the electric kettle I wanted to put on ebay and 
send it to me”). The secondary task was part of the cover story used to justify the purpose of the 
study in the initial instruction. Participants were briefed on the real purpose after the study.  
A detailed procedure of the studies and the stepwise sequence of events is shown in Table 2. After 
a phase of introduction, explanation and calibration (A–D), participants started with a training course 
to get used to the simulator. The subsequent test course contained six LCs and was designed to 
take about 7 min driving time from one LC to the next. The first LC-passage always served as a 
baseline. A passive LC was crossed without a train approaching.  
                                            
1  https://www.dlr.de/fs/en/desktopdefault.aspx/tabid-11368/19984_read-46631/ 
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Table 2. Procedure and time plan of the driving simulation study. 
Trial / Phase Duration   Contents 
Factor 1 
(within subj.): 
Factor 2 
(within subj.) 
Factor 3 
(between subj.) 
LC measure Train presence Train design 
(nested in „train coming") 
A 5 min   
Welcome and 
instruction 
    
      
B 5 min   Informed consent           
C 2 min   
explanations in 
simulator 
    
      
D 8 min   
calibration of 
eyetracking system 
    
      
0 5 min   training drive no LC  no train       
1 7 min   
Baseline test (always 
first) 
no measure (=control / 
baseline) 
no train (=control / 
baseline) 
      
2 7 min 


Effects of Factor 1 - 
Position of measure 
balanced across 
subjects 
Blinking PeriLight <-> 
Noise-prod. pavement 
<-> 
Sign Look for train 
no train 
(=control / baseline) 
      
3 7 min 
4 7 min 
5 7 min   
Effects of Factor 2 - 
only one train design 
per subject 
none train coming 
Normal 
(=baseline 
for train-
specific 
comparisons) 
or 
Blinking  
Lights on 
train to 
enhance 
train 
detection 
6 7 min   
Effect of train 
exposition - additional 
LC traverse for testing 
the effect 
no measure 
(= experimental 
condition after train 
exposition) 
no train 
      
E 18 min   
Survey of subjective 
data on the scenarios 
experienced (5 or 6) 
    
      
F 3 min   Debriefing           
G 2 min   
Disbursement and 
farewell 
    
   
Driving time 47 min    target n subjects 18   18 
Total duration 90 min    target total n 36     
The second to fourth LC likewise entailed a passage without a train coming, but with one of three 
different infrastructural safety-measures in place (sign ‘Look for train’, peripheral blinking lights or 
noise-producing pavement). These three experimental conditions were encountered by all of the 
participants. The order of measures was balanced across participants. 
At the fifth level crossing, each participant encountered a train that approached the LC. This train 
was a normal train for a half of the participants (baseline for the factor train design), and a train with 
additional blinking lights for the other half. While the other factors were varied within-subjects, a 
between-subjects design was chosen for this factor because a train encounter was expected to bias 
driver behaviour in any following LC passages towards more attentiveness and caution than would 
normally be observed at LCs. Therefore, each participant should only encounter a train once, and 
always at the end of the measure sequence. The direction of train approach from the left vs. right 
side was balanced across participants. The train was triggered when the participant’s car was at 
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390 m ahead of the LC, with its trajectory to be on a perfect collision course in case the driver would 
continue to drive at the maximum allowed speed of 50 km/h. 
To test for the effects of a train encounter on driver behaviour at LCs, a sixth LC passage was 
included, involving a LC without any supplemental safety measure and without a train, similar to the 
baseline condition. 
After the test-drive, a questionnaire was administered to the participants in which they were first 
briefed on the background and focus of the study and then shown each of the measures again, along 
a with a short description of their proposed functions. Participants were subsequently asked to give 
their assessment of the measure on a number of scales (see results for items). 
3.1.3. Evaluation results 
Participants 
A total of 52 participants (24 male, 28 female) took part in the study. The conduct of the study and 
the assessment of the driving, gaze and subjective data, respectively, was partially restricted due to 
simulator sickness (participants were instructed to abort the test immediately in this case), technical 
problems with gaze detection or calibration quality in eye-tracking, and, in one case, persisting failure 
to comply with the instructions. Participants who had to quit early because of simulator sickness, still 
filled in the user questionnaire if they felt ok to do so. Subjective assessments were collected of 49 
participants (24 male, 25 female, aged 18 to 65, M = 35.3, SD = 13.1). A complete set of driving data 
could be obtained of 46 participants (22 male, 24 female, aged 18 to 65, M = 34.4, SD = 12.5), and 
a complete set of gaze data was obtained of 39 participants (18 male, 21 female, aged 18 to 65, 
M = 34.4, SD = 12.7). 
Gaze behaviour 
To assess the effect of the measures on visual search for a train, indicators of looking out for a train 
on the tracks to the left and right were computed and compared between the conditions. The 
necessary stopping distance at a speed of 50 km/h (including reaction and braking) is about 40 m 
with normal braking, or 30 m with hazard braking. Therefore, the analysis focused on gaze behaviour 
in the LC approach section from 140 to 40 m ahead of the LC, in which visual scanning for a train is 
especially important to determine whether there is a need to brake and give way to a train. 
Figure 5 shows the regions of interest (ROI) that were defined as the left periphery and right 
periphery for the analysis. Fixations needed to last at least 120 ms to be counted. For the defined 
ROI and approach phase, the following indicators were computed: (1) number and percent of 
participants who fixated the ROI at least once, and (2) mean number of fixations on the ROI. 
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Figure 5. Definition of the regions of interest (ROI) “left periphery” (L) and “right periphery” (R). The 
blue dot represents the participant’s current gaze position in this screenshot. 
When looking at the proportion of participants who gave a given ROI at least one fixation, it first 
became obvious that there was a general bias to attend more to the left than to the right side. Across 
all LC conditions, about 75% of participants scanned the left peripheral region of the tracks at some 
point during the critical approach phase between 140 and 40 m ahead of the LC, while the mean 
proportion of participants who did the same on the right side was only about 51%. 
In the baseline condition (passive LC without any additional safety measures), around 65% of 
participants fixated on the left side of the tracks, and around 45% fixated on the right side once or 
more often on approach (see Table 3). On the left side, this proportion increased in almost all of the 
test conditions, except the noise-producing pavement condition. The highest increase was observed 
with the PeriLight (+ 19%), followed by the sign Look for train (+ 15%). On the right side, the only 
measure that lead to a comparable increase was the PeriLight (+ 19%). The sign Look for train did 
not induce considerable changes compared to the baseline. Neither did the noise-producing 
pavement. 
A considerable increase on the left side and somewhat smaller effects on the right side were also 
observed in the blinking train condition (left: +15%, right: + 9%), compared to increases of around 
+7 % on both sides in the normal train condition. However, the ROI fixation results for the conditions 
with a train present should be considered together with the results of the analysis of the first fixation 
on the train (reported below) which show that in all but one of these cases the approaching train had 
already been detected. What is more interesting in the conditions with a train present is the effect of 
the train approaching from one side on the inspection of the tracks on the opposite side. When a 
train approached from the right side, fixations to that side were increased (+18%), and there was 
also a small increase (+8%) on the left side in comparison to the baseline. When a train approached 
from the left side, there was an increase of fixations on this side, but not on the right side. 
Notably, in the condition After train encounter, which involved approaching a passive LC without any 
additional safety measures and without a train after having encountered a train on the LC before, 
the proportion of participants who scanned the critical regions was also enhanced by around 20% 
on the left side and 10% on the right side. 
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Table 3. Number and percent of participants who fixated the given ROI at least once between 140 
and 40 m ahead of the LC. Note: n-Participants equals the number of available data of participants 
by condition. Row percent are based on this value. 
ROI Left Periphery Participants Right Periphery 
LC condition n % n n % 
Baseline 31 64.6 48 22 45.8 
PeriLight 36 83.7 43 28 65.1 
Noise-producing pavement 30 66.7 45 18 40.0 
Sign Look for train 36 80.0 45 21 46.7 
Train 31 75.6 41 22 53.7 
 Blinking 16 80.0 20 11 55.0 
 Normal 15 71.4 21 11 52.4 
 From left 15 78.9 19 8 42.1 
 From right 16 72.7 22 14 63.6 
After train encounter 33 84.6 39 22 56.4 
Table 4 and Figure 6 show the mean number of fixations in the left and right periphery for each of 
the LC conditions. Complementing these descriptive statistics, a two-way repeated-measures 
ANOVA with ROI and LC as factors was run on the data of the 39 participants of whom observations 
of all LC conditions were available. The data again reveal the general relative neglect of the right 
side of the tracks. This observation is confirmed by a highly significant main effect of the ROI in the 
ANOVA, F(1,38) = 15.68, p = 0.000. The main effect of the LC condition was also significant with 
F(2.44, 92.83) = 6.15, p = 0.002 (Greenhouse-Geisser-corrected), indicating that some of the 
measures induced significant changes in the number of ROI fixations on LC approach. Simple 
contrasts with the baseline as the reference condition showed a pronounced effect of the PeriLight, 
F(1,38) = 11.71, p = 0.002, and some effects in most of the remaining conditions, sign Look for train: 
F(1,38) = 12.51, p = 0.001, train: F(1,38) = 6.39, p = 0.016, and after train encounter: F(1,38) = 5.88, 
p = 0.020. In the noise-producing pavement condition, the number of fixations was not significantly 
different from the baseline, F(1,38) = 1.32, p = 0.258. 
Table 4. Mean number of fixations on ROI between 140 and 40 m ahead of the LC. 
ROI Left Periphery  Right Periphery 
LC Condition M   (SD)  M (SD) 
Baseline 1.23 (1.21)  0.88 (1.27) 
PeriLight 3.16 (3.12)  2.53 (3.73) 
Noise producing pavement 1.71 (1.52)  0.89 (1.42) 
Sign Look for train 2.36 (1.87)  1.22 (1.76) 
Train 2.10 (2.36)  1.34 (1.76) 
After train encounter 2.15 (1.42)  1.15 (1.42) 
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Figure 6. Mean number of fixations on ROI (left vs. right periphery) between 140 and 40 m ahead 
of the LC. 
In the condition involving a train encounter, the train was triggered on the left or right side when the 
participant’s car passed a fixed trigger point ahead of the LC. It first became visible on the screen 
on average when the participant’s was at 250 m ahead of the LC. The trigger point was chosen to 
achieve a situation in which the participant’s car would have to give way to the train when 
approaching at a speed of 50 km/h. Therefore, the train was already present on the screens and 
hence detectable before the participant’s car reached the critical approach region that was analysed 
in the ROI analyses reported above. To test whether the blinking train was detected earlier than the 
normal train the time of first fixation on the train in terms of distance ahead of the LC was analysed 
for each participant. 
The time of first fixation on the train could be determined for 36 participants (blinking train: n = 18, 
normal train: n = 18). All but one participant detected the train and let it pass before they crossed the 
LC. The one participant who did not fixate the train and passed the LC in front of it was in the normal 
train condition. Participants in the blinking train condition fixated on the train for the first time on 
average at 251.2 m ahead of the LC (SD = 23.7), participants in the normal train condition at 214.7 m 
(SD = 22.8), resulting in a statistically significant mean difference of 36.5 m (Welch’s t(31.9) = -3.97, 
p = .000). 
Analyses of the time that the train first became visible on the screen in the periphery also showed a 
significant difference between the two groups (blinking train: M = 258.8, SD = 23.9, normal train: 
M = 242.2, SD = 19.5, Welch’s t(32.7) = -2.29, p = .029). Therefore, the time to first fixation was 
computed as another indicator of gaze behaviour. The time to first fixation describes how soon the 
train was fixated for the first time after it appeared on the screen, in terms of meters driven in that 
time. Participants in the blinking train condition detected the train soon after its onset, with a mean 
of 8.2 m driven in between (SD = 9.3). Participants in the normal train condition drove 30.5 m on 
average before they first looked at the train (SD = 27.6; Welch’s t(20.8) = -3.24, p = .004). As implied 
in the standard deviations, the distribution of the time to first fixation was also broader in the normal 
train condition. The last participant to fixate on the train after it appeared drove a further 110 m before 
first looking at it, while in the blinking train condition, the maximum distance driven between train 
onset and its first fixation was only 37 m.   
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Driving dynamics 
The analysis of drivers’ speed choices on LC approach focuses on the 300 m ahead of each LC, i.e. 
it starts at the point at which the first sign of the respective LC infrastructure (three-striped post  at 
240 m ahead of the LC) becomes discernable, and ends at the beginning of the LC (0 m). To assess 
the effects of the different measures, we look at the velocity difference between each condition and 
the baseline – i.e., how much slower or faster did drivers go on average at a certain point with a 
certain measure compared to the situation without the measure –, and compare the resulting 
difference profiles across the measures. 
Figure 7 shows the mean velocity differences to the baseline for the three stationary measures. For 
the noise-producing pavement and the sign ‘Look for train’, the mean speed profile is virtually the 
same as in the baseline condition. For the PeriLight measure, a speed reduction can be observed 
starting at around 160 m and reaching its maximum at around 50 m ahead of the LC.  
 
Figure 7. Mean velocity difference to baseline for the three stationary measures PeriLight, noise-
producing pavement and sign ‘Look for train’. Error bands: +/- 1 SD. 
Figure 8 shows the mean velocity differences to the baseline for the two train conditions, normal vs. 
blinking. Visual inspection shows an obvious drop in the slope of both of the curves, where speed 
choice starts to deviate from the baseline condition. This is interpreted as the moment when the 
participants realised that a train is coming and that they need to adapt their speed to avoid a collision 
and give way to the train. In the blinking train condition, the drop appears on average at 240 m ahead 
of the LC, whereas in the normal train condition, it occurs at about 190 m ahead of the LC, i.e. 50 m 
later on average. 
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Figure 8. Mean velocity difference to baseline for the two train conditions “normal” vs. “blinking”. 
Error bands: +/- 1 SD.  
Subjective data (user questionnaire) 
Effectiveness of cover story - notice of LC focus 
Before the debriefing, participants were asked in an open question to shortly sum up what they 
thought the study was about. After the debriefing, they were asked to indicate at what LC encounter, 
if applicable, they had assumed that the study could be about LCs. 36 of the 49 participants indicated 
they had not assumed this before the debriefing (Figure 9). In total, 13 participants reported having 
had a hunch of this sort at some point during the drive. Only four participants expressed the idea of 
a LC focus already in the open item that was asked before the debriefing.  
 
Figure 9. Number of participants who expressed having had an idea about the LC focus of the study 
at a given point in time. 
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Perceived usefulness of measures to prevent LC accidents 
On the scale from 1 - completely useless to 6 - extremely useful, participants judged all of the 
measures to be rather useful for the prevention of accidents, as shown in the means in Figure 10.  
The blinking train (M = 4.51, SD = 1.69), PeriLight (M = 4.80, SD = 1.23) and the sign ‘Look for train’ 
gained about equally high scores (M = 4.69, SD = 1.26), while the noise-producing pavement were 
perceived a little less useful to prevent LC accidents (M = 3.65, SD = 1.49). 
 
Figure 10. Mean perceived usefulness of the four measures tested. 
Perceived usefulness of measures to support information processing at LCs 
Four items of the questionnaire were to assess the participants’ perception of the usefulness of 
measures to support different aspects of information processing at LCs. The scores are displayed in 
Figure 11 and Table 5. 
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a  
 
b  
 
c  
 
d  
Figure 11. Mean perceived usefulness of the measures tested to support information processing at 
LCs: a – to support LC detection, b – to support train detection, c – to support speed adjustment on 
approach to LC, d – to support safe crossing. 
Concerning the facilitation of LC detection (Figure 11, a), the PeriLight was perceived as the most 
useful measure on average, followed by the sign ‘Look for train’. With regard to the facilitation of train 
detection (Figure 11, b), the blinking train reached the highest score, followed by the PeriLight and 
the sign ‘Look for train’. Concerning the facilitation of speed adjustment (Figure 11, c), the differences 
are less pronounced: While all measures reached mean scores of approximately 4, there is a slight 
tendency for the PeriLight and the sign ‘Look for train’ to score better by around half a scale point. 
Finally, the perceived usefulness to support a safe LC traverse (Figure 11, d) appears to integrate 
the results of the three other dimensions, with a pattern resembling the one for the perceived 
usefulness to prevent LC accidents (cf. Figure 10). This pattern shows relatively high mean scores 
for the blinking train, PeriLight and the sign ‘Look for train’, and the noise-producing pavement 
scoring about one scale point lower on average. 
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Table 5. Mean values and standard deviation of the perceived usefulness of measures to support 
information processing at LCs. 
 Blinking train PeriLight 
Noise-producing  
pavement 
Sign "Look for 
train" 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
LC detection 3.47 (1.67) 4.98 (1.27) 3.35 (1.67) 4.47 (1.40) 
Train detection 4.90 (1.42) 4.16 (1.37) 2.49 (1.29) 3.96 (1.58) 
Speed adjustment 4.00 (1.79) 4.49 (1.32) 3.96 (1.44) 4.41 (1.31) 
Safe crossing 4.14 (1.63) 4.45 (1.14) 3.39 (1.40) 4.20 (1.40) 
Perceived ease of use 
In the questionnaire after the drive, participants were asked whether they had noticed each measure 
in the simulation and whether they had understood its meaning. The results are displayed in Table 
6. Three of the measures were assessed to be very easily detectable in general (Figure 12, a), with 
the sign ‘Look for train’ and the PeriLight reaching mean scores above 5 and the blinking train 
reaching a mean score of around 4.5 (Table 7). The medium mean score of the noise-producing 
pavement might partly be due a “visual” conception of the phrase easily detectable in the item text, 
i.e. participants might mainly have judged the visual discriminability of the noise-producing pavement 
on the road, rather than the ease of detecting the haptic stimulus of the vibration caused by the 
strips. The pattern concerning participants’ subjective ease of understanding the measures’ meaning 
(Figure 12, b) mirrors the results observed in the frequencies of understanding the measure in the 
simulation (Table 6), with the blinking train and sign ‘Look for train’ being judged as very easy, the 
PeriLight as a little harder and the noise-producing pavement as even harder to understand 
concerning their function related to the LC. Looking at participants’ sensations if the measure 
motivates them to drive with caution in approaching the LC (Figure 12, c), the PeriLight and the sign 
‘Look for train’ gained the highest mean scores, followed by the blinking train, while the noise-
producing pavement were perceived as least suitable in comparison. 
Table 6. Absolute and relative frequencies of participants who reported (post hoc) to have noticed 
and understood, respectively, the measures in the simulation (Note: Total frequency is n = 24 for 
the blinking train, and n = 49 for the other measures). 
  
Blinking train PeriLight 
Noise-
producing 
pavement 
Sign ‘Look 
for train’ 
  n % n % n % n % 
Noticed measure 
in simulation 
yes 23 95.8 43 87.8 42 85.7 49 100.0 
no 0 0.0 5 10.2 7 14.3 0 0.0 
no answer 1 4.2 1 2.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 
Understood 
measure in 
simulation 
yes 22 91.7 27 55.1 15 30.6 46 93.9 
no 1 4.2 22 44.9 33 67.3 0 0.0 
no answer 1 4.2 0 0.0 1 2.0 3 6.1 
All participants reported to have noticed the sign ‘Look for train’, and virtually all who had 
encountered the blinking train, reported to have noticed it, too (one participant did not answer this 
item). Most of the participants reported to have noticed the PeriLight and the noise-producing 
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pavement (88 %, and 86%, respectively). Looking at the understanding of the measure in the 
simulation, again, virtually all participants who answered this item reported to have understood the 
meaning of the sign ‘Look for train’ and the blinking train. Just over half of the participants stated 
they had understood the meaning of the PeriLight, and about one third reported to have understood 
the meaning of the noise-producing pavement. 
In the section of the questionnaire concerned with how participants perceived the measures’ 
usability, participants were instructed to imagine the measures in real traffic – i.e. beyond the 
concrete depiction in the simulator – and also to think of their deployment under different conditions 
– e.g. regarding traffic density, weather, sight, building development etc. – to give a general judgment 
of each measure. 
a
 
 b
 
 c
 
Figure 12. Mean perceived ease of use of the measures tested with regard to (a) the ease of 
detecting the measure, (b) the ease of understanding the measure, and (c) the capability of the 
measure to motivate cautious driving on approach to the LC. 
Three of the measures were assessed to be very easily detectable in general (Figure 12, a), with the 
sign ‘Look for train’ and the PeriLight reaching mean scores above 5 and the blinking train reaching 
a mean score of around 4.5 (Table 7). The medium mean score of the noise-producing pavement 
might partly be due a “visual” conception of the phrase easily detectable in the item text, i.e. 
participants might mainly have judged the visual discriminability of the noise-producing pavement on 
the road, rather than the ease of detecting the haptic stimulus of the vibration caused by the strips. 
The pattern concerning participants’ subjective ease of understanding the measures’ meaning 
(Figure 12, b; Table 7) mirrors the results observed in the frequencies of understanding the measure 
in the simulation (Table 6), with the blinking train and sign ‘Look for train’ being judged as very easy, 
the PeriLight as a little harder and the noise-producing pavement as even harder to understand 
concerning their function related to the LC. Looking at participants’ sensations if the measure 
motivates them to drive with caution in approaching the LC (Figure 12, c), the PeriLight and the sign 
‘Look for train’ gained the highest mean scores, followed by the blinking train, while the noise-
producing pavement were perceived as least suitable in comparison. 
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Table 7. Mean values and standard deviation of the three perceived ease of use dimensions for 
the measures tested. 
 
Blinking train PeriLight 
Noise-
producing 
pavement 
Sign  
"Look for train" 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Is easy to detect 4.45 (1.67) 5.10 (1.18) 3.57 (1.70) 5.12 (1.05) 
Is easy to understand 4.71 (1.71) 3.92 (1.64) 3.35 (1.82) 5.18 (1.05) 
Motivates to drive cautiously 4.12 (1.70) 4.67 (1.42) 3.55 (1.63) 4.65 (1.28) 
Perceived distraction by the measures was relatively low for all measures, with a tendency for 
PeriLight to be judged as slightly more distracting (Figure 13, a; Table 8). Concerning participants’ 
expression of reservations against the measure, all measures gained comparably low scores that lie 
below the middle of the scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a b   
Figure 13. Mean perceived (a) distraction by measures and (b) reservations against measures. 
Table 8. Mean values and standard deviation of perceived distraction and reservations against the 
measures tested. 
 
Blinking train PeriLight 
Noise-producing  
pavement 
Sign  
"Look for train" 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Distracts me from driving 1,92 (1,24) 2,65 (1,33) 2,08 (1,41) 1,96 (1,22) 
I have reservations 2,47 (1,67) 2,45 (1,50) 2,71 (1,74) 2,20 (1,43) 
 
3.1.4. Discussion 
Summary of results 
Four measures to improve safety at passive LCs were tested in a driving simulator experiment that 
involved a straight and flat approach to the LC with no other road traffic and very good sight 
conditions for scanning the tracks to the left and right to look for an approaching train. One measure 
focusing on train design, a train equipped with auxiliary blinking lights (blinking train), was tested at 
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a passive LC against a normal train as the baseline. Additionally, three stationary measures focusing 
on LC design were tested at passive LCs without a train coming and compared to the baseline of a 
standard passive LC: blinking peripheral lights (PeriLight), a sign “ Is a train coming? →” including 
train symbols (sign Look for train), and noise-producing pavement on approach to the LC applied in 
combination with the standard LC signage at 240 m and 80 m ahead of the LC. 
The blinking train was detected earlier and more reliably than the normal train, induced earlier speed 
reduction, and gained high subjective ratings on the usefulness and ease-of-use dimensions 
assessed. The PeriLight induced large increases in visual search for a train both to the left and the 
right side of the tracks as well as a speed reduction on approach to the LC. The measure gained 
high ratings on perceived usefulness and moderate to high ratings on the ease-of-use dimensions. 
The sign Look for train induced large increases in visual search for a train to the left side of the 
tracks, while search behavior to the right side was hardly increased. No effect on approach speed 
was observed. The measure gained high ratings on perceived usefulness and ease-of-use 
dimensions. The noise-producing pavement did not increase visual search for a train, had no effect 
on speed and gained moderate ratings concerning their perceived usefulness and low to moderate 
ratings concerning their ease of use. 
General discussion 
The greatest effects on gaze behavior and speed choice were achieved by the two measures 
involving blinking lights: the blinking train and the PeriLight. Both work by using the mechanism of 
exogenous attention capture and thus do not require voluntary effort of the driver to attend to the 
relevant parts of the scene. In this, the PeriLight, although assessed to be very easily detectable and 
also motivating a cautious approach, was associated with some more uncertainty concerning its 
exact meaning – some participants reported they were unsure whether it could have meant a train 
was approaching. Therefore, part of the observed speed reduction might be based on this 
interpretation.  
Of the other two measures that require the driver to voluntarily shift attention to scan the tracks for 
trains, the sign Look for train proved more useful than the noise-producing pavement to achieve the 
desired effect. The advantage of the sign is most likely because, unlike the noise-producing 
pavement, it provides specific information on the kind of hazard it refers to, as well as a direct cue to 
the adequate behavior. Complementing the results of the comprehensibility variables reported 
above, many of the participants stated in qualitative feedback that they did not relate the rumbling to 
the LC, although the strips appeared in combination with elements of the standard LC signage at 
240 m and 80 m ahead of the LC. 
One potential restriction to the generalizability of the results attained for the noise-producing 
pavement comes from their implementation in the simulation. The rumbling was conveyed via 
vibrations of the steering wheel. Although these were clearly noticeable and were also correctly 
attributed by the participants to be caused by the road pavement, the overall physical effect 
experienced through noise-producing pavement in a real driving environment is most likely stronger, 
due to the vibration affecting the whole of the car and driver’s body. Therefore, there might be a 
stronger motivation to reduce speed in order to avoid unpleasant feelings and material stress to the 
car with noise-producing pavement in real environments. 
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Though the sign Look for train enhanced visual search for a train, the results observed suggest that 
it might not be as effective on the right side as on the left. The underlying mechanism leading to this 
imbalance is yet unknown. As it was also observed in the baseline condition, there might be an 
association with an overlearned gaze pattern prevalent in countries with right-hand traffic that favors 
the left side, as this is the side where a collision with crossing traffic would first occur on roads. 
However, other explanations might apply. Although the simulated track environment to the left and 
right was designed to be equally salient, the two sides were not perfectly symmetrically identical. 
Therefore, the possibility that some feature of environmental design drew more attention to the left 
side cannot be completely excluded. 
Lessons learned 
The Hawthorne or observer effect, a type of reactivity known in psychological and human factors 
research, involves study participants modifying their behavior in response to their awareness of 
being observed. In a study that explicitly focuses on behavior at LCs, it is likely that participants 
involuntary pay more attention at LCs than they would normally do or that their behavior gets 
modified in other ways just because processes that usually run highly automatically are brought into 
consciousness. To enable the valid observation of behavior at LCs, a cover story was used in the 
current study. Participants were instructed that the study was about coping with various traffic and 
stress situations in driving and were given a secondary task that involved answering short inquiries 
on a mobile phone and had to be completed while driving through the villages in between the LCs. 
Participants were briefed on the exact study purpose immediately after the drive. 
From the experience gained in the study, the use of a cover story is recommended for further 
experimental research on behavior at LCs. The survey results showed that the cover story was 
reasonable to the majority of participants and suitable to distract from the LC focus. This corroborates 
the assumption that the behaviour observed in the study is largely free from bias and represents an 
ecologically valid sample2 of how participants behave as drivers at LCs. The use of a cover story is 
also encouraged by the feedback of participants after the debriefing. They were often amused, and 
none expressed being upset after learning about the exact focus of the study. More importantly, 
participants expressed their agreement that it is sensible to design an experimental test like this to 
avoid unwanted effects on behavior. 
Due to the framework conditions and regulations for the application of passive protection at LCs from 
a road user’s view, the chances of not encountering an approaching train at a passive LC are much 
greater than those of actually encountering one. The resulting low expectancy of a train is part of the 
human factors safety issues at passive LCs because it lessens the motivation to visually scan the 
tracks to the left and right on LC approach (Wickens et al., 2015). Therefore, it was expected that a 
train encounter at a passive LC would exert an influence on behavior at a subsequent passive LC 
by increasing the expectancy of a train and thereby increasing search behavior and caution on 
approach. That is why, in the current study, the test condition involving a train encounter was always 
positioned last in the sequence of repeated LC encounters, to avoid an overestimation of the effect 
of measures applied at subsequent LCs. The train encounter hypothesis was tested by including a 
second “baseline” LC passage (i.e. passive LC without any additional measures) after the LC 
                                            
2  Ecological validity refers to the extent to which the findings obtained in a study with a certain method can 
be generalised to real-life settings. 
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involving the oncoming train. The results confirm the expected effect of enhanced visual search 
behavior after a train encounter. Therefore, this effect should be considered in the design of future 
experimental research on behavior at LCs.  
Applicability of results to different circumstances and recommendations 
The road layout and environmental conditions in the study were chosen to allow an experimental 
test and comparison of the measures by creating an ideal LC: Starting at 500 ahead of the LC, the 
road was perfectly straight and perpendicular to the tracks. Sight on the tracks was extraordinarily 
good and there was no other road traffic. Therefore, the absolute values of the indicators of gaze 
behavior (e.g. time of first fixation on the train / the tracks, fixation probability on relevant parts of the 
tracks) are likely to be better than they would on average be in a real traffic environment, while the 
observed speed on approach might be higher on average than it would be feasible in a real traffic 
environment. However, keeping interfering factors constant or eliminating them allows for the 
isolation and comparison of the effect of the different measures tested. 
Moreover, there are constraints to the situations in which passive protection can and will be applied 
at LCs in real traffic environments. These constraints create essential structural similarities that apply 
to both passive LCs in real environments and the ideal LC setup in the simulator study. Passive 
protection without any additional measure is only allowed to be applied at LCs where it is possible 
in principle to visually detect an approaching train in time to come to a stop if necessary  – given that 
the driver pays due attention, which is the behavior that the measures tested mainly aim to enhance. 
Therefore, although the applicability of the measures tested is of course restricted by sight conditions 
(e.g. heavy vegetation, buildings etc. covering the tracks), these restrictions will typically not apply 
to a passive LC to an extent that would render the measures ineffective. 
It should be pointed out that the use of an optimal approach in the simulator study does probably not 
make the test more liberal, but, on the contrary, more conservative. That means the simulator setup 
does not make it easier, but even harder for the measures tested to cause large effects in behavior, 
compared to a real traffic environment where visibility conditions are less optimal (e.g. due to 
approach angle, weather, vegetation etc.). The reason for this is that the optimal approach raises 
the overall rate of active visual search done by road users, including that of the baseline for passive 
LCs without any additional measures.  
This assumption is corroborated by findings available from a real-traffic study of one of the measures 
involved in the simulator study. Grippenkoven et al. (2016) tested peripheral blinking lights in a field 
study involving the traverse of a passive LC in a day- and a nighttime condition. By day, the share 
of drivers who looked to the left and right at least once ahead of the LC, was increased by 47% on 
the left and 23% on the right side when the measure was active, compared to the baseline. At night, 
the effects were even larger with an increase of 59% on the left, 53% on the right side. 
With regard to the angle between road and railroad tracks, measures to enhance peripheral attention 
should become even more effective when it deviates from 90°. Measures that rely on the exogenous 
capture of attention by blinking stimuli will still work as long as the blinking stimuli appear within the 
maximum field of vision that extends up to 110° to the left and right from the center axis of the visual 
field. 
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Additional lights designed to improve the early detection of a train need to be in line with the 
specifications given in EU regulation No 1302/2014. This regulation specifies the triangular head 
light constellation of locomotives and shall not be harmed by innovative light designs. 
Concerning the application of noise-producing pavement, as explained above, the implementation 
in the simulation environment might contribute to an underestimation of a potential effect on speed 
reduction. However, what can clearly be inferred from the study results is that noise-producing 
pavement alone is not a suitable means to enhance visual search behavior on approach to passive 
LC. This is because drivers do not reliably relate them to the LC crossing even if applied in 
conjunction with elements of the standard advance LC signage and the necessity to look for a train. 
Therefore, noise-producing pavement should always be combined with additional measures that 
give clear hints to the relevant hazard and the recommended behavior. 
The sign “ Is a train coming? →” proved to be one suitable solution to give such hints on the 
relevant hazard and the recommended behavior. Its applicability is mostly restricted by factors that 
reduce its visibility (e.g. fog, rain, snow, visual covering). Reading the text requires language and 
basic reading skills. However, the question mark, arrows and train symbols are expected to make 
the sign comprehensible even if the text cannot be read. As the measure increased search behavior 
and is very low-cost, its application will likely support safe behavior at passive LCs, despite an 
uncertainty remaining concerning its effect on the right side. Further research could investigate the 
causes of the observed differential effectivity on the right and left side and, in case the effect proves 
reliable, whether it could be overcome by adapting sign design. 
No long-term effects were assessed in the simulator study. For the sign Look for train and the noise-
producing pavement, some habituation effects can be expected in the long term, because, to be 
effective, both measures require a voluntary effort of the driver to initiate visual search. In contrast, 
the automatic capture of visual attention by flickering stimuli in the periphery of the visual field, as 
used in the blinking train and the peripheral blinking lights, is a hard-wired feature of the nervous 
system. This automatism evolved because it represented an evolutionary advantage. Therefore, this 
reaction is not expected to be subject to any considerable habituation effects. 
 Driving simulator (SNCF) 
3.2.1. Piloted safety measures 
Coloured road markings 
The coloured road markings aim to improve the visibility and detectability of a LC to improve the 
vigilance of drivers when they approach the LC and to reduce their driving speed. They are aimed 
at urban active level crossings with barriers. 
The road marking used in this study included fours stripes: 1) yellow band of 5 cm at 150 meters, 
2) orange band of 10 cm at 100 meters, 3) train band 50 cm at 75 meters, and 4) 20 cm red band 
at 2 meters from the active LC (Figure 14). 
 
 
 
 
Deliverable D4.4 – Results of the evaluation of the pilot tests – 31/12/2019  Page 36 of 163 
 
        
Figure 14. Example of coloured road markings. 
Funnel effect pylons 
The tunnel effect pylons aim to improve the visibility and detectability of an LC. The desired effect is 
to improve the vigilance of drivers as they approach and to reduce their driving speed. The measure 
consists of 10–15 pylons with a diameter of 20 cm to 5 meters upstream of LC creating a ‘funnel’ 
effect (i.e. gives a visual impression of shrinking. The pylons are overlaid with reflective stickers and 
are installed from the smallest to the tallest (Figure 15).  
 
Figure 15. Example of tunnel effect pylons installed before the LC.  
Rings 
The rings aim to improve the visibility and detectability of an LC, improve the vigilance of drivers as 
they approach the LC and to reduce driver speed. The rings are intended for active level crossings 
with barriers that are located at rural areas. This measure consists of two rings which are located 
before the LC: one at 150 m and a second at 10 m before the LC. The rings consist of a set of LEDs 
and an orange light (diameter of 30 cm) (Figure 16). The second ring must not obscure the visibility 
of the red flashing light of the LC.  
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Figure 16. Example of rings. 
Traffic lights      
The purpose of the traffic lights is to encourage road users to respect the stop before the LC to 
increase probability of stopping upon activation of the LC. This measure is targeted to active level 
crossings with barriers located both at urban and rural areas. Two different configurations of this 
measure were implemented: 1) the flashing red light (R24) was replaced with a two-color light (22j) 
flashing orange, and 2) the flashing red light (R24) was replaced with a green traffic light (Figure 17). 
   
Figure 17. Traffic lights. 
Speed bump and flashing posts 
The speed bump and flashing posts aim to improve the visibility and detectability of an LC in order 
to improve the vigilance of drivers as they approach the LC and reduce driver speed. This measure 
is intended for rural active level crossings with barriers. The posts are equipped with a red LED lamp, 
and the three poles flash in alternating flicker located at 150, 100 and 50 m from the LC on the right 
edge of the roadway (Figure 18). The bumps are located 150, 100 and 50 m from the LC. The 
number of inner lines is different according to its location of the LC (1, 2 or 3 lines). 
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Figure 18. Example of flashing posts and speed bump.                                                                                                                                                                                            
Proximity message via in-car device 
This measure aims to improve the safety of LCs by supporting car drivers to adapt their driving speed 
at the LC approach by providing different messages to their in-vehicle device. The content of these 
messages vary according to the status of the LC (LC closed, LC at 300 m, no crossings etc.) (Figure 
19). 
  
Figure 19. Examples of messages provided to car drivers. 
3.2.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
All measures were tested in the driving simulator of SNCF. The main aim was to identify the effects 
of the implemented safety measures on driver behaviour by comparing driving behaviour at an LC 
before and after implementing these measures. The evaluation was conducted based on within 
subjects before and after measurements.  
The baseline data were collected during a 3–4 minute drive in the city centre in a route without any 
LCs but with a STOP sign, traffic lights, a give way situation, a roundabout and a road outside an 
agglomeration with a different speed along both a straight line and a curve. In practice, this was a 
route beginning of the actual test drive in the simulator.  
The actual test drives were 20–30 minutes long and the route included both open and closed LCs 
(seven situations with closed LC and six situations with open LC). The first three LCs in the route 
were ‘classic LCs’, which were considered as the control condition. After that, the participants began 
to encounter LCs equipped with different safety measures.  
During the simulation tests and for all LC status scenarios (open-closed), two main sources of data 
were leveraged to enable the evaluation of safety measures: 
− Speed sensor of the vehicle compared to speed limit 
− Videos of driver in the vehicle and video of simulation (to compare the time lapse) 
After the test drive, each simulation participant was interviewed for 30 to 50 minutes by a cognitive 
expert according to Vermesch’s method. This qualitative explicitation interview allows the subjects 
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to verbalise the mental or physical actions implemented in a situation. The main interview topics 
were: 
− Perception 
− Reasoning 
− Action 
− Comprehension 
3.2.3. Evaluation results  
In total, 58 persons participated in the simulator study. Of these, 33 persons participated in the safety 
course and 25 persons participated in the connected vehicle course. Out of all 58 participants, five 
were professional drivers. 
The test subjects were selected based on various criteria for gender, age, occupation, number of 
years holding a driving license as well as typical trip purpose (work/home or professional 
appointments) and its frequency:  
− 53% of subjects were women and 47% men 
− 14 subjects were 14−24 years old and 19 were 25−35 years old (25 subjects were 35−50 
years old (of which at least half of them had children) 
− 30 respondents had a varying level of  education  
− Five were professional drivers (commercial, taxis, technicians, etc.) 
− 10 subjects reported their annually driving less than 5000 km; 20 subjects 5000−20000 km 
and 10 subjects more than 20000 km  
− In terms of the number of years holding a driving license, seven subjects reported less than 
two years, eight subjects between two and five years and 43 subjects reported between five 
and 30 years 
Coloured road markings 
Interviews with 27 subjects were conducted to evaluate the safety measures. In total, 20 subjects 
reacted upon seeing the road marking. Only two subjects saw the red “TRAIN” marking and the red 
line, and the rest only saw the white “train” marking. This reaction resulted in a deceleration at the 
approach of the LC. 
Very scattered results were received when respondents were asked about their understanding of 
the road markings: i) for some, the marking was perceived as a repetition of the ‘LC ahead’ sign’ (A7 
panel) and was perceived to have the same meaning, ii) for others, interpreting the simulator 
rendering was unclear: Some perceived the marking as a bump, and some focused their attention 
on reading the text and were subsequently surprised to encounter the LC so soon. Others interpreted 
the marking as a mandatory stop and others perceived the painted arrow as an instruction to 
accelerate. 
It is likely that the rendering of the simulator did not adequately represent the quality hoped for in 
reality. Therefore, the results obtained are to be considered with caution, and the evaluation of this 
safety measure should be performed in a real road environment. 
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Funnel effect pylons 
For this safety measure, 28 subjects participated in testing. Less than 10% of subjects reacted to 
seeing the pylons by decelerating upon approach to the LC. The safety measure was unseen by 
60% of subjects. The remaining 30% saw the safety measure, but did not understand its purpose. 
Only 10% of subjects understood that the pylons represent a danger zone, and that the funnel effect 
aimed to reduce approach speed. 
It is likely that the rendering of the simulator did not adequately represent the quality hoped for in 
reality. Therefore, the results obtained are to be considered with caution, and the evaluation of this 
safety measure should be done in real road environment. 
Rings 
To evaluate this safety measure, 29 subjects participated in testing. More than half reacted to seeing 
the rings and the rest approached the LC uninfluenced as they normally would. However, half of 
these uninfluenced drivers noticed the lights on the arc. 
The safety measure was interpreted as a decoration or village entrance by 90% of subjects, and 
they assumed it had nothing to do with the LC. Some subjects were so concentrated on the safety 
measure that they missed some information such as the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 panel) or the 
approaching LC and were surprised at the sight of the LC being closed. Only 10% of the subjects 
understood that the rings announce the approaching train and closure of the LC. The subjects were 
often distracted by the rings and did not associate it with the LC. 
Traffic lights (Orange flashing traffic light) 
In this test, the flashing red light (R24) was replaced with a two-color light (22j) flashing orange. This 
safety measure was located on a straight road out of town. The (R22j) light flashes orange (lowest 
light) and is located in place of the flashing red light (R24). 
All 32 subjects reported having seen the flashing orange light. Three subjects did not associate the 
traffic light with the LC and anticipated an intersection instead. Moreover, one subject thought the 
flashing light was green. Of the remaining 28 subjects, we observed the following: 
− 23 subjects thought that the flashing light indicated that the light would soon display red and 
that the LC would close.  
− Two subjects understood that the flashing light indicated that the LC was out of order 
− Three subjects understood that the flashing light invited them to cross the LC, but to do so 
urgently. 
Overall, all subjects slowed down at the sight of the flashing orange light, including those who 
misinterpreted it and anticipated a road intersection instead of an LC. The subjects largely reported 
being distracted upon encountering a flashing orange traffic light. Elements that drew subjects’ 
attention in particular included the light’s orange colour, the flashing itself and the fact that it was the 
lowest light. 
It is worth considering that this safety measure and its attention drawing nature may also generate 
risks of its own, as drivers may suddenly brake or hesitate, which may increase the risk of being 
struck by another vehicle. For instance, one subject chose to drastically reduce speed and later 
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reported that "Well, right here, I practically stopped. Because I did not know exactly why it was 
blinking, so I thought the barriers would bend down ... ". Moreover, it is possible that the first time 
the subjects encounter this safety measure, they will slow down due to habit. Behaviour risks may 
be further generated when drivers who understand how to appropriately respond to the safety 
measure are mixed with drivers who are unfamiliar with the safety measure. These risks make the 
safety measure seem ineffective. 
Traffic lights (Green traffic light) 
In this test, the flashing red light (R24) was replaced with a green traffic light. This safety measure 
was located on a straight road in a built-up area. The (R22) light is green and is located in place of 
the flashing red (R24) light. 
All 31 subjects reported that they saw the green light. One subject failed to associate the safety 
measure with the LC, as they were accustomed to seeing a traffic light on the approach to a junction. 
Of the remaining 30 subjects, we observed the following: 
− 26 subjects associated the green light with permission to cross the LC without precautions 
− Four subjects noted a contradiction between the green light signifying a precarious crossing 
and the LC that they associate with a danger. 
As a conclusion, the green light clearly reassured the subjects that the LC is safe to cross. In addition, 
it also encouraged them to cross the LC without precautions and at higher reported speeds. In some 
cases, the green light cancelled the caution induced by the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 panel) (lack of 
indication on the triggering of the LC). When the majority of subjects saw the green light, they 
assumed no train would pass, resulting in acceleration. Four subjects noted a contradiction between 
the green light and the LC, and reported some weaknesses of this safety measure. For instance, 
one subject indicated that: "... I know that at a green light we have the right to pass but I also know 
that behind there is the barrier so ... Danger. ". 
Speed bump and flashing pylons 
Of 28 subjects participating in testing this safety measure, over half reacted to the speed bumps by 
lowering their LC approach speed. Although the subjects understood that the bumps indicate nearby 
danger, few associated the speed bump with the LC directly. It is worth noting that because subjects 
were so concentrated on the speed bumps, very few noticed the side light beacons. Additionally, 
some subjects expressed their animosity regarding speed bumps. Speed bumps were considered 
dangerous for motorcycles and generally uncomfortable.  
Proximity message via in-car device 
Data were collected from 23 and 25 subjects for the different situations (two subjects were sick and 
could not attend all the tests). In total, 70% of subjects reacted to the message and associated 
notification sound (beep) providing information of LC status (LC closed, road works in LC or LC in 
xx meters). This allowed them to adapt their speed upon approach to the LC and to better prepare 
for the stop. 
For situations in which no message was received, the subjects resumed their existing behaviour and 
were not worried about the lack of a message. The majority of subjects understood that the 
messages were sent in order to anticipate situations demanding attention on approach to the LC. 
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However, the interviews showed that some subjects preferred to concentrate on their driving 
behaviour instead of the messages. This was because reading messages on a screen was 
considered distracting and dangerous, as it forced subjects to look elsewhere from the road. 
‘LC closed’ situation 
We attempted to observe different reactions to subjects receiving the messages and associated 
notification sounds. This reaction generally differed depending on the information received by the 
subject (Figure 20): 
− When the notification sound and message were activated: the subjects assumed that a 
train was arriving and that the LC was closed 
− When only the message was activated: the subjects assumed that a train was arriving 
except for one subject, who misinterpreted the message 
 
Figure 20. Diagram of LC closed device. 
When only the notification sound was activated, the subjects received no explicit information 
regarding what to expect ahead. Two subjects assumed the sound warned of a danger, but they did 
not identify what it was. Two subjects did not consider the notification sound at all because they 
perceived it to relate to their existing behaviour. Additionally, the notification sound on its own was 
distracting for some subjects, and one of which stated that: "it disturbed me. I said to myself: I do not 
see a sign and that's after I saw the sign. ". 
Of all subjects, 74% knew before arriving to LC that the barriers were closed. For 25% of the subjects, 
the information of the LC’s closure only came from LC warning devices (bell, lights, barrier) and not 
via the in-car device. 
Road works in LC 
The message reminded subjects that they are approaching an LC with barriers and that they must 
turn left before the LC due to road works (Figure 21). A significant share (61%) of car drivers 
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continued straight ahead despite the road works warning. This was either due to the bad positioning 
of the panels and/or the approaching vehicle traffic. 
 
Figure 21. Illustration of road works in LC. 
LC in xx meters 
In this situation, we observed three phenomena shared with the other situations (Figure 22): 
− Subjects reacted to the message 
− Subjects reacted to the ‘LC ahead’ sing (A7 panel) 
− Subjects waited to see the LC 
We observed that although the message allowed the subject to anticipate the risks associated with 
the LC, it did not provide information of the state of the LC. Thus, at least three subjects considered 
the message irrelevant because the lateral signalling gave them the same information. Another 
subject even associated the message with an open LC. In general, this type of message is 
complementary to the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 panel), which was confirmed by four subjects who 
believed that it allowed them to anticipate the approach. 
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Figure 22. Illustration of LC in xx meters. 
3.2.4. Discussion  
It is also important to note that drivers who have experience with the safety measure, and those who 
discover it the first time, can behave very differently. This can lead to mismatching expectations 
between road users, who have a different level of experience with the system, creating risky 
situations. 
No information on the cost of measures is available since the tested equipment are from reflections 
following a design study or a benchmark. Development, integration and maintenance costs were not 
studied. 
 Two simulation environments (VTT) 
3.3.1. V2X messaging system between automated vehicles and 
passive level crossings 
The V2X messaging system between automated vehicles and passive level crossings was 
developed with the aim of enabling automated vehicles (AV) to cross passive LCs safely. The 
detection ranges of sensors used in AVs today are too short to detect trains at the required distances 
for crossing LCs safely. To overcome this, V2X messaging is required to increase the awareness of 
AVs of approaching trains. However, there are currently no standardised V2X messages for this 
purpose.  
The aim of this measure is to improve safety especially at passive level crossings, as they are 
typically located far from the infrastructure required for traditional LC installations (safety measures, 
roadside units etc.), making them cost-intensive. This distance from infrastructure is also the reason 
why ITS-G5 roadside units (RSU) are unavailable in most cases. However, even with ITS-G5, based 
on IEEE 802.11p technology, the communication range is still too short for direct communication 
between the train and the AV. The only cost-effective solution to this problem is the use of a 
centralised server, which keeps track of train traffic, provides estimated arrival times and creates 
virtual barriers for all level crossings (Figure 23). The system is very flexible for information 
dissemination (not exclusive to a single technology or platform). The estimated train arrival time and 
the state of the level crossing can be delivered via information displays, as well as sent using ITS-
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G5 messages either with DSRC (dedicated short range communication) devices or LTE/5G mobile 
networks. A client contacts the service interface and requests data for a specific LC. In this pilot, 
ITS-G5 unit was used to simulate a protected level crossing, and an RSU and LTE connection was 
used for data requests at an unprotected level crossing. The system is very cost effective, because 
it does not require any additional installations to the LC.  
 
Figure 23. System architecture to provide approaching train information to automated vehicles. 
SAE J3016 defines six levels (0−5) of vehicle automation (SAE, 2018). In this analysis, it was 
assumed that the automation level of the autonomous car is 4 or above. This means that the vehicle 
can drive without driver intervention, and that there can be passengers or the vehicle can also be 
completely empty.  
3.3.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
The measure was implemented in two simulation environments: 1) In Junavaro data simulator which 
contains train and level crossing data from Finnish rail section 142 between Hanko and Karjaa and 
uses train traffic data recorded during May 2010, and 2) in road traffic simulator which utilises GIS 
information from OpenStreet Map.  
Operation 
The LC can be compared to a road intersection with traffic lights. However, there are two main 
differences: 
− LC equipped with warning lights has no yellow light to indicate that the status of traffic lights 
is going to change. Further, in level crossing lights, the green light is replaced with a blinking 
white light.  
− At LCs, cars always drive straight over and there are no right or left turns. Thus, if the LC is 
closed, it is closed for all road users. Passive LC is also either open or closed, because the 
train has the right of way for passing. Traffic regulations state, “Passing the level crossing is 
forbidden if a train is approaching, traffic lights oblige to stop, a warning sound is heard or 
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the barrier is down or moving. One must stop at safe distance from tracks, before the barrier 
or semaphore”.   
Autonomous car cannot determine a safe distance to stop before the LC. Machines are good at 
measuring things, therefore seconds and metres would be more practical for them. Therefore, a 
simple map of the LC including the defined stop lines is required. Figure 24 presents an example of 
such a map. As a minimum requirement, the map should include a rectangle, which defines the area 
where car cannot enter if the LC is closed. The car is not allowed to stop inside the rectangle or ‘no 
stop zone’ because otherwise it will be on the tracks. The length of the rectangle varies and depends 
on amount of tracks. 
Saint Andrew’s Cross
Traffic lights
and barrier
No stop zone
Virtual stop line
 
Figure 24. LC from the autonomous vehicle point of view. 
C-ITS messages  
Because protective devices require power, it is possible to install an ITS-G5 DSRC radio roadside 
unit to the level crossing. Usable messages are:  
− The Decentralized Environmental Notification Message (DENM) (EN 302 637-3.) Its main 
purpose is to notify road users for potentially dangerous road events.  
− The Cooperative Awareness Message (CAM) (EN 302 637-2) is for the exchange of 
information between road users and roadside infrastructure, including each other's position, 
dynamics and attributes. Road users may be cars, trucks, motorcycles, bicycles or even 
pedestrians, while roadside infrastructure equipment includes road signs, traffic lights or 
barriers and gates. 
− MAP (SAE J2735) - topological definition of lanes within an intersection, links between 
segments, lane types and restrictions. 
− SPaT (SAE J2735) - Traffic light signal phase and timing information and the status of traffic 
controller. Prediction of duration and phases. 
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− CPM (ETSI TR 103 562 V0.0.17 (2019-08)) Collective Perception Message is a new V2X 
service under development which aims at disseminating sensory information about the 
current driving environment by letting vehicles and road infrastructure elements transmit data 
about detected objects (i.e., about the behaviour of other road participants, obstacles and 
dynamic road hazards) in abstract descriptions. These descriptions then will be included in 
broadcast messages called CP messages (CPMs).  
Relevance of each of the above options: 
− DENM message can be used to inform the autonomous car about the presence of a LC and 
where the area of danger starts and ends, but it does not contain information about LC status, 
therefore its usefulness for the autonomous car is limited. Autonomous cars use pre-planned 
routes and a routing algorithm can include LC data to the route. Thus, DENM contain 
redundant information. 
− CAM messaging from the approaching train could provide train location information to the 
autonomous cars. The main problem is the communication range of the ITS-G5, which is 
only a few hundred meters (Gozalves et al., 2012). Therefore, a relay station is needed to 
achieve the required communication range. The second challenge is the reliability of the 
communication. The communication is not failure proof, since one does not know if a missing 
message means that no train is approaching or no message is transmitted. 
− SPaT messages can send LC status information to the autonomous car and thus support 
sensor based recognition. However, since the state of LC is either “open” or “closed”, the LC 
protection system cannot produce “time to green” or “remaining green time” values. 
− MAP is very useful and contains required features to describe LC geometry precisely.  
− CPMs carry abstract representations about the status of detected objects (both static and 
dynamic ones) which represent safety risk in the traffic situations and, therefore, are to be 
included in the CPM for information sharing, with the objective of warning other traffic 
participants. CPM messaging is relevant at active LCs where LC infrastructure can produce 
content to CPM messages. 
In summary, using RSU that sends DENM, SPaT and MAP messages together with sensor-based 
recognition provides enough data for the safe passing of level 4 or level 5 autonomous cars. 
Concerning level 2 autonomous cars, the control can be passed to the driver who performs the 
crossing of LC manually. 
SPaT and MAP messages are the best choice for autonomous cars, and the Junavaro system can 
be modified to produce and provide necessary phase and time as SPaT information for the passive 
LC. By using SPaT messages one can provide compatibility to road intersections’ data messaging. 
The principle of the SPaT calculation is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Principle of the SPaT information determination. 
‘Remaining open time’ is the time taken for the train to arrive to the trigger point where the LC is set 
to the ‘closed’ state. ‘Time to open’ is the time from the trigger point to the moment where the last 
railway car passes the LC. Thus, data for train length is required. Fortunately, train composition data 
is available in the backend systems. If not, one can use some conservative value such as 450 m. 
Nevertheless, car sensors can detect the train and determine whether the LC is free or not. In a case 
where multiple trains pass the level crossing subsequently, SPaT messaging integrates all trains as 
one message. The Junavaro system can show arrival times and directions for all trains approaching 
the LC.  
Additional tests 
Additional tests were performed in May 2019 in co-operation with the AutoPilot project. This was 
done due to the challenges that occurred in the simulator exercises. Specifically, the train did not 
move fast enough in the simulator, and it did not manage to follow the location information from 
Junavaro. Because of this, LC opening and closing times did not match between the simulated train 
and Junavaro.   
The test scenario involved a vehicle approaching a junction controlled by a traffic light. In the tests, 
the autonomous car known as Marilyn received the traffic light’s phase data (SPaT), sent using a 
MQTT (Message Queuing Telemetry Transport) protocol, and would then perform the relevant 
required action. When the traffic light displayed red, the objective was that the car would stop before 
a virtual stop line (Figure 27). When the traffic light displayed green, the car resumed movement and 
continued on its route. The objective of the AutoPilot project was to measure the performance of the 
IoT-platform’s communication capability, while the SAFER-LC project aimed to evaluate the 
performance of the car itself. 
GNSSSS
Level crossing
Location
Remaining open timeTime to open
LC openLC closed
Train length
Trigger point
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Figure 26. Autonomous car stopped before a virtual stop line. 
Measured values included the accuracy of stopping at the correct point as well as the time taken for 
the vehicle to resume movement after the traffic light’s change of state. The route was on a downhill 
slope and the vehicle’s approach speed was 20 km/h. The vehicle was set to stop five metres (the 
length of the vehicle itself) before the virtual stop line. The test was repeated 16 times. 
3.3.3. Evaluation results 
Figure 27 presents an example of SPaT data produced by the modified Junavaro system from 
Kirkkotie level crossing which is located at railway section 142 in Finland (59,864443°, 23,075697°, 
WGS84). The data is produced by using a distance-based trigger point 1.2 km before the LC. If the 
adaptive closing scheme is used, remaining open time is “arrival time to LC” minus 30 seconds. The 
remaining open time is set to the infinity value after the train has passed the LC. The red line 
represents LC status, which is either “open” or “closed”. The results of the simulation show that 
equivalent SPaT messages can be produced to both railroad level crossings and road intersections. 
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Figure 27. Example of the SPaT data produced by the Junavaro system. 
The behaviour of an autonomous car is illustrated in Figure 28. First, the user defines the destination 
of his/her route, based on which the route planning module produces a coarse route plan. During 
route planning, the route module searches for static events along the route such as zebra crossings, 
intersections, bus stops and level crossings, and divides the route to shorter sections. Then, a set of 
pre-defined behavioural rules are adapted to each identified section. During the execution of the 
route plan, a trajectory planner continuously creates a new trajectory for the autonomous car. In the 
case of the LC, it sends requests using LC identification (LC ID) to server and receives SPaT 
messages as a response. After receiving the SPaT messages, the trajectory planner checks their 
relevance and ignores the irrelevant messages. Next, it estimates the arrival time of the autonomous 
car to the LC. A virtual obstacle is set, if the analysis shows that LC is “closed” when the car arrives 
to the LC. Once the LC is again “open”, the virtual obstacle is removed and the autonomous car 
continues its journey by following the behavioural rules set for the LC until the car leaves the section. 
 
Figure 28. Autonomous car behavior when approaching the LC. 
The average stopping distance of the car in the additional tests was 4.22 meters from the virtual stop 
line (Table 9). The length of the car from the rear axle (reference point) to the front bumper is 3.8 m. 
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Therefore, the average distance from the car front to the virtual stop line was 0.42 meters. In one 
case, the virtual stop line was overshoot by 0.86 meters. However, this overshooting was not severe. 
Table 9. Stopping distance from virtual stop line. 
Run Longitude (WGS84) Latitude(WGS84) Distance [m] Distance to car front [m] 
1 23,8839392 61,45454267 2.93 -0.86 
2 23,8839488 61,45455367 4.25 0.45 
3 23,8839455 61,45454983 3.79 -0.00 
4 23,8839497 61,45455567 4.47 0.67 
5 23,8839492 61,4545545 4.34 0.54 
6 23,8839478 61,45455283 4.14 0.34 
7 23,883949 61,45455417 4.30 0.50 
8 23,8839483 61,45455383 4.25 0.45 
9 23,8839502 61,4545555 4.46 0.66 
10 23,8839503 61,45455533 4.45 0.65 
11 23,883949 61,45455417 4.30 0.50 
12 23,8839493 61,45455433 4.33 0.53 
13 23,8839492 61,45455433 4.32 0.52 
14 23,8839485 61,45455383 4.26 0.46 
15 23,8839497 61,45455583 4.48 0.68 
16 23,8839492 61,45455483 4.37 0.57 
  Average 4.22 0.42 
  STD 0.38 0.38 
 
The average duration from the traffic light changing its state to green to the moment when the car 
resumed movement was 908 milliseconds, with a deviation of 319 milliseconds (Table 10). 
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Table 10. Time difference between the traffic light changing its state to green to the moment when 
the car resumed movement. 
Run Time difference [ms] 
1 508 
2 674 
3 744 
4 743 
5 733 
6 747 
7 1,248 
8 1,494 
9 1,176 
10 1,261 
11 1,254 
12 782 
13 758 
14 652 
15 478 
16 1,273 
Average 908 
STD 319 
Safety aspects 
The detection of trains sufficiently early using sensors of the automated vehicle involves 
uncertainties depending on sensor setup, sensor location (especially installation height), weather 
conditions as well as unknown and variable visibility barriers like vegetation or snow banks. Fully 
autonomous vehicles no doubt require support for passing passive level crossings safely.  
3.3.4. Discussion 
Level crossings are an interface between road and rail environments. If an autonomous car needs 
to pass the LC and its automation level is less than 4 (SAE, J3016), the control of the car can be 
passed to the driver, who then manually operates the car over the LC. If the automation level is 4 or 
above this is not possible, since no driver intervention is required. 
An autonomous car follows the planned route and therefore the presence of the LC along the route 
is known. The autonomous car can detect the protected LCs by using environment perception 
sensors. The protected LCs have mains power available, and hence a roadside unit can be used to 
send C-ITS messages. The most useful C-ITS messages for autonomous cars are SPaT and MAP 
messages, where the former provide information on the status of LC and the latter precise 
geographic presentation of the LC environment.  
Today, the majority of level crossings are still unprotected. Train speeds can be up to 140 km/h, 
which require minimum visibility range of 840 meters to both directions from road to railway tracks. 
Today, the detection range of the sensors used in autonomous cars reach up to 250 meters in a 
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good visibility conditions. However, the adverse weather conditions dramatically limit the available 
detection range. Therefore, the use of environment perception sensors alone cannot guarantee the 
safe passing of LCs. 
The pilot tests demonstrated the importance of the communication system’s real time nature. The 
MQTT-protocol used has been developed for IoT-platforms, in which the transmission of all 
messages is more important than delivering them on time. In real time systems, if a message cannot 
be delivered, new messages should overwrite it. This avoids message queueing and delivers the 
most recent data. 
Message timestamping is highly important, and requires time synchronisation through the system. 
The required accuracy for timestamp comparison operations is achievable by using GNSS to record 
the time. However, it is important to consider that every operation in the chain increases transmission 
delay. Finally, when the data reaches the end user, one must know how old the data is and whether 
it is trustworthy. Delays and short communication breaks are manageable with estimation models.  
Train location and velocity data serves as the base information which everything else depends on. 
On its own, GNSS is not capable of providing reliable location information in all circumstances (e.g. 
tunnels). This calls for a more integrated solution. Additionally, the availability of location data is more 
important than its accuracy. Arrival time estimation relies only on longitudinal location data. For 
example, a 10-metre error in the location data does not correspond to a great amount of time. 
However, if one wants to locate the train on for example parallel tracks, the accuracy requirement is 
stricter. The integrated location system requires the use of information from railway balises3 and 
odometer of train to fulfil inaccuracies in GNSS-based positioning. 
The reliability of system information may be improved by comparing detected train locations with 
signalling system and timetable information. All three information types should match each other. 
Thus, it is possible to detect broken equipment and rail sections where trains are moving and reliably 
adapt system information.   
Summary of requirements for the system functioning:  
− Integrated positioning system in train using high quality antennas and receiver 
− Reliable low latency communication between train and back office system 
− Up to date and accurate GIS information of the rail network 
− All self-propelled railway equipment are included in the system 
− Standardised information delivery protocols 
To conclude, SPaT and Map C-ITS messages should be used to achieve compatibility with road 
infrastructure and traffic light intersections. As autonomous cars drive a predefined route, upcoming 
level crossings are already known. In order to use level crossing information, the crossing must have 
a unique identifier (Unique id). Map messages require accurate GIS information, which requires 
mapping the level crossing area (Map data and base information on LCs; name, location and is 
                                            
3  An electronic beacon or transponder placed between the rails of a railway as part of an automatic train 
protection (ATP) system (Wikipedia 2019). 
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protected or not). In addition, information must be geographically accurate (< 1m) to ensure that the 
autonomous car can stop at a safe distance from the level crossing. 
 Aachen test site 
Aachen test site was used to pilot several safety measures. Four of them were linked together and 
could be called as Smart detection and communication system. This system covers a real level 
crossing (a mock-up representing an active LC) that is interfaced with a roadside unit (RSU) which 
can send information to cars, control room and trains.  
 
The system includes two main functionalities (Figure 29): 
1. Detection of potentially dangerous situations (obstacles, vehicle stopped at LC, approaching 
train etc.) by cameras and/or vehicle to everything (V2X) communication 
2. Wired communication between the cameras and level crossing (LC) unit, G5 communication 
between the roadside units (RSUs) and LC unit, and G5 communication between the LC unit 
and vehicles (road vehicles and/or train) 
 
 
Figure 29. Detection and communication scenarios tested in Aachen. 
The above functionalities can be used for the following safety purposes: 1) to close the barriers 
based on the estimated time of arrival (ETA) of the approaching train, and 2) to deliver in-vehicle 
messages and alerts to the control room about a dangerous situation using decentralized 
environmental notification messages (DENM) and collective perception messages (CPM) to cars 
equipped via a specific on-board unit. 
 
The individual measures linked to this combined measure are presented in subchapters 3.4.1–3.4.4.  
3.4.1. Smart Detection System (CEREMA & UTBM) 
Piloted safety measure 
The piloted safety measure is Smart Detection System (SDS) which supports the railway 
stakeholders in identifying the potentially dangerous situations occurring at level crossings and 
enabling them to act on time to prevent the potential accidents. The Smart Detection System will 
detect and classify the potentially dangerous situations occurring at LCs based on up-to-date video 
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data. After detection, the Smart Detection System sends an alarm to the control room together with 
the up-to-date video images from that specific LC. The operator will then assess the situation and 
decide whether any action is needed to ensure the safety of LC.  
Method and data to evaluate the piloted measures 
The following aspects were tested during the piloting of this measure: 
− The connection between smart detection system and smart RSU of NEOGLS 
− The connection between smart RSU and communication unit (which can deliver information 
to trains or in-vehicle on board units carried out by IFSTTAR team) 
− The connection between smart detection system, RSU and in-vehicle on board unit 
− The connection with the control room and the possibility to provide up-to-date video data 
together with the alert messages in case of a detected event (i.e. potentially dangerous 
situation) 
− The performance of the system in term of scenarios’ recognition. In this study, a scenario is 
an event (e.g. a car is coming on the LC and stopped for a while) that is played by one or 
several actors. The scenarios can involve cars, pedestrians, train, or other objects. Based on 
this, also what we call as ‘event’ is a scenario automatically detected by the SDS. The 
evaluation of the SDS has been realised considering that in case it is installed at a level 
crossing with a high security context, its ability to detect events (stopped cars, pedestrians 
etc.), whatever their nature, is crucial. Further, every time an event is detected, an alarm is 
sent at least to the control room with the corresponding video. Therefore, it is very important 
that the system is able to detect an event from its beginning to its end and to send an alarm 
accompanied with the related video. In this case, the operator in his control room is warned, 
the video is displayed and it is up to them to decide on the appropriate actions according to 
the data received. The difference between detection and recognition is the following: 
detection means that the system detects an event without providing information on the nature 
of the event (i.e. there is something or somebody on the LC). Recognition means that the 
system has detected something and is able to qualify its nature (a car stopped, a pedestrian, 
etc.). For this purpose, we propose four different evaluation indicators: 
o Perf_Detect = (number of events detected by the SDS)/(number of the events 
correctly detected by the SDS + the number of events not detected by the SDS). This 
indicator measures the ability of the system to detect an event whatever its nature. 
This indicator is calculated for every video (41 videos) but we have decided to group 
the evaluation by distinguishing Cerema Datasets and Aachen datasets, as their 
contexts are quite different. 
o The indicator Perf_Detect_Weather is used to calculate the ability of the SDS to 
detect events according to the weather conditions. Among the 41 videos collected, 
seven different weather conditions were defined: 
▪ High sun with shadows created by objects, wind 
▪ Sun and shadow on the LC 
▪ Cloudy and low illumination 
▪ Snow and low illumination 
▪ Cloudy with low average illumination with small rain 
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▪ Snow with very low illumination 
▪ Cloudy higher illumination 
The same formula than that of Perf_Detect was used, but applied to sub datasets, 
each one corresponding to a specific weather condition. The indicator 
Perf_Detect_Weather was used to calculate the ability of the SDS to detect events 
according to the weather conditions. 
o Perf_Detect_recog = (number of events recognised by the SDS)/(number of the 
events correctly recognised by the SDS + the number of events not correctly 
recognised). This indicator measures the ability to detect and recognise the nature of 
an event (car, train, pedestrian, etc.). This indicator is calculated for every video (41 
videos) but we have decided to group the evaluation by distinguishing Cerema 
Datasets and Aachen datasets, as their contexts are quite different. In principle, it is 
enough for the railway operator that the event is detected and sent to the control room 
together with the corresponding video. However, in our case, it is also possible to 
detect and recognise the event (stopped cars, pedestrians, bicycles, etc). Hence, in 
this case it could be useful to calculate a second indicator that we call 
Perf_Detect_Recog (See deliverable D3.5; Bakey et al. 2019). 
o The indicator Perf_Detect_Recog_Weather is used to calculate the ability of the 
SDS to detect and recognise events according to the weather conditions. 
In order to have a complete and comprehensive evaluation, the performance of the system in terms 
of scenario recognition (means detect and recognise the nature of the event: car stopped, 
pedestrian, etc.) was evaluated by using two video datasets: one recorded at Cerema test site and 
another at Aachen test site. During the assessment, the scenarios recognition was compared with 
the ground truth (ground truth was obtained from manual annotation of initial raw video data and 
comparison with the automatic scenarios’ recognition) which was directly provided by the raw video 
data (collected during piloting at Cerema test site and at Aachen test site). During the piloting, the 
system was operating constantly and thus it was possible to have several scenarios involving the 
same vehicle. 
Many different scenarios were played at Cerema test site and at Aachen test site. These scenarios 
include cars, pedestrians, a small train, moving cars, stopped cars, moving pedestrians, stopped 
pedestrians, several cars at the same time constituting jams. At the beginning, a classification of all 
scenarios (events) was organised into different categories, but since the categories were not so 
different in terms of type during the evaluation, (for instance an atypical behaviour can be considered 
firstly as an obstacle and then as an atypical behaviour), it was decided to focus on the detection 
capabilities of the SDS. All scenarios were simulated with different barrier configurations (open and 
closed periods) with several dozens of repetitions to make the results statistically representative. For 
each scenario, the video data was stored, the detection was performed and information exchange 
between smart detection system and RSU was carried out. 
The more specific variables included in the evaluation were: 
− Detection performance (Perf_Detect and Perf_detect_weather indicators),  
− Recognition performance (Perf_Detect_recog and Perf_Detect_Recog_Weather indicators) 
− Processing time,  
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− Sample size, and 
− Ability to transmit information 
Evaluation results 
The results of main variables evaluated during the testing are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11. Results of the main variables included in the testing. 
Evaluated variables Results 
The connection between smart 
detection system and RSU 
During the tests, each scenario detected by the Smart 
Detection System was sent to the roadside unit (RSU). This 
exchange of data was done on exactly 1,038 events 
(scenarios played) for the two datasets Cerema and 
Aachen. No anomaly in the exchanges was identified.  
The connection between RSU and 
communication unit (which can 
deliver information to trains or in-
vehicle on board units). 
This communication protocol is shared between NeoGLS 
and IFSTTAR. 
The connection between smart 
detection system, RSU and in-
vehicle on board unit 
This global chain was tested in the third test phase in 
Aachen for a number of scenarios. When using a single 
vehicle to receive the event of the Smart Detection System, 
the range was about 80 meters. This was partly due to the 
test site location (several trees, buildings etc.). By using 
several vehicles to make multi-hop, a range of 180 meters 
was reached (with only one relay vehicle). With two relay 
vehicles this range can be reach to 500 meters.  
The connection with the control 
room and the possibility to provide 
up-to-date video data together with 
the alert messages in case of a 
detected event (i.e. potentially 
dangerous situation) 
The communication between the Smart Detection System 
and the control room was tested during the last test session. 
The Smart Detection System sent continuously image 
buffers of 5 s and when an event was detected, the operator 
in his room received a pictorial or audible warning and the 
video which corresponds to the event. The tests were 
conclusive. The duration of the buffer is configurable.      
The performances of the system in 
terms of detection and recognition 
and during different weather 
conditions 
The average performance of detection of the system is 84% 
(Perf_Detect indicator): 79% for Cerema datasets and 88% 
for Aachen datasets; the performance of recognition is 72% 
(Perf_Detect_Recog indicator): 75.5% for Cerema datasets 
and 68.5% for Aachen datasets. 
The difference in detection performance among cases with 
different types of weather is not considered significant. The 
worse performance was observed in cases with low 
illumination. Indeed, the performance of recognition during 
“Snow with very low illumination” is 38.8%. Nonetheless, the 
performance of detection for this weather situation is 93,7%. 
This means that the SDS is quite powerful for the detection 
performance (which is the most important) and could meet 
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some difficulties for the recognition task during bad weather 
conditions. Much more data is needed to reinforce the 
results. 
The classification of objects 
In the retrieved bases, we are able to differentiate between 
pedestrian, car, train and two-wheel vehicles. We have 
evaluated the capability of the system to classify objects. To 
do that, we have used 24 videos among the 41 available. 
These videos contained 341 objects. The classification was 
correct for 268 objects and not correct for 73 objects. This 
lead to a classification rate of 78.6%. There was a very big 
variation for the objects classification. The classification 
errors were mainly linked to ambiguities cases: bicycle 
moving on the axis of the camera (this lead to a confusion 
between a person and a bicycle. It was also the case for 
some heavy vehicles (trucks, bus, train). Some occlusions 
were always present at Aachen test site because of the lack 
of room to locate the video sensor correctly. This affected a 
lot the classification rate. For pedestrians, cars in normal 
situations (no occlusions for example), the classification 
rate was close to 100%.  
 
The smart detection system is a technical evaluation, a proof-of-concept and the functioning of the 
system was tested only during few days. The system addresses mainly situations where there are 
traffic disruptions on LC, such as stopped vehicles or traffic jams, by providing better situation 
awareness for the traffic management. Table 12 presents the numerical results calculated based on 
the pilot data.  
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Table 12. Numerical results of the main variables included in the testing. 
Evaluated variables Results 
Detection performance 
(Perf_Detect indicator) 
▪ Detection performance per dataset:Global datasets: 84% 
▪ Cerema datasets: 79% 
▪ Aachen datasets: 88% 
Detection performance per weather condition: 
▪ High sun with shadows created by objects, wind: 80% 
▪ Sun and shadows on the LC: 100% 
▪ Cloudy and low illumination: 73.5% 
▪ Snow and low illumination: 93.6% 
▪ Cloudy with low average illumination with small rain: 
87.7% 
▪ Snow with very low illumination: 100% 
▪ Cloudy with higher illumination: 88.9% 
The detailed formulas for the detection performance are 
included in deliverable D3.5 (Bakey et al., 2019).  
Recognition performance 
(Perf_recog indicator) 
 Recognition performance per dataset: 
▪ Global datasets: 72% 
▪ Cerema datasets: 75.5% 
▪ Aachen datasets: 68.5% 
Recognition performance per weather condition: 
▪ High sun with shadows created by objects, wind: 68.5% 
▪ Sun and shadows on the LC: 100% 
▪ Cloudy and low illumination: 72% 
▪ Snow and low illumination: 77.5% 
▪ Cloudy with low average illumination with small rain: 
70.2% 
▪ Snow with very low illumination: 38.8% 
▪ Cloudy with higher illumination: 100% 
Processing time The smart detection system is able to process data up to 25 
frames per second. This is compatible with a real time 
implementation, which means that every entity crossing the LC 
will be detected, whatever its speed. 
Sample size In total, 41 videos that correspond to around five hours of video 
data, composed of 1,038 events (including cars, pedestrian, 
objects, etc.) detected by the SDS. Cerema and Aachen data 
consist of 523 and 515 events respectively, totalling to 1,038. 
Ability to transfer information 100% between smart detection system and RSU, 100% 
between smart detection system and control room. This last 
functionality is based on a web platform (platform that enables 
to build solutions that enable delivery of content). 
Quantification of safety effects 
To estimate the safety effects of the current system based on empirical data, the system would need 
to be installed for a long time on one or more LCs to monitor how many accidents and incidents are 
avoided, which is out of the scope of this project.  
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From the literature and discussions with numerous domain experts we can conclude that the SDS is 
one important component of a global system which could be installed at LC premises. The global 
system could be called “An Intelligent Level Crossing”, as it integrates functions of advanced 
sensors, communications and information technologies in order to improve safety and operational 
efficiency at rail-road crossings. 
The main benefits offered by a well-designed Intelligent Level Crossing system are (i) increased 
security and safety of the road users, train passengers and rail staff, (ii) improved efficiency of the 
rail and road traffic management by provision of real-time information to rail and road users on the 
status of the traffic network (for example, possible route alterations due to traffic jams at level-
crossings). 
Such system has the capability to detect the conditions at the level crossing, identify potentially 
hazardous situations, notify the local traffic management system, trigger the system response 
accordingly, and provide advanced warnings to the vehicle users and train drivers. 
The purpose of obstacle detection systems is to prevent vehicle and train collisions at level 
crossings. They allow for the timely detection of objects caught within the level-crossing area and 
provide means for automated alert notification and activation of an appropriate network response 
(such as setting off the warning signs, lifting/closing the barriers, train route alterations, or partial 
closing down of the rail network). The main benefit of these systems is that they are potentially 
capable of fully automated performance, remote control and system failure diagnostic. 
Discussion 
The following challenges were identified during piloting: 
− The transfer of video data to control centre was not as simple as expected. Some 
modifications to software configuration between the software implemented on the test site 
computer and the office computer were needed.  
− The range (functionality tested only at Aachen test site) between the smart detection system 
and the in-vehicle on-board unit was not very high (around 300 m) because the Aachen test 
site was not open-air, and there were many obstacles such as buildings, trees, etc. The multi-
hop testing (by using several vehicles) enabled us to reach 500 m as a distance range.  
− According to experts, the operator is very busy at his control room and does not need to have 
details on a detected scenario. It is sufficient for them to know that something very trivial is 
happening on the LC (like car stopped on the LC for a given time) because they receive video 
data at the same time. For instance, in some cases they were not interested by a pedestrian 
crossing or stopping on the LC. They want to be notified only for critical events. To this end, 
the system’s evaluation focuses on detecting entire events and transmitting them to the 
control center, which is a more relevant evaluation. 
Lessons learned 
Some typical considerations linked to the SDS itself and to image processing techniques were 
noticed. A qualitative evaluation was carried out when comparing the ground truth and the automatic 
detection of scenarios.  
Some scenarios were not taken into account, because of their limited duration.  
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The video’s point of view is highly important. It was found that the system performs best when the 
sensor is installed at a vertical position. 
Recommendations 
The position of the video sensor is also very important and relevant to the scenarios the system is 
meant to recognise. The video sensor has to be located in such a way that it embraces all the vicinity 
of the level crossing in order to avoid problems linked to occlusions. 
Applicability of results to different circumstances 
The SDS was tested in two very different test sites and under changing weather conditions including 
sun, clouds, sudden illumination changes, rain and snow. Its performance was not degraded by the 
conditions. 
Conclusions 
The main performance of the SDS is its ability to detect and transmit events. It was measured on 
Cerema and Aachen datasets and the overall event detection performance is around 84%, while the 
scenarios recognition performance is around 72%. The detection performance is considered by far 
the most important. 
There is no significant influence of the weather conditions on the ability to detect or recognise events, 
except for cases when illumination is very low which typically result in the detection being delayed. 
The SDS evaluation was realised utilising two datasets, and therefore could be different if other 
scenarios were tested. The authors believe that an even more representative evaluation is indeed 
possible, but it would either require richer data sets recorded over longer periods, or testing under 
real world conditions, during normal operation of a LC. 
3.4.2. Early detection and hazard information warning by means of 
Collective Perception Messaging (CPM) and driver’s warning 
(COMMSIGNIA) 
Piloted safety measure 
The piloted safety measure is called as Early detection and hazard information by means of collective 
perception messaging and driver’s warning. This measure consists of three safety vehicle-to-
everything (V2X) communication-based applications, aiming to improve the safety of LCs: 
− by warning drivers of both road and rail vehicles about dangerous traffic events identified in 
LCs. 
− by assisting road users to escape from dangerous situations, and 
− by assisting drivers of both road and rail vehicles to avoid and mitigate the danger of 
hazardous situations (e.g. by stopping the car or train before the LC). 
The first application warns drivers of both road and rail vehicles about dangerous traffic events 
identified in LCs. This is achieved by issuing critical collision warning to road vehicles and trains 
whenever the train’s collision with a V2X enabled road vehicle is imminent at LCs. The information 
supports the car drivers in avoiding collisions with trains (e.g. helps them to escape from the car in 
case of last second hazard situations) and supports the train drivers in mitigating the severity of 
collisions in LCs by reducing speed. The collision warning can also be delivered to the train in case 
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a pedestrian (or any pre-specified type of object) blocks the LC and the collision with the arriving 
train is imminent. 
The second application provides more accurate information on train arrival to active LC. This 
application identifies the presence of the approaching train by sensing and disseminating rail specific 
CAM messages by means of collective perception technology and CPM messaging. Train position 
information is made available in the LC that can be used in the calculation of the timing of safety 
actions such as barrier closing and opening. 
The third application has the same objective as the second, however, instead of CAM messages, it 
triggers DENM messages on train upon arrival and disseminates these messages by means of multi-
hop forwarding using the available V2X infrastructure and/or intermediate V2X capable vehicles’ 
functionality. 
The above scenarios demonstrate the capabilities of standard V2X use-cases in V2X-based 
monitoring and clearance assurance of LCs, and the role of V2X technology in early train detection 
and hazard information sharing by means of collective perception and drivers' warning technologies. 
These safety applications were developed in response to the need of cross-modal information 
exchange between road and rail vehicles drivers. The piloted V2X applications operate by collecting 
relevant environmental information and sharing this information among road and rail users/drivers in 
an attempt to support corrective actions.  
Clearance assurance means the proper monitoring and processing of movement information of V2X 
capable vehicles around LCs, as well as last second warning of drivers in case of imminent hazard. 
Method and data to evaluate the piloted safety measure 
During the piloting, the performance and capabilities of selected V2X safety applications were 
demonstrated regarding the clearance assurance and safety enhancement of LCs. Clearance 
assurance means the proper monitoring and processing of movement information of V2X capable 
vehicles around LCs, as well as last second warning of drivers in case of imminent hazard. The 
experimental applications were tested and operated in real traffic environments and hazard 
conditions. 
The performance of the system in terms of scenario recognition was carried out using video data. 
Video data and interactive log files were used as input but also as ground truth utilised by this 
validation report. The applications realising the scenarios were verified by event logging and time 
stamp analysis of the safety messages and by measuring and evaluating safety parameters (e.g., 
target radius, dangerous closest distance, time to collision) which have direct influence on the 
performance and sensitivity of the communication. 
The evaluation data consisted of information from message logs and HMI information evaluation. 
The evaluation included the following main use cases: 
− Intersection assist safety applications in LCs including various traffic scenarios. The 
scenarios are about the avoidance and mitigation of the severity of collisions between road 
and rail vehicles at LCs. It is assumed that both road and rail vehicles are V2X enabled 
vehicles meaning they are equipped with on-board communication units (OBUs). The 
intersection assist safety applications are installed and operated on these OBUs. 
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− Train detection range enhancement in LC environments may have critical effect on hazard 
mitigation, detection and warning performances especially in cases when high speed trains 
are involved. The following use-case scenario demonstrates the capabilities of the collective 
perception service of V2X technology in LC environments in extending the perception range 
of the cars for several km. Cars wanting to cross the LC will be able to elongate their warning 
horizon in hazard situations. 
− Another scenario demonstrates the capability of the multi-hop DENM forwarding technique 
in early train detection. The method is based on the Geonetworking protocol and fast forwards 
train position (arrival) information initiated by the train itself to a distant LC environment using 
the available V2X infrastructure. 
Evaluation results 
The evaluation was conducted for three main use-cases (UCs) which scenarios included different 
use-case scenarios. The total number of evaluated scenarios was six as they follows:  
Use-case 1: Intersection assist safety applications in LCs 
− LC intersection management from view of the ego (road) vehicle (use-case 1.1): Real time 
front-to-train and side-to-train collision monitoring and mitigation of the severity of collision 
hazards for road vehicles while in normal traffic speed. 
− LC clearance management for train I (use-case 1.2): This scenario is a differently tuned 
Scenario #1 for rail vehicles. Train will use the intersection assist safety application with 
differently tuned parameter sensitivity. 
− LC clearance management for train II (use-case 1.3): It warns car driver about the 
approaching train while the car gets in a dangerous situation inside, or in the dangerous 
vicinity of the LC (e.g., braked down vehicle) and helps to escape from the car in case of last 
second hazard situations. 
− LC clearance management for train III (use-case 1.4): Collective Perception Message 
generation and distribution upon the detection of hazardous object in the LC. 
Use-case 2: Detection range extension by means of collective perception 
− Remote detection and monitoring of the approaching train (use-case 2.1): Large distance 
detection and sensing of the approaching train and dissemination of its changing position 
information towards LC by means of collective perception technology and CPM messaging. 
Use-case 3: Perception range extension by means of multi-hop DENM forwarding 
− Remote detection of the approaching train by means of multi-hop DENM forwarding with 
drivers warning (use-case 3.1): This is to advertise the presence of the coming train by 
triggering DENM messages on train upon arrival and disseminating these messages by 
means of multi-hop message forwarding. 
Each of the above scenarios are presented in the tables (Table 13, Table 15, Table 17, Table 19 , 
Table 21, Table 23) followed by their corresponding evaluation data (Table 14, Table 16, Table 18, 
Table 20, Table 22, Table 24). The evaluation data to assess the safety effects covered the following 
variables: ‘Detection accuracy’, ‘Detection rate’, ‘Processing time’, ‘Sample size’, ‘General usability 
conditions’, ‘Stability and maturity of the solutions’, ‘Environment conditions for processing’, ‘Ability 
to work in hard conditions’, and ‘Ability to efficiently transmit information in the test scenario’. 
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Table 13. Description of scenario 1.1. 
Scenario title LC intersection management from view of the ego (road) vehicle  
V2X application LC intersection management safety application (LIMA) 
Objective The safety app issues critical collision warning to road vehicles and 
the train when the trains’ collision with a V2X enabled road vehicle 
is imminent. The safety app provides collision warning and hazard 
mitigation for car drivers and clearance assurance for train. It helps 
car drivers to avoid front-to-train and side-to-train collision 
situations and mitigate the severity of collision hazards for trains. 
Equipment Car with OBU with LC intersection management safety application 
and HMI 
Train with OBU with LC intersection management safety application 
and HMI 
Description 1: Car travels in a neutral direction regarding the LC geometry. This 
means either the car is (yet) outside of critical LC proximity or it 
travels in a neutral direction (presumably not wanting to cross the 
rail track). 
2: Train is approaching the LC. 
3: Car suddenly changes travel direction and heads for the crossing 
of the railway (or it gets in critical proximity to the LC) and the 
estimated movement trajectories of the train and road vehicle might 
have common points in the LC (i.e., the two parametric curves 
intersect) and as such, a probable collision with the arriving train 
can be confirmed. 
4: The app triggers notification to both car and train drivers that the 
collision is imminent depending on the sensitivity parameters of the 
setup. Triggering conditions may differ depending on the real 
geolocation information of the LC, road and train track geometry. 
Enabling technology CAM processing and sensor fusion 
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Application loading and reaction time, remaining time to collision 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
Target radius (the radius in which vehicle relative locations are 
evaluated), dangerous distance (the minimal distance between two 
vehicles which cannot be reduced any further without risking the 
collision). 
Open issues None 
Notes This application works in the very same way from view of the train 
(different ego vehicle). Sensitivity parameters, however, should be 
set differently for the train. Determination of the proper sensitivity 
setup and making proposition for a real application configuration is 
among the main the subjects of this scenario. 
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Table 14. Evaluation data of scenario 1.1. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. This sampling rate is sufficient 
and provide satisfactory event recognition resolution in LCs where 
the expected maneuvering speed of cars are less than 60 Km/h. 
Estimation of remaining time to collision is continuously updated 
during the dynamical scenario. 
Detection rate Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. 
Processing time Processing time is within the limit of the detection rate i.e. it is less 
than 0.1 sec per one hit. 
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with consistent evaluation 
results. 
Usability Usability of this use-case in real situations is well established based 
on Day 1 V2X safety applications. The scenario can be integrated in 
LCs without risk. High speed trains (over 80 Km/h) may pose safety 
challenges, however. The V2X parameters “target radius” and 
“dangerous distance” must be assigned dynamically with respect to 
the actual speed of the train. Further experimentation is needed. 
Stability The intersection management safety application is a quality assured, 
standardised V2X application that must be stable and providing 
repeatedly consistent results which can be used in LC environment. 
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
The approaching train is assumed to be in a microwave visible area.  
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
No specific requirements over standard V2X operability conditions. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Information exchange between various actors (i.e. road and rail 
vehicles) are performed on secured and coded information channels. 
Exchange rate of information is proportional to the V2X detection 
rate i.e., 10 Hz. 
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Table 15. Description of scenario 1.2. 
Scenario title LC clearance management for train I. 
V2X application LC intersection management safety application (LIMA) 
Objective The safety app issues critical collision warning to vehicles and the 
train when approaching LCs in the forward path of travel when a 
collision with a V2X enabled vehicle is imminent (dangerously 
approaching road vehicle towards LC). The app provides collision 
warning and hazard mitigation for car drivers and clearance 
assurance for train. It helps train driver to mitigate the severity of 
collisions in LCs. 
Equipment Car with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Train with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Description 1: An unwary car approaches the LC (e.g., in dangerous speed or 
incautious behavior) presumably not intending to stop before of the 
rail track and its movement trajectory might have a probable 
collision point with the arriving train. 
3: Train is approaching the LC 
4: The app triggers notification to both car and train depending on 
the sensitivity parameters of the setup. Triggering conditions may 
differ depending on the real geolocation information of the LC, road 
and train track geometry. 
Enabling technology CAM processing 
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Application loading and reaction time, remaining time to collision 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
target radius, dangerous distance 
Open issues None 
Notes This scenario is a differently tuned Scenario #1 meaning that rail 
vehicles will run the safety application with different parameter 
setup. Sensitivity parameters should be set differently for the train 
and the cars. Determination of the proper sensitivity setup and 
making proposition for a real application configuration is among the 
main the subjects of this scenario. 
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Table 16. Evaluation data of scenario 1.2. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. This sampling rate is sufficient 
and provide satisfactory event recognition resolution in LCs where 
the expected maneuvering speed of cars are less than 60 Km/h. 
Estimation of remaining time to collision is continuously updated 
during the dynamical scenario. 
Detection rate Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. 
Processing time Processing time is within the limit of the detection rate. 
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with the same positive 
evaluation results. 
Usability Usability of this use-case in real situations is well established based 
on Day 1 V2X safety applications. The scenario can be integrated in 
LCs without risk. High speed trains (over 80 Km/h) may pose safety 
challenges, however. The V2X parameters “target radius” and 
“dangerous distance” must be assigned dynamically with respect to 
the actual speed of the train. Further experimentation is needed. 
Stability The intersection management safety application is a quality assured, 
standardized V2X application that must be stable and providing 
repeatedly consistent results which can be used in LC environment. 
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
The LC is assumed to be in a microwave visible area.  
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
No specific requirements over standard V2X operability conditions. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Information exchange between various actors (i.e. road and rail 
vehicles) are performed on secured and coded information channels. 
Exchange rate of information is proportional with the V2X detection 
rate i.e., 10 Hz. 
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Table 17. Description of scenario 1.3. 
Scenario title LC clearance management for train II. 
V2X application LC intersection management safety application (LIMA) 
Objective The safety application issues critical collision warning to both rail 
vehicle and the subjected car when train is approaching and the car 
is near stationary (or stopped) at the dangerous vicinity of LC and 
the collision with the V2X enabled vehicle is imminent. The app 
provides collision warning and hazard mitigation for car drivers and 
clearance assurance for train. It warns the car driver about the 
approaching train and/or helps to escape from the car in case of 
last second hazard situations. It also helps to avoid front-to-LC 
collisions for train drivers and/or mitigates the severity of collisions 
in LCs. 
Equipment Car with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Train with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Description 1: Car crosses the LC in a very slow speed or stops suddenly (for 
any reason, e.g. due to traffic jam or technical malfunction.  
2: Train is approaching the LC. 
3: The app triggers notification to both car and train depending on 
the sensitivity parameters of the setup. Triggering conditions may 
differ depending on the real geolocation information of the LC, road 
and train track geometry. 
4: Car moves away  
5: Train HMI stops showing warning 
Enabling technology CAM processing 
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Application loading and reaction time, remaining time to collision 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
target radius, dangerous distance 
Open issues None 
Notes None 
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Table 18. Evaluation data of scenario 1.3. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. This sampling rate is sufficient 
and provides satisfactory event recognition resolution in LCs where 
the expected maneuvering speed of cars are less than 60 Km/h. 
Estimation of remaining time to collision is continuously updated 
during the dynamical scenario. 
Detection rate Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. 
Processing time Processing time is within the limit of the detection rate i.e., 0.1 sec. 
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with the same positive 
evaluation results. 
Usability Usability of this use-case in real situations is well established based 
on Day 1 V2X safety applications. The scenario can be integrated in 
LCs without risk, however, high speed trains (over 80 Km/h) may 
pose safety challenges. The V2X parameters “target radius” and 
“dangerous distance” must be assigned dynamically with respect to 
the actual speed of the train. Further experimentation is needed. 
Stability The intersection management safety application is a quality assured 
standardised V2X application that can be used in LC environment. 
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
The approaching train with respect to the LC location is assumed to 
be in a microwave visible area.  
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
No specific requirements over standard V2X operability conditions. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Information exchange between various actors (i.e. road and rail 
vehicles) are performed on secured and coded information channels. 
Exchange rate of information is proportional with the V2X detection 
rate i.e., 10 Hz. 
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Table 19. Description of scenario 1.4. 
Scenario title LC clearance management for train III. 
V2X application CPM generation and distribution upon detected object triggering 
Objective The safety app issues critical collision warning to the approaching 
rail vehicle when a detected pedestrian (or any pre-specified type 
of object) blocks the LC and the collision with the arriving train is 
imminent. The app provides collision warning and hazard mitigation 
and clearance assurance for train drivers. It helps to avoid front-to-
LC collisions for train drivers or mitigate the severity of collisions in 
LCs. 
Equipment Smart object detection system connected with RSU located at the 
LC 
Train with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Description 1: A pedestrian crosses the LC in a very slow speed (wandering) 
and/or stops suddenly from any reason. 
2: Train is approaching the LC. 
3: The video object detection system detects the wandering 
pedestrian (or any other pre-specified type of objects) and 
conditionally triggers notification to the RSU. Triggering conditions 
may be varied (pedestrian in between closed barriers etc.) and may 
depend on the sensitivity parameters of the setup.  
4: RSU generates and distributes CPM messages to the 
approaching train. 
5: Train OBU receives and decodes CPM messages and displays 
notification about pedestrian on track on train HMI and warns train 
driver. 
Enabling technology Smart Object Detection system with CPM processing 
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Application loading and reaction time, remaining time to collision, 
detection time and consistency 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
Detected object type identification according to vulnerable road 
users’ categories, moreover the estimated size of detected object. 
Open issues Detected object type resolution is to be further developed and 
experimented with. 
Notes None 
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Table 20. Evaluation data of scenario 1.4. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Detection accuracy depends on the accuracy of the video processing 
of the smart detection system. After receiving the detection trigger 
the start time of CPM processing in the RSU is immediate. CPM 
distribution is in accordance with standard V2X detection rate which 
is 10 Hz. Estimation of remaining time to collision is continuously 
updated for train driver during the dynamical scenario. 
Detection rate Detection rate is fundamentally based on the video processing 
capabilities of the smart object detection system. Upon request, 
standard V2X processing rate is 10 Hz. 
Processing time Processing time could be validated on the V2X side only, after the 
object detection trigger has been received from the smart detection 
system which was found within the limit of the 10 Hz detection rate of 
the V2X system. 
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with the same positive 
evaluation results. 
Usability Usability of this use-case in real LC situations can be considered. 
CPM processing is conformant with the ETSI standard in 
preparation. The scenario can be integrated in LCs without risk. High 
speed trains (over 80 Km/h) may pose safety challenges, however, 
due to small time to collision parameters. Relaying of CPM 
information to far away trains is to be considered. Further 
experimentation is needed with this scenario especially regarding the 
CPM range extension which recently is the standard one hop 
distance (around 1 Km). 
Stability CPM messaging is a well-tested stable process that follows the rule 
of the standard in preparation. There is no risk with this application.  
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
Environmental condition compromising the visibility and event 
resolution capability of the video processor of the smart detection 
system represents limitation. 
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
It is to be assured that the video processing system is always 
operated in good sighting conditions. Otherwise, there are no 
specific requirements over standard V2X operability conditions. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Information exchange between the smart detection system and the 
RSU is ensured by the hard-wired communication link (ethernet), 
which is a secured link for data exchange.  Exchange rate of 
information is proportional to the detection rate of the smart detection 
system. CPM processing in the RSU and the secured transmission 
of CPM packets over the air happens in 10 Hz frequency. 
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Table 21. Description of scenario 2.1. 
Scenario title Remote detection and monitoring of the approaching train 
V2X application CPM generation and V2X sensor fusion 
Objective This use-case is about to advertise the presence of the 
approaching train by sensing and disseminating rail specific CAM 
messages by means of collective perception technology and CPM 
messaging. Train position information is made available in the LC 
which information can be used in the calculation of the timing of 
safety actions such as barrier closing and opening. 
Equipment Car with OBU with safety application and HMI 
Train (emulated with a car) with OBU with safety application and 
HMI. The approaching train is emulated by a V2X capable road 
vehicle traveling in a quasi-parallel route along the railway track. 
Description 1: Train approaches the LC in a faraway location.  
2: Remote RSU senses the CAM distributed by the coming train, it 
processes the train CAM messages and transforms them to 
collective perception information (CPM protocol). 
3: The remote RSU broadcasts CPMs to the LC, where both the 
local RSU and the vehicles in the LC vicinity receive and decode it. 
CPM protocol contains the position information of the remote train. 
4: RSU at the LC provides train position information dynamically for 
control and monitoring purposes to the LC barrier controller, which 
can be displayed on screen of the control center. 
5: Car OBUs receive the CPM and displays the closing train 
location information on its HMI and generate warning for cars 
driver. 
Enabling technology CAM and CPM processing and distribution, V2X sensor fusion 
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Detection range, detection time, frequency of train location update 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
None 
Open issues None 
Notes None 
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Table 22. Evaluation data of scenario 2.1. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz. This sampling rate is sufficient and 
provide satisfactory event recognition resolution in LCs where the expected 
maneuvering speed of cars are less than 60 Km/h. Estimation of remaining 
time to collision is continuously updated during the dynamical scenario. 
Detection rate Standard V2X detection rate is 10 Hz meaning that CPM messages 
carrying the position information of the arriving train contains position 
information in 0.1 sec resolution. 
Processing time Processing time is within the limit of the detection rate i.e. it is less than 0.1 
sec per CAM hit.  
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with the same positive evaluation 
results. 
Usability Applicability and integration of this use-case in real LC situations can be 
effectively considered. This scenario increases the detection range of the 
system by one RSU hop distance (approx. 1-2 Km). Further 
experimentation is needed with this scenario especially regarding the CPM 
range extension. In a real rail application, the detection range can be 
further extended by using a chain of RSUs around the railway and adjust 
system parameters to the speed of trains and geometry of railway. The 
actual solution is highly rail dependent and is to be streamlined on site. 
Final location specific antenna and radio configuration of the RSUs are to 
be determined by application request. 
Stability CAM to CPM generation and the corresponding sensor fusion process 
proved to be stable that provides ground for the standardisation process 
which is ongoing at ETSI.  No stability risk with this application.  
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
No specific environmental conditions. 
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
Electric rail environment represents a hostile environment for radio 
transmission devices because of the presence of high voltage trolley-wires 
and other metal objects. The effect is further amplified in case the line of 
sight condition of communication is obstructed by high voltage lines and/or 
large metal objects. The validation scenario, however, was still successful. 
The radio connection between the remote RSU (800 m away from the LC) 
and the RSU located in the LC were 100% reliable. The experienced radio 
disturbance patterns could be successfully eliminated by means of the 
application of a special radio configuration and special antenna architecture 
and arrangement applied to the RSUs. As a conclusion, it can be verified 
that the hostile rail environment did not pose any problem for the ETSI-G5-
based V2X microwave radio technology. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Information exchange between the remote and local RSUs, moreover the 
approaching train is safely and securely ensured via standard V2X 
communication. CPM processing in the RSU and the secured transmission 
of CPM packets over air happens in 10 Hz frequency meaning that the 
resolution of the approaching train position is calculated using the base 
time 0.1 sec, thus the distance resolution depends on the actual speed of 
the train. 
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Table 23. Description of scenario 3.1. 
Scenario title Remote detection of the approaching train by means of multi-hop 
DENM forwarding with drivers warning 
V2X application Multi-hop DENM messaging  
Objective This use-case is about announcing the presence of the 
approaching train by triggering DENM messages on train upon 
arrival and disseminating these messages by means of multi-hop 
forwarding using the available V2X infrastructure and/or 
intermediate V2X capable vehicles’ functionality.  
Equipment V2X capable road vehicle with OBU and safety application 
emulates the approaching train.  
Remote RSU.  
Local RSU located in the LC.  
V2X capable road vehicles in LC vicinity with OBU and safety 
application and HMI.  
Description 1: Train approaches the LC in a faraway location and triggers a 
DENM message geo-conditionally. It is assumed that the train 
always knows about the geolocation of the actually coming LC in its 
forward path of travel and triggers a DENM in due time and 
distance.  
2: Remote RSUs (and or any V2X capable vehicle OBUs) receives 
the message and forwards it to any intermediate vehicle or 
infrastructure. This process is ad-hoc, if a V2X capable device is 
present, then it will be part of the forwarding process. 
3: Finally, the message arrives to the RSU located at the LC and 
broadcasts the warning of the approaching train to the vehicles in 
LC vicinity.  
4: Car OBUs receive the DENM and displays the closing train 
information on its HMI. 
5: The train cancels DENM message after passing through the LC. 
Enabling technology Multi-hop DENM message forwarding is based on Geonetworking 
protocol and geolocation information triggering.  
Measures to be 
evaluated 
Detection range, detection time 
Sensitivity parameters 
to be adjusted (both 
road and rail vehicles 
OBUs) 
None 
Open issues None 
Notes None 
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Table 24. Evaluation data of scenario 3.1. 
Variable Results 
Detection accuracy Detection accuracy depends on various conditions. In case we can 
assume that a V2X capable transmission device is always available 
in the radio range then the arrival of the train triggered DENM to the 
LC depends on the minimal number of hops included in the 
GeoNetworking scenario between train and the remote LC. In cases 
when  no intermediate V2X device is timely available, the message 
might be delayed. In the worst case, when there are no intermediate 
transmission units (a very probable scenario when traffic is low, e.g. 
in nighttime), the DENM will arrive to the LC as a “last minute” single 
hop message directly from the train. 
Detection rate DENM messages are processed upon request but still aligned to the 
standard V2X processing rate which is 10 Hz. 
Processing time Processing time depends on the ad-hoc geonetworking scenario 
(see detection accuracy considerations above). 
Sample size The use-case was repeated 5 times with the same positive 
evaluation results. 
Usability Usability of this use-case in real LC situations can be seriously 
considered. V2X equipped vehicles are capable to contribute to this 
scenario even if their traveling trajectory is neutral to the LC. 
Stability Multi-hop DENM messaging is a standard well-tested safety 
application of V2X technology. This is based on a secure 
transmission mechanism and the safety applications are standard-
based and certified. There is no stability risk with this application.  
Environmental 
conditions for 
processing 
The approaching train with respect to other optionally located V2X 
devices and/or the LC location are assumed to be in a mutually 
visible area.  
Ability to work in hard 
conditions 
There are no specific requirements over standard V2X operability 
conditions. 
Ability to efficiently 
transmit information  
Efficiency of this scenario highly depends on the penetration rate of 
the V2X technology. The more V2X capable devices involved in the 
communication, the faster the DENM information will be propagated 
to the LC. In case the standard geonetworking routing from source 
(train) to destination (LC) can be secured, the transmission of DENM 
packets between train and the LC is ensured.  
Discussion 
Lessons learned 
It was revealing to showcase that ITS safety applications of the V2X ecosystem can be effectively 
used in railway applications in a cross-modal setup safely and securely. The demonstrations 
convincingly exhibited that sharing a common communication technology standard between road 
and rail vehicles can provide railway operators with a means to control and manage the train traffic 
on their networks. This may contribute to make the traffic in the crossroads of the two modes of 
transportation safe and sustainable in the future. 
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Electric rail environment represents a hostile environment for radio transmission because of the 
presence of high voltage trolley-wires and other metallic objects. The effect is further amplified in 
case the line of sight condition of communication is obstructed by high voltage lines and/or large 
metallic objects. Therefore, not only the test scenarios but the performance and operation of the 
microwave radio communication system was subject of testing in Aachen. During the validation of 
the range extension scenario, we experienced electromagnetic disturbance which compromised the 
radio range of the RSUs significantly. This required the application of a special radio configuration, 
antenna architecture and antenna arrangement at the RSUs. As a general rule, the configuration of 
the radio parameters, moreover, the 5.9 GHz microwave antenna proved to be highly dependent to 
the scenario and location. RSU radio and antenna configuration, therefore, should be adapted to the 
environment of a given LC.  
Recommendations 
In electric rail environment it is always required to use high quality, high gain and well oriented RSU 
antennas. Sometimes, only directional antennas can satisfy the range and performance 
requirements. It is highly recommended that communication system deployments in electric rail 
environments are preceded by specifically designed communication tests verifying the range, fault 
tolerance and general communication performance of the system. 
Applicability of results to different circumstances 
DSRC V2X technology (ETSI-G5) was designed to be robust against a wide range of variations of 
environmental conditions. The basic set of safety applications developed for V2X systems are 
sufficiently rich to satisfy a wide range of applications for railway use. The Aachen test event 
showcased a selected set of applications and demonstrated a small set of possibilities of these 
applications. 
Conclusions 
As a general conclusion, it can be said that standard V2X technology with their standard safety 
applications (such as intersection assist safety applications) developed for road ITS use can be 
safely utilised in LC environments. The above characterised scenarios pointed out the importance 
and necessity of the use of cross-modal road-rail communications technology in hazard avoidance 
in LCs. The successful technology harmonisation is a precondition of the integration of the methods 
in rail environment and a key focus area for safe and sustainable transportation. It is important to 
note that the hostile rail environment did not pose unsolvable problems for the ETSI-G5-based 
microwave radio technology. However, the LC deployment of RSUs and their antenna and radio 
channel configuration needs special care and adjustment. With proper setup the visible range 
between two consecutive RSUs in electric rail environment can be safely kept around 1,000 meters 
that is not worse than in a standard highway environment. 
3.4.3. Smart Communication System 1 (IFSTTAR & Geolog) 
Piloted safety measure 
This measure is Smart Communication System covering multi-hop communication of alerts through 
vehicle to everything (V2X) communication between roadside unit (RSU) and on-board 
communication unit (OBU).  
The piloting included two scenarios: 
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− Scenario 1: Detection of the incident and transmission to the road users.  
− Scenario 2: Detection of the incident and re-transmission to all road users.  
During the piloting, the smart communication system was installed and connected to the smart 
detection system (described in subchapter 3.4.1).  
Method and data to evaluate the piloted safety measure 
The evaluation focussed on identifying whether all detected events were correctly received by the 
vehicles and by the control room. This was investigated based on message logs (DENIM and CAM).  
The investigated variables covered: 
− Communication range  
− Conformity  
− Transmission delay  
− End to end delay  
− Event to vehicle distance 
During the tests some logs were saved to calculate the relevant key performance indicators (KPIs) 
for this scenario.  
Evaluation results 
The smart communication was installed and connected to the smart detection system, and the first 
testing focussed on the communication between roadside unit (RSU) and OBU. In total, 229 DENMs 
were received in seven times (Table 25). The evaluation was done by comparing the cause code 
and subclass code for each received DENM with the ones sent at the same time interval. 
Table 25. Example of conformity. 
ID message emission (RSU) Reception interval Cause code Subcause code 
1309 14:58:02.27 to 14:58:17.32 94 0 
1310 14:58:17.33 to 14:58:39.43 97 2 
1312 14:59:17.04 to 14:59:40.12 98 1 
1313 15:00:21.25 to 15:00:28.27 98 1 
1315 15:03:55.07 to 14:04:04.10 94 0 
1317 15:05:46.71 to 15:05:55.74 98 1 
1318 15:06:11.44 to 15:06:33.52 98 1 
The communication range was at least 40 meters. However, the maximal value of this range is not 
known since during the piloting there was not enough time to test the communication for varying 
ranges. 
The latency should have been one millisecond or less because the accuracy is limited to 
milliseconds. However, some exceptional values of two milliseconds (twice), 998 milliseconds and 
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999 milliseconds (twice) were also identified (Table 26). These problems were due to the 
synchronisation and hence this problem was corrected for the second period of piloting. 
Table 26. DENM generation latency. 
Latency Recurrence Percentage 
1 ms 138 times 60.27% 
0 ms 86 times 37.56% 
2 ms 2 times 0.87% 
999 ms 2 times 0.87% 
998 ms 1 time 0.43% 
The second testing focussed on the connection between roadside unit and OBU in case of others 
scenarios, which were:  
− Traffic jams at the level crossing 
− Car blocked between the barriers 
− Vehicle drives against closed barriers 
− Pedestrian is detected at the LC 
In this phase, the re-transmission between vehicle approaching LC and other vehicles far from the 
LC was also tested. 
The DENIMs of all scenarios were well received. The tests were realised several times and the logs 
(DENIM and CAM) were saved in order to give some KPIs for each scenario.  
Two problems were encountered in this phase: 
− The transmit delay could not be measured because there was a shift between the time of 
the RSU and OBU. Thus, without knowing the exact value of this shift, it was almost 
impossible to have reliable transmit delay.  
− KPIs could not be calculated for the multi hop scenarios.  
These problems were solved for the last test session. 
The last piloting sessions focussed on testing the multi hop scenarios. The objective was to evaluate 
the maximum communication range. The nearest vehicles sent the same received DENM to another 
vehicles coming to the level crossing. 
Discussion 
All scenarios were tested for the multi-hop schemas. All DENIMs were received correctly whenever 
the distance of OBU and RSU was lower than the maximum range of communication. In the case of 
line-of-sight, the maximum range is about 250 m. In case of ‘Non line-of-sight’ (NLOS), the maximum 
range in Aachen site (with presence of trees, buildings etc.), was about 60 to 80 m. With the multi-
hop solution and two vehicles used, the maximum range was between 160 to 180 metres. 
The following challenges were identified during piloting: 
− The range values are very limit for smart communication ITS_G5 (around 180 m). These 
values are very much lower than the range proposed by the normalisation. This limitation is 
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due to the Aachen test site. In this site there was no ‘line of sight communication’, there were 
many obstacles such as buildings, trees, etc. 
− In frequency 5.9 GHz antenna positions are very sensitive, and the range depends on the 
propagation environment and number of equipped vehicles. 
Lessons learned 
Based on the evaluation, the multi hop scenarios are very important to increase the range (around 
5km) of communication if all vehicles in an environment are equipped with the same technology. 
3.4.4. Smart Communication System 2 (neoGLS & CEREMA) 
Piloted safety measure 
The Smart Communication System provides alerts about potentially dangerous situations to the 
control room. This system focusses on the interface between Smart Detection System (described in 
subchapter 3.4.1) and the smart roadside unit (RSU). This measure fetches and aggregates the 
video files from the camera of the Smart Detection System and transmits them to the control room 
to provide vision of the level crossing to the person monitoring the LCs.  
Specifically, the Smart Detection System pushes the video files periodically to the smart RSU. Then 
the smart RSU chooses if the video file is relevant regarding the running events on the LC. If this is 
the case, the video files are sent to the control room. 
Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure  
The evaluation focussed on testing the video file chain between the Smart Detection System and 
the roadside unit (RSU) using a VPN connection and a test RSU.  
Some challenges occurred during piloting since the system architecture of the Smart Detection 
System had changed between the pre-tests and second testing session. This caused encoding 
issues and thus the upload could not be tested during the second session. The encoding issues 
were solved for the third session and hence the video upload could have been tested.  
Evaluation results 
First, the Secure Shell (SSH) context was set up to send video files in a secured way between Smart 
Detection System and the RSU (using a key authentication). After that, the video upload was tested 
using dummy scenarios prepared for the Smart Detection System. At this point, the RSU received 
the complete video feed, in chunks of 30 seconds. The mechanism to upload videos to the control 
room also worked efficiently because it was also based on SSH. In addition, it had been tested before 
the piloting in the Aachen test site.  
One issue encountered concerned the control room interface, where the video aggregation was 
initially not working. This issue occurred because the aggregation started when the file was not 
completely uploaded yet. To counter this issue, a MD5 sum was added to ensure that video files 
were complete before sending them to the control room. 
Next, the complete chain with real scenarios was tested by using the Smart Detection System. After 
the modifications were implemented, as explained in the previous paragraph, the chain worked 
successfully, as expected. When an event was detected by the camera, the RSU uploaded it to the 
platform, and by clicking on the alert, the video files were aggregated, starting from the event 
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detection until the event end. Figure 30 presents an example of a detected event and the 
corresponding video. 
 
Figure 30. Example of a detected event and the corresponding video. 
During the test, the video was displayed on-screen with an unsatisfactory delay, as a result of the 
different loop intervals on the different systems to process video files. Specifically, the delays were 
the following: 
− Camera of the Smart Detection System: One file every 30 seconds 
− RSU: Check for upload every minute 
− Control Room: Aggregate on click. 
To resolve this problem, the interval was reduced to 5 seconds on each system. By doing that, the 
video availability was very quick. 
Discussion 
No discussion was included. 
 CEREMA Rouen (CEREMA & NTNU) 
3.5.1. Monitoring and remote maintenance 
The purpose of Monitoring and remote maintenance is to monitor the condition of LCs and detect 
potential problems with rail infrastructure (e.g. any deterioration) by using sensors on the track and 
road (seismic sensors, photogrammetric system and thermal infrared method). This measure aims 
to detect infrastructure conditions (and any deterioration of the structure) to avoid collisions at LCs 
between trains and heavy vehicles stuck at LCs. The issue of vehicles stuck at LCs relates to the 
longitudinal section on either side of the LC.  
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Railway managers already use topographic sections with a lower level of precision. The 
photogrammetric method will improve the detection of dangerous profiles. 
3.5.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
The piloting of this measure was conducted at the Cerema experimental site in Normandy. The test 
site included a three-meter-wide experimental level crossing structure that was built for the SAFER-
LC project (more details of the implementation can be found from deliverable D4.3, Carrese et al. 
2019). The piloting aimed at testing the feasibility of different methods to detect degradation on level 
crossing.  
Two different road configurations – bump and hollow – were used to reproduce the most common 
types of natural relief road configurations (Figure 31).  
 
Figure 31. Different configurations of the Cerema experimental test site. 
Bump configurations 
The wood beams with two thickness were used in the bump configuration to generate three 
investigated configurations: 1a = 0 cm, 1b = 3.5 cm, and 1c = 7 cm (Figure 32).  
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Figure 32. Bump experimental LC – two thickness of wood. 
Hollow configurations 
The hollow configurations were simulated by using water-saturated sand inside waterproof film in 
combination with the passage of trucks to produce deterioration of the infrastructure (Figure 33). The 
hollow configurations used in the piloting were:  
− 2a’ = 0 cm,  
− 2b’ = 1.9 cm, after 1 truck passage – 3km/h 
− 2c’ = 2.1 cm, after 1 truck passage – 12 km/h 
− 2d’ = 2.4 cm,  after 1 truck passage – 12 km/h 
− 2e’ = 2.8 cm, after 3 truck passages – 3 km/h, 3 truck passages – 12 km/h, 3 truck passages 
– 25 km/h, after 3 van passages – 15 km/h, 3 van passages – 25 km/h, 3 van passages – 30 
km/h. 
 
Figure 33. Hollow experimental LC – three steps with truck traffic. 
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The type of measurements used for different configurations to detect surface degradations are listed 
in Table 27. 
Table 27. Type of measurements used to detect surface degradations by configuration.  
Configurations Measurements 
Bump 1a, 1b, 1c Vibration, photogrammetric, VACC (instrumented vehicle) 
Hollow 2a’, 2b’, 2c’, 2d’, 2e’ Photogrammetric, thermal infrared, vibration, VACC 
Four methods were tested on the experimental LC site. 
Vibration 
Two loads were used for the seismic measurements: a truck (6,5t/wheel, a deflectograph) and a van 
(1,5t/wheel). Three different speeds were used for each vehicle type: 
− Truck (6.5t/wheel): 3 km/h, 12 km/h and 25 km/h 
− Van (1.5t/wheel): 15 km/h, 25 km/h and 30 km/h 
The accelerometers and their positioning used in the testing are presented in Figure 34. 
      
Figure 34. Accelerometers and their position. 
Photogrammetric 
The model was referenced with landmarks (Figure 35).  
    
Figure 35. Photogrammetric measure. 
Accelerometers 
landmarks 
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In total, eight photogrammetric references were used (Figure 36). Furthermore, a stabiliser was used 
on an instrumented ramp to keep horizontal movement stable. 
 
Figure 36. LC representation with photogrammetric references. 
Instrumented vehicle (VACC “Véhicule d’Analyse du Comportement des Conducteurs”) 
An instrumented vehicle recorded all the data passing through the A/D converter bus of the car; that 
is, data on the dynamics of the vehicle (used by the different safety devices) and the actions of the 
driver. This data was associated with shooting video (front, back, steering wheel, pedals, driver) and 
GPS positioning.  
Thermal infrared 
The collection of thermal infrared data required a high-resolution thermal imaging camera. 
Scenarios used in the measurements 
Below, you will find the different scenarios for configuration 1a, 1b, 1c, 2a', 2b' 2c’, 2d’ and 2e’: 
− Scenario 1: instrumented vehicle crossing the LC (moving at 8.5 km/h) for photogrammetric 
measure - moving forward 
− Scenario 2: loaded truck or van crossing the LC (speed 1) - moving backward  
− Scenario 3: loaded truck or van crossing the LC (speed 2) - moving backward 
− Scenario 4: loaded truck or van crossing the LC (speed 3) - moving backward 
− Scenario 5: instrumented vehicle crossing the LC (VACC)  
Complementary scenario for configurations 2a', 2b', 2c’, 2d’ and 2e’:  
− Scenario 6: field HD thermal-infrared camera by pedestrian  
For each configuration (1a to 1c and 2a’ to 2d’), a levelling on rail was realised to compare 
photogrammetric results with full station measurement (Figure 37). Four points (R1D, R1G, R2D and 
R2G) were realised in total, and the result is the mean of these points (Table 28). 
 
 
 
Deliverable D4.4 – Results of the evaluation of the pilot tests – 31/12/2019  Page 85 of 163 
 
 
 
Figure 37. Rail levelling and reference measure of the full station. 
Table 28. Levelling results by configuration. 
Configuration Thickness average (cm) Std 
Bump 
1b 4.4 0.3 
1c 8.9 1.0 
Hollow 
2b’ 1.9 0.5 
2c’ 2.1 0.8 
2d’ 2.4 0.8 
2e’ 2.8 0.6 
 
3.5.3. Evaluation results 
Photogrammetry 
Some mock-up tests were conducted and they revealed an issue to detect moving objects with 
photogrammetric method. Therefore, a photogrammetric model was created to compare two dates. 
The object was moved between two states (see Figure 38).  
 
Figure 38. Mock-up with object detection. 
A 3D model was obtained to compare two sets of pictures (Figure 39). The green areas represent 
stable zone, yellow depressions and red elevations. These results are consistent with our 
R1G 
R2G 
R1D 
R2D 
Fixed 
reference 
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expectations. A yellow zone of depression can be observed at the old location of the object, and a 
red zone of elevation at its new location. Although centimetre precision is not enough to show the 
movement of sand under the object, it would be sufficient for LC application. It was necessary to 
calibrate camera with photoscan software to improve distortion correction on the edges of the model 
(Figure 39). 
  
Figure 39. 3D photogrammetric models comparison with object detection. Centimetre precision 
without calibrate (left) and millimetric precision with calibrate (right). 
Seven photogrammetric models were obtained from a batch of photos. In order to limit the 
processing time and to prevent software crashes, 260 photos converging towards the surface were 
used, as seen in the green rectangles in Figure 40, to calculate 3D models with around 25 meters of 
roadway with adapted focal to obtain a strong density of points. 
 
Figure 40. Example of camera device layout for scanning model. 
Different photogrammetry software can be used to generate a cloud with photos game. Micmac has 
been used (Pierrot-Deseilligny et al. 2016) for full model because of the possibility of calibrating the 
cameras. Three photos are needed to perform the calibration of each camera, in our case photos of 
geometric shapes were used. 
Point clouds must be recalibrated with common repository. The first configuration (1a and 2a’) was 
defined as a reference and therefore must be georeferenced. Two methods were used: GPS points 
(GCP point in micmac), and the distances method, where the cloud is georeferenced to an absolute 
reference by similarity. 
Figure 41 and Figure 42 present models (with s top of view presentations) obtained with two types 
of configuration (Figure 41 for bump and Figure 42 for hollow). Each model includes about 25.2 
million of points. The geometric dimensions of the study area are 3.57 m by 24.88 m which leads to 
25 points per cm². 
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Figure 41. Photogrammetric model − Bump configuration (left to right 0, 3.5 and 7 cm). 
 
Figure 42. Photogrammetric model – Hollow configuration (left to right 0, 3, 5 and 5.7 cm). 
Each model was then compared with CloudCompare against each other in order to obtain a 3D 
comparison model and thus quantify the degradations encountered on the crossing. An example 
model is presented in Figure 43. It shows a typical cloud of the surface change with depth. The direct 
cloud-to-cloud comparison with the closest point technique does not require gridding or meshing of 
the data, and is the simplest direct 3D comparison. Each point can be defined in both clouds. The 
surface variation is estimated as the distance between the two points (M3C2). With the length of the 
measuring area, cutting to three zones is necessary in order to obtain a coherent result.  
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Figure 43. Incoherent results full treatment M3C2 (left). Coherent result with cutting and merging 
zone treatment M3C2 – hollow configuration 2a’–2d’ (right). 
According to Figure 44, the measured distance is sensitive to the cloud’s roughness. So this 
technique is used to change LC surface on dense clouds. This figure also shows a distance around 
8.6 cm on level crossing. It is similar with levelling results. 
 
 
Figure 44. Example of 3D photogrammetric model comparison – model bump 0 and 7 cm. 
Figure 45 illustrates the depression of the level crossing comparing configuration 1a and 1c. 
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Figure 45. Comparison model hollow 2a’–2b’ (left). Comparison model hollow 2a’–2d’ (right). 
From a computer development, we can obtain geometric profile data. The graph below (Figure 47) 
shows a difference between model bump 0 (blue curve) and model bump 7 (red curve) 
representative of values obtained with levelling. 
Results obtained on the LC central zone for hollow configuration (Figure 45) show more deformation 
on configuration 2a’–2d’ with greater truck passages with a depression marked in wheel passage. 
This technique is satisfactory for detecting deformations on level crossing. Application of this 
technique in the level crossing context is suitable. These results are similar to Lague et al. (2013). 
With cloudcompare it is possible to recover manually a geometric profile as shown in Figure 46. 
 
Figure 46. Geometric profile recovery with cloud compare. 
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To complete this treatment, the data of geometric profile recovered were leveraged by an algorithm 
developed in Python programming language. Figure 47 represents the modality in bump with the 
configuration at 0 cm in blue and at 7 cm in red. Figure shows a difference between model bump 0 
(blue curve) and model bump 7 (red curve) representative of values obtained with levelling. A similar 
photogrammetric example with another application was described in Fauchard et al. (2013) and 
Chanut et al. (2017). 
 
Figure 47. Example of geometric profile – model bump 0 and 7 cm. 
An approximate surface profile is displayed, with the dangerous areas pointed out in red colour 
(Figure 48). These figures show that between two different trucks appears a conflict point with a 
different holder false. The photogrammetric method is used to efficiently detect and locate conflict 
points according to the characteristics of the truck. 
  
Figure 48. Approximate surface profile with conflict point in red – model bump 7 cm. 
This surface profile depends on truck characteristics as shown in Figure 49. 
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Figure 49. Truck characteristics – surface profile. 
Vibration 
We recorded four passages with VACC vehicle to average for each configuration. Figure 50 presents 
an example of VACC record average. 
 
Figure 50. Example VACC average - bump configurations. 
We record an increase of the acceleration with the increase of the height of the bump or the hollow 
(Figure 51 and Figure 52). 
 
Figure 51. VACC results - bump configuration. 
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Figure 52. VACC results - hollow configuration. 
Nevertheless, the variation remains very small and the result can probably vary according to the 
lateral deviation of the vehicle on the roadway. 
The variation of the acceleration according to the speed and the height of the LC is presented in 
Figure 53 for a van and in Figure 54 for a truck. For the van, the variation of acceleration increases 
when the speed and the height of the level crossing becomes greater. For the truck, results are not 
representative, as the 3 km/h speed could not be correctly realised. Figure 54 shows anomalies as 
the acceleration should be variated with a higher value when speed and height of the level crossing 
increase.  
 
Figure 53. Acceleration according to the speed and height of the LC for the van. 
 
 
 
Deliverable D4.4 – Results of the evaluation of the pilot tests – 31/12/2019  Page 93 of 163 
 
 
Figure 54. Acceleration according to the speed and height of the LC for the truck. 
3D thermal behaviour of the experimental LC and crack detection during deformation using the 
thermal infrared method 
This study aimed to detect potential cracks appearing in asphalt in contact with an LC, if the LC 
structure has deformed. Our hypothesis was 1) this asphalt may be subject to cracking at the contact 
of the deformed LC and 2) the cracks may be detectable using the thermal infrared method during 
daytime. The experiment (discussed in the photogrammetric section) consisted of triggering 
deformations of the LC by repeated passings using a car and a truck. After each passing, the thermal 
infrared method was applied on the two asphalt bands in contact with the LC. The methodology 
consisted of acquiring thermal images and photos using a high-resolution thermal camera (Variocam 
HD 800, 1024*768 pixel) at 1 m height. The 8 megapixel visible camera is directly present on the 
thermal infrared camera. These data were then used to obtain 3D visible and temperature maps 
calculated using the photogrammetric method. In this case, the 3D modelling enriches the data, 
bringing a topographic (depth) information in addition to the temperature and visible reflectance. 
Here, we only present preliminary results (general model + one passing after fracturation), as the 
CER experiment was performed in June 2019. It would be of interest to continue this type of 
experiments of another measure on a different test site. Figure 55 displays the 3D general 
temperature map of the LC obtained using the thermogrammetric method (developed in our team) 
and obtained at 10 a.m., i.e. during the warming of the structure. Due to their high thermal inertia 
(important thermal conductivity, density and heat capacity), the railways are 7°C colder than the 
surrounding environment during the morning (while it may appear warmer during the night). It is of 
note that the two asphalt bands in contact with the LC do not have the same temperatures. The 
asphalt band A1 is clearly warmer than A2 during the morning (contrast of 3°C). This observation 
should be associated to a difference in thermal inertia and thus to a contrast in the compaction 
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degree of the bands: these structures were built just before the experiment, but within an interval of 
several days for A1 and A2. 
 
Figure 55. Different views of the general 3D temperature map of the LC using the thermogrammetric 
method. 
Figure 56 exhibits an example of a 3D thermal and visible map on A1 (view from the top) after three 
passings (car + truck). First, a crack is induced within the asphalt band A1 (white square, Figure 56, 
a), due to the subsidence of the LC. Second, a temperature variation is detected in this area, 
associated to the recent crack formation (Figure 56, b). In this case, the temperature contrast is 2°C 
between the fissure and the surrounding area, while the crack may be highly difficult to detect with 
semi-automatic segmentation algorithms in the visible wavelength. More work will be obviously done 
in the next months to characterise the thermal behavior of the fissure for all the passings. However, 
from all these results, we plan to combine the visible, thermal and depth information to enhance 
some crack detection algorithms. The work will have to be continued in another time. 
 
Figure 56. a) 3D visible model of A1 (view from the top) and formation of a crack due to the LC 
deformation (white square) and b) 3D temperature model (view from the top) of the A1 Asphalt band. 
Note the presence of the thermally distinct crack recently formed during the deformation of the LC. 
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3.5.4. Discussion 
This measure was applied on a level crossing mock-up installed on Rouen test site. The mock-up 
represented an LC in which different scenarios of infrastructure were played. The monitoring system 
ensured the safety performance of the LC through the continuous and real time monitoring through 
two approaches: 
− The use of smart and embedded wireless sensor networks. Vibration and temperature 
sensors were installed on the relevant track/road components and data was transmitted with 
an alert threshold to the LC operator. The system enabled to send alerts to LC users. To 
measure the vibration, it was necessary to use a truck. 
− A photogrammetric device was used to monitored infrastructure surface condition and to 
detect any deterioration of the structure. This system could also measure displacement and 
deterioration of the road surface. In addition, the visible information combined to thermal 
infrared data to enhance the interpretations of the potential disorders as fissuration. High 
permeability zones generated a thermal anomaly of several degrees. 
The methods tested at Cerema aims to provide infrastructure managers an efficient means in 
monitoring structural and geometric LC state to ensure preventive maintenance and safety for level 
crossings. These methods have shown their effectiveness in detecting and quantifying a geometric 
evolution. However, they need to be improved and industrialised to be easily used by infrastructure 
managers. 
The advantages and disadvantages of each method are described below: 
Photogrammetric method 
Six high-resolution cameras were used which led to very long time computation. For ease 
processing, and with light profile need, two cameras with reduced resolutions would be sufficient. 
− Advantages: Geometric modeling with realistic rendering of the LC to determine possible 
evolutions. Low cost of the measurement device. 
− Disadvantages: The measurement should be carried out preferably in cloudy weather and on 
dry pavement. The processing time can be significant depending on the quality of the result 
sought. Programming of measurement campaigns. 
Vibratory method 
We tested two types of vibratory measurements: 1) sensors implanted inside the LC, and 2) sensors 
embedded in a vehicle (VACC). 
The first technique (fixed accelerometers) monitors the structural state of the LC by measuring the 
intrinsic accelerations and therefore the elastic deformations undergone by the structure. It provides 
a permanent monitoring system. 
− Advantages: Permanent real-time LC monitoring allowing an alert for the maintenance 
department or blocking traffic with detected danger. 
− Disadvantages: Need to instrument the LC and to set up a communication device with a 
control post. Relatively high cost of deployment 
The second technique (accelerometers included inside vehicle) allows monitoring to several LCs 
with light vehicle. The accelerations measured by the on-board sensors evaluate the LC geometric 
evolution. 
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− Advantages: Only one vehicle is necessary for periodic monitoring of the evolution of LCs in 
a network. Vehicle not specifically dedicated. 
− Disadvantages: It is necessary to set acceleration thresholds beyond which geometry 
measurements must be made on the LC in order to confirm the level of evolution of the LC. 
Programming of measurement campaigns. 
Infrared thermography 
This method allows early detection of cracks in the transition zone between the railway structure and 
the road structure and therefore anticipates the need for maintenance of the structure. 
− Advantages: Early detection of a structural evolution of the LC. Low cost 
− Disadvantages: Rapid detection of deformation can lead to the appearance of a conflict zone. 
Programming of measurement campaigns. 
Conclusions 
Different techniques implemented on full-scale Cerema test site LC can be implemented to ensure 
LC safety in the area of conflict prevention between the structure and a vehicle. However, each 
technique has advantages and disadvantages. The implemented technique should be selected 
depending on budget, dangerousness of the LC, and the evolution speed according to the geometric 
structure: 
− Photogrammetry allows periodic monitoring, the measurement accuracy of which can be 
adapted as required. 
− Fixed accelerometry with a relatively high implementation and exploitation cost is justified 
when it is necessary to monitor the evolution of a LC in real time. 
− Mobile accelerometers, which is cheaper than photogrammetry, allows periodic monitoring 
but requires additional measurements after detecting threshold overshoot. 
− Infrared thermography is justified only by the need for early detection of the degradation of 
the transition zone to the railway structure. 
 Thessaloniki living lab (CERTH-HIT & DLR) 
3.6.1. In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning 
The In-vehicle train and LC proximity alert, is a mobile application aiming to enhance road user safety 
around level crossings. The application can be installed on any common mobile device such as a 
smartphone or tablet, and it warns road users about the presence of a LC through a dedicated pop-
up window and a short audio alert, whenever they approach a LC. The warning also includes the 
estimated time of train arrival, whenever an incoming train is expected to reach the LC within one 
minute (Figure 57; static visual LC warning in the left and dynamic warning in the right). 
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Figure 57. The static visual LC warning (left) and the dynamic warning when the train is estimated 
to reach the LC in six seconds (right). 
The alert system can be used for all types of LCs (e.g. passive, active with light signals, active with 
barriers and light signals). In fact, the application is independent of LC and train type or state of other 
variables and circumstances (e.g. weather conditions). The only requirement of the system is 
sufficiently accurate location tracking by the mobile device and a predefined polygon area of interest 
around the monitored LC, in which road users should receive the warnings. 
The system is expected to mainly contribute to increasing safety at passive crossings, which are 
unprotected, often difficult to spot and thus more dangerous. It is also expected to assist drivers who 
do not anticipate a level crossing while driving on an unfamiliar road or region, or while driving without 
being properly concentrated on the road and the warning road signals. The measure is expected to 
assist in such cases by providing real time information about the existence and status of the level 
crossing. 
3.6.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
Before–after study was used to assess the safety effects of this measure. The before data consisted 
of 1.5 months of baseline data (situation before the application was in use). During this period, the 
application was installed and logged spatiotemporal data for the floating taxis near LCs included in 
the pilot, without producing alerts (‘inactive’ mode). The data collected in inactive mode were used 
for assessing the behaviour of drivers around LCs without the safety warnings.  
The length of after data collection period was eight months4. During this period, the service was fully 
operable (‘active’ mode), and data analysis for this period focused on two differentiated cases: static 
alerts for the proximity of the LC and dynamic alerts for the proximity of a train, issued when a train 
is expected to reach a LC within a minute. 
More than 600 taxis (out of approximately 1,000 taxis operating for the same taxi association) used 
the application in the city of Thessaloniki, Greece. Taxi drivers were allowed to withdraw from the 
pilot and have all the data recorded for the vehicles erased, by uninstalling the application at any 
time. According to the taxi association, some taxis use rather basic tablets with low-end 
                                            
4  In deliverable D4.3 (Carrese et al., 2019) the data collection period was planned until the end of July, but it 
was decided to extend this period until mid-September in order to collect evaluation data spanning over a 
longer period. 
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specifications (e.g. 1GB RAM) which struggle to cope with the existing dispatching software and they 
were expected to not install/use our application, which was a limitation for the testing of the service 
and it has reduced the performance to lower levels. However, at the same time these have become 
more representative of a large-scale implementation, in which various users may not have high-
processing devices.  
The drivers that participated in the program were provided with a written instruction form during the 
process of application installation. Its purpose was to highlight that application users should never 
fully entrust the system about the dangers and proximity of trains and that they are fully responsible 
for taking all necessary safety precautions when driving close to level crossings. On a technical level, 
the geolocation tracking, data transmission and popup alerts operate autonomously after the mobile 
application is installed, therefore no further training was required for the application users. 
In total, 29 level crossings and various trains in the line Athens–Thessaloniki were included in the 
pilot. The trains were equipped with GNSS devices monitored by the Greek national train operator 
TRAINOSE and CERTH-HIT was granted real time access to the train location and speed data. 
Besides the safety impact assessment by means of Floating Car Data (FCD), the piloted measure 
was evaluated in terms of operational performance and user’s experience, utilising operational data 
automatically recorded by the system and questionnaires answered by test vehicle drivers before 
and after their experience with the piloted measure, respectively. In addition, three taxis were 
equipped with Naturalistic Driving Study (NDS) equipment to collect data for analysing the drivers’ 
reaction to the safety service in the context of the approach to level crossings. The NDS platform 
consisted of a set of four miniature cameras. It monitored the environment as well as the driver’s 
behavior and facial expressions during November and December 2018. In addition to the cameras, 
a GPS sensor was implemented in the NDS system to detect driving parameters such as speed, 
acceleration and position of the taxis. Four different drivers drove these NDS equipped taxis.  
In summary, the datasets recorded and utilised in the evaluation of this measure are the following:  
− Vehicle location and speed data generated by trains and taxis 
− Data recorded by the safety system backend server 
− Questionnaires answered by the drivers of the test vehicles (taxis)  
− NDS data 
In the following subsections, those datasets are described in higher detail, along with the analysis 
methods applied to each. 
Vehicle data 
Location data regarding circulating taxis and trains were recorded for the evaluation of the tested 
safety measure. The raw data is FCD composed of vehicle id, location (in the form of longitude and 
latitude coordinates), timestamp, speed magnitude (m/s) and orientation (as an angle to the North 
direction). All the data was generated by the respective fleet management equipment (tablets in the 
taxis and GNSS receivers in the trains) and collected by CERTH. The data was anonymised in order 
to respect the privacy of the drivers and can be only processed by staff of CERTH, following the 
ethical framework/guidelines defined in WP8.  
More specifically: 
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− Taxi probe data were recorded whenever the vehicles entered the LC polygons at a 1Hz 
frequency. They were transmitted to CERTH-HIT in near real time, utilising wireless internet 
connectivity, where they were stored for future processing and analysis. 
− TRAINOSE provided GNSS data for moving trains. Tracking devices were installed in 
SIEMENS DESIRO locomotives, operating the suburban railway of Thessaloniki. These 
devices were connected to the main battery of the train and worked with 12V voltage. 
Moreover, a specification of EN50155 was used to be compatible with the main rolling stock. 
CERTH-HIT received and stored data from these locomotives for more than six months, until 
June 2018. TRAINOSE then started the installation of more tracking devices and switched to 
a new IT service provider, as a result the data transmission was temporarily offline. A web-
service providing with the data recorded by those new sensors in real time was  online and 
accessible by CERTH in January 2019, monitoring some of the passenger and freight trains 
operating in Greece. These are ADTRANZ, SIEMENS 120 and MLW500 locomotives. Ever 
since, TRAINOSE was gradually installing more tracking devices to track a larger part of its 
fleet. 
The evaluation datasets recorded by the on-board sensors on taxis and trains were collected from 
December 2018 to September 2019. During April, the quality of data recorded up to that date was 
assessed, leading to minor refinements and updates to the data logging mechanisms and polygon 
definitions. Probe data from the trains were gradually available and recorded from January onwards. 
The Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) defined and calculated for the driving behavior around LCs, 
utilising the FCD were: 
− Driving behavior based on trajectories of the taxis when approaching a LC including driver 
speed profiles with respect to temporal and spatial distance to the rail, number of stops for 
safety checking, temporal duration of stops, and distance of stops from LC. 
− Kinematic indicators including vehicle speed and acceleration-deceleration functions around 
LCs. 
During the baseline period the application was installed in 32 taxis, a relatively small percentage of 
approximately 3% of the whole fleet, to evaluate the application performance on a technical level 
and ensure that it does not disrupt the navigation and dispatching application that constantly runs 
on the fleet tablets. Three of those taxis participated in the NDS, and for those vehicles the 
application was set to ‘active’ mode in December, prior to the rest 29 taxis, in order to produce video 
recordings in cases when drivers receive alerts. As a result, the baseline dataset was generated by 
29 taxis, with the app set in ‘inactive’ mode. In total, 4,303 unique vehicle trajectories through LCs 
were discovered during the baseline period, in a dataset of more than 133K GNSS pulses. In our 
analysis, a vehicle trajectory was defined as the set of all FCD records generated by the same vehicle 
each time it entered any of the polygons defined around the 29 LCs. 
In the following paragraphs the data recorded during the regular period and until the 15th of 
September 2019 are presented. The application was installed in 635 unique tablets which were 
planted on taxis typically driven in shifts, by more than one driver.  The number of professional drivers 
exposed to the ‘in-car train and LC proximity alert’ system was estimated to exceed 1,000. 
Almost 7.2 million GNSS pulses have been recorded inside the 29 LC polygons, from a total of 257K 
unique vehicle trajectories around LCs (Figure 58). For all those cases, the application was in active 
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mode and produced the static or dynamic alerts. Furthermore, almost 496K requests were posted to 
CERTH servers for train proximity status and estimated time of train arrival. A train was detected 
close to the corresponding LCs 167 times, and in those cases the dynamic message with the 
countdown was also generated for the driver.  
 
Figure 58. Vehicle trajectories to LCs. 
Further analysis on the FCD revealed that several taxis were stopped for prolonged periods inside 
two polygons in close proximity to Thessaloniki intercity bus station, while queueing up for 
passengers (Figure 59). An algorithm was designed to confirm such events and differentiate them 
from cases of vehicles temporarily stopped behind closed barriers. The FCD from taxis waiting in 
the queue where excluded from further analysis. 
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Figure 59. Taxis queuing in close proximity to a LC. Screenshot taken using Google Street View 
application. 
With regards to the number of FCD pulses (records) produced by each vehicle trajectory, there is a 
clear decreasing pattern meaning that fewer vehicle trajectories produced larger number of pulses. 
Almost 45% of vehicle trajectories produced up to 10 FCD records (Figure 60). 
 
Figure 60. Histogram (left) and cumulative distribution (right) of number of FCD pulses per vehicle 
trajectory through a LC. 
In detail, the high signal density and variety of observed variables allowed the development of 
geolocation data processing algorithms which were applied on the raw data. The rest part of the 
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analysis focuses on the FCD which were recorded in the polygon areas around the two busiest LCs 
out of the three LCs where trains were tracked, and the dynamic message was available. Those LCs 
lie at coordinates 40°40'07.4"N 22°53'09.4"E and 40°39'45.7"N 22°53'49.3"E and hereinafter will be 
referred to as LC1 and LC3 respectively, following the same labels used in Figure 58. The polygon 
areas defined around those LCs are presented in Figure 61. 
 
Figure 61. Polygon areas around LC1 (left) and LC3 (right). A straight section with its corresponding 
length (192 and 74 meters) is plotted inside both polygons for reference. Screenshots captured from 
Google My Maps application. 
The number of FCD pulses and vehicle trajectories recorded in LC1 and LC3 are presented in Table 
29. 
Table 29. Count of FCD records and vehicle trajectories at LC1 and LC3. 
LC  # FCD records # vehicle trajectories (baseline / not baseline) 
LC1 52,129 48 / 873 
LC3 397,363 285 / 17,854 
Total 449,492 333 / 18,727 
A certain limitation of this real-world, large-scale pilot test is the quality of recorded data. The mobile 
application was designed to record data each second while the vehicle moves inside any of the 
polygons, however, the database contains several trajectories with FCD recorded in lower frequency 
and/or very few pulses. The quality of each trajectory was assessed in terms of duration and 
recording frequency, in order to process meaningful trajectories for further analysis. and exit the 
polygons without crossing the rail tracks and was separated from the main data table. 
The speed values at each second, measured by the tablet’s sensor, typically contain noise and 
fluctuates in extraordinary ranges from second to second. In order to reduce noise, a smoothing 
function was applied to the speed time series of each trajectory, which corrects the speed value 
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computing the mean speed value utilising the previous and next measurement. An original and its 
corresponding smoothed speed time series is presented in Figure 62. 
 
Figure 62. A trajectory’s speed time series, with original (left) and smoothed values (right). 
Another function was applied to each trajectory to classify the pulses before the vehicle meet the rail 
track as ‘approaching’, and ‘not approaching’ otherwise. This was achieved by labelling the different 
areas separated by the rail tracks with different identification labels. LC3 is also accessible from the 
road section between two rail tracks, therefore 3 areas were defined, area 1 North of both tracks, 
area 2 between the tracks and area 3 South of the tracks. For each datapoint, the corresponding 
area was identified and the distance to the first rail track was computed. Furthermore, each trajectory 
was assigned a label, according to the entry and exit road of the vehicle. A web-based interactive 
dashboard was developed to visualise taxi trajectories on a map, along with data for each point 
(area, speed and distance to track). This tool supports filtering of trajectories with respect to their 
type, and the user may choose any of the trajectories of the selected type for visualisation and 
exploration. A screenshot of the tool is presented in Figure 63, where the trajectory with identification 
label ‘25’ of type ‘123’ (meaning that the vehicle enters from area 1 and then moves to areas 2 and 
3) is visualised. 
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Figure 63. Screenshot from the interactive tool for visualisation and exploratory analysis of unique 
trajectories, when trajectory ‘25’ of type ‘123’ is visualised. 
In an attempt to study the speed profiles of vehicles approaching LCs and explore patterns from the 
drivers, clustering was applied to the speed time series. Initially, the trajectories were grouped with 
regards to the road from which a vehicle approaches each LC, in order to utilise speed time series 
recorded in the same road sections. Four unique cases were defined for LC1 and five for LC3. The 
distance between each pair of time series was calculated utilising the Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) 
method, which attempts to optimally align time-dependent sequences of observations, even in the 
presence of deformations, noise and unequal length in the series (Müller, 2017). After computing 
pairwise distance of the speed sequences, four agglomerative clustering algorithms were utilised, 
namely ward linkage, complete linkage, average linkage and single linkage. 
Additional functions and methods were applied on each taxi trajectory to classify and distinguish 
trajectories with respect to LC, system operational status (“baseline” or “after” period), current LC 
status and driver decision. Statistics and safety-related KPIs were calculated for those categories to 
quantify the safety impacts of the warning application before and after its deployment. 
Backend server data 
The backend server was designed to log operational data since the first day of the pilot tests. Two 
significant events were registered, namely the alerts and requests. An alert event was recorded 
when a vehicle entered any polygon and the warning pop-up was generated. A request event was 
registered to the database whenever a device has successfully posted a request to the server to 
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acquire train proximity and its estimated time of arrival (ETA), after entering any LC polygon area. 
The logged data contained details for each safety warning message issued by the system including 
the vehicle ID, the event’s timestamp, the ID of the corresponding LC polygon, the type of the warning 
(static or dynamic), the version of the application, the server’s response to request, and the way the 
pop-up message was closed.  Only 22% of pop up alerts were force-closed by users and the rest 
timed-out without intervention after the predefined 15-seconds period, indicating that the visual and 
audio alert are adequately discreet. Message force-closing is achieved by tapping anywhere on the 
tablet screen, to prevent or minimise the duration of “eyes off the road” events. 
The backend server data were fused with the taxi generated FCD for the same temporal period to 
verify and cross-check the safety service operation and actions with the geolocation of taxis. One 
limitation of both the taxi FCD and backend server data logging was that data batches were 
transmitted to the server via 4G mobile communications network right after each taxi exited a 
polygon. According to the taxi association and their software services provider, most on-board tablet 
devices had low hardware specifications and run several applications including navigation and taxi 
dispatching, thus the more robust option of storing the data on the tablets was not feasible during 
the pilot tests. Transmitting data via mobile communication network is less reliable and may fail in 
cases of low quality or unavailable internet connectivity, or when the tablet or mobile application 
crashes. Consequently, it is possible that a warning message was indeed generated for a test vehicle 
circulating around a LC, although the event was not recorded in the database due to packet loss. 
The backend server data analysis focused on the identification and examination of critical cases, 
including: 
− False positive cases, when dynamic and static alerts were generated in appropriate 
distances.  
− False negative cases, when dynamic and/or static alerts were incorrectly not generated.    
− Estimated time of train arrival deviations and errors. 
Questionnaires 
Questionnaires were created to collect feedback from system users, and are presented in Annexes  
A and B. They were handed to the taxi drivers in three phases, in order to monitor their opinion and 
experience before, during and after using the system. Each version of the questionnaire was 
different, and adjusted to the pilot testing phase, as some questions were relevant in specific periods 
of the pilot implementation. The questions included in the forms are typically composed in order to 
target one or more of the criteria to assess: 
a) the behavioral safety effect of the measure on road users and 
b) user experience and social perception of system users 
as defined in the Human Factor Assessment Tool (HFAT), presented in Deliverable D2.2 of the 
SAFER-LC project (Havârneanu et al., 2018). Processing of answers is directed towards a twofold 
aim: to generate input for the HFAT and also provide insights regarding the pilot evaluation 
procedure on a more general basis. 
Both the traditional paper questionnaire and the more modern web-based, digital format were 
considered for this survey. The latter was preferred after discussions with taxi association 
representatives and the navigation software providers. All taxi drivers are familiar with the 
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dispatching application interface; they have been using it for years and they receive business and 
operations related messages regularly. The web-based format ensures that the questionnaire 
targets all the fleet drivers with same probability without favoring the ones familiar with technology. 
The link to the digital questionnaire was sent to all drivers as a short message through the navigation 
application. It was posted to both morning and afternoon shift drivers within the same day. The 
invitation was sent again to the vehicles from which the drivers did not initially respond. Analysis on 
the questionnaire answers provided statistical indicators about the end users of the safety service. 
The results from those surveys are considered highly important, as most of the taxi drivers who 
tested the safety system have huge driving experience, based on their answers regarding age, years 
of professional driving experience and distance driven the previous year. The first phase 
questionnaires (before the pilot period initiation) focused on user behavior and experience related to 
driving through LCs, and their opinion on the significance of an in-vehicle warning system. The next 
two phases focused on collecting information and feedback related to the significance, general user’s 
experience and ease of use of the application. Some questions focused on the behavioral change 
after using the application.   
Naturalistic driving data 
The NDS was installed in three taxis between October 2017 and January 2018. NDS videos were 
recorded whenever the NDS system’s power supply was plugged into the in-car socket and the car’s 
electric power supply was activated (typically when the motor was running). The system creates a 
new video file each time the power supply gets switched off and on again. This way, between 0 and 
134 video files were recorded per taxi per day (mean M = 3.8, SD = 12.1). Drivers were free to decide 
whether to plug in the system and thus whether to participate in the video recording or not. The 
recordings from the NDS system yielded 3,050 videos overall, sorted in folders by the taxi from which 
they  
3.6.3. Evaluation results 
In this section the evaluation results are presented, organised in four subsections with respect to the 
dataset utilised in analysis, namely a) evaluation of driving behavior, b) system’s operational 
performance evaluation, c) questionnaire analysis and d) naturalistic driving study data evaluation.      
Driving behaviour 
The behavior of drivers was studied in the last 70 meters before reaching the rail track and data 
points outside this area were not considered for the results. The data quality filters introduced in 
subchapter 3.6.2, regarding each trajectory’s duration and data recording frequency were applied. 
As Table 30 depicts, the initial sample size of 18,727 trajectories around LC1 and LC3 was 
decreased to 6,730 trajectories, after the exclusion of the trajectories that did not cross the rail tracks 
and application of the data quality filters. It is important to mention that trajectories not crossing the 
rail track have occurred for multiple reasons, for instance when a driver did not intend to cross the 
rail track or when the driver decides to make a U-turn to avoid waiting behind closed barriers. As 
seen in Figure 61, both LC1 and LC3 polygons might be entered and exited without driving through 
the rail track. 
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Table 30. Trajectories sample size. 
Trajectories types LC1 (baseline / after) LC3 (baseline / after) 
Total # of trajectories processed 48 / 825 285 / 17,569 
# of trajectories after the duration and 
frequency filter application 
27/ 253 160 / 7,904 
# of trajectories not crossing the rail track 
(U-turn/other) 
21 / 107 41 / 1545 
# of trajectories crossing the rail track 6 / 246 119 / 6359 
The vehicle trajectories that did not cross the LC were not considered for the rest of analysis. The 
remaining ones were classified in two categories; trajectories with open or closed LC protection 
barriers. In the absence of data about barriers shutdown period, the closed barriers cases were 
identified when a vehicle’s pulses were stationary for at least 10 seconds. The purpose of this 
classification is to distinguish cases with inherently different speed profiles and extract appropriate 
statistics and safety-related KPIs adjusted for each category. 
On a coarse-grained level of aggregation, where all trajectories are grouped with respect to the road 
from which vehicles enter the polygon, exploratory analysis does not reveal significant 
differentiations. In Figure 64, the aggregated functions of speed and acceleration with respect to 
vehicle distance from LC3 are plotted, for the case when vehicles enter the polygon via “Μεγ. 
Αλεξάνδρου” street. 
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Figure 64. Plots of aggregated speed and acceleration values with respect to distance from the rail 
track, around LC3 for vehicles approaching via “Μεγ. Αλεξάνδρου” street. The baseline period line 
is noisier due to less samples. Negative distance values correspond to points after the vehicle 
crosses the rail track. 
The agglomerative clustering was implemented utilising the DTW for distance calculation between 
trajectories, and the number of clusters was tested in the range of 2 to 5 clusters. The visualisations 
of produced clusters did not result in meaningful clusters. This can be observed in Figure 65, which 
utilises data from a random sample of 40 trajectories around LC3. The three different line styles 
indicate the corresponding cluster for each trajectory. 
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Figure 65. Vehicle speeds vs spatial and temporal distance to LC3 for a random sample of 40 
vehicle trajectories approaching via “Μεγ. Αλεξάνδρου” street. The different line styles (continuous, 
dashed and dashed-dotted) indicate the cluster each trajectory is assigned to, using the single 
linkage method. 
In the finest grained level, 252 and 6,478 unique trajectories around LC1 and LC3 respectively were 
processed. The safety-related KPIs and results are presented in Table 31. In an attempt to quantify 
the level of driver attention in the open-barrier case, “safety check” events were defined, as instances 
of vehicle speed dropping below the walking speed threshold of 5 km/h, up to 70 meters before 
reaching the rail track. 
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Table 31. Classification of vehicle trajectories crossing the LC. 
 LC1 (baseline / after) LC3 (baseline / after) 
# of trajectories with open barriers 6 / 229 112 / 6070 
# of trajectories with closed barriers 0 / 17 7 / 289 
KPIs for vehicle trajectories with open barriers 
KPI1. Percentage of trajectories with at least 
1 “safety check” 
 33.33% / 7.86%  19.64% / 18.92% 
KPI2. Mean # of “safety checks” per 
trajectory before crossing 
0.33 / 0.10 00.20 / 0.23 
KPI3. Mean temporal duration of “safety 
checks” per trajectory (seconds) 
1.16 / 0.55 0.86 / 1.17 
 KPI4. Mean temporal duration of all “safety 
checks” detected (seconds) 
3.5 / 5.77 4.21 / 5.12 
KPI5. Mean distance of first “safety check” 
from LC within 25 meters to LC, ignoring 
trajectories that did not “safety check” 
(meters) 
22.11 / 14.81 10.81 / 12.75 
KPI6. Mean vehicle speed when the distance 
from the rail is between 5 to 15 meters (m/s) 
4.22 / 4.13 3.43 / 3.87 
KPI7. Mean vehicle deceleration when the 
distance from the rail is between 5 to 15 
meters (m/s2) 
0.04 / -0.14 -0.29 / -0.32 
KPIs for vehicle trajectories with close barriers 
KPI8. Mean time stopped (seconds) 
75.82 
(non-baseline only) 
43.57 / 47.87 
KPI9. Mean of max deceleration per 
trajectory (m/s2) 
-2.04 
(non-baseline only) 
-1.27 / -2.42 
The sample size of trajectories through LC1 for the baseline period is only six trajectories, therefore 
comparison of the KPIs with the “after” period results is unrepresentative, with large numerical 
differentiations. For instance, the percentage change of average temporal duration of “safety checks” 
per trajectory was increased by 65%. The results are more representative and meaningful for 
comparisons between the “baseline” and “after” periods for vehicle trajectories through LC3, for 
which the sample size in both periods is sufficiently large. Furthermore, for the case of open barriers, 
several KPIs indicate safer vehicle trajectories during the “after” period. Most significantly, after 
launching the safety system, the mean duration of all “safety checks” was increased by 22 % and 
the average distance of “safety checks” to the rail track also increased by 18%. 
The statistical significance of the four improved KPIs 2, 3, 4 and 5 was investigated. Statistical tests 
were considered in order to assess whether the available data samples for the two periods (before 
and after the safety system) were drawn from populations with similar distributions. The independent 
t-test was not applicable because of violation of its assumption that the samples approximate a 
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normal distribution. Instead, the two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test was applied, a nonparametric 
counterpart of the t-test that does not assume normally distributed samples, with the null hypothesis 
that the distributions of the data samples are identical. All four tests resulted in p values higher than 
the 5% threshold, suggesting that samples are drawn from distributions that do not differ significantly. 
As a result, KPI differentiations and changes cannot be considered statistically significant. 
Operational performance evaluation 
The backend server data for the period from 1st February to 15th September were analysed to assess 
the overall operation of the system and the communication between its components. During this six-
month period, 249,021 taxi trajectories around LCs were recorded in the FCD. The number of 
registered unique pop-up warning messages and unique ETA requests to the server are 443,718 
and 467,480 respectively. For 124,996 test vehicle trajectories (~65% of total), the pop-up warning 
was successfully generated and registered, and for 127,306 (~66% of total) a request was 
successfully posted to the servers and registered. Every time a warning pop-up was generated, the 
systems have logged a successful request to the server for the ETA, except for three cases. 
The estimations of time of train arrival issued by the system were also assessed. For all 106 cases 
when a taxi was issued with a dynamic message, and therefore an ETA, the corresponding train 
data pulses where processed to extract the actual arrival time. Figure 66 presents the comparison 
between estimated and actual crossing times, with respect to train speed and distance to the LC at 
the moment of prediction. 
 
Figure 66. Estimated versus actual time period until train arrival in seconds. 
As depicted, the neural network predictive algorithm is in most cases highly accurate and more 
biased towards underestimations than overestimations, so that a prediction error will typically result 
in a train arriving later than expected, which is a safe scenario. Another remark is the six heavily 
underestimated cases, with actual arriving time greater than 100 seconds. Those cases where 
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individually examined and the large error was produced due to the combination of extraordinary slow 
speed at the respective locations. The dataset that was utilised to train the predictive algorithm was 
recorded by a certain type of trains and did not contain similar cases, thus the model was unable to 
issue more accurate estimations. 
Questionnaire analysis 
The survey analysis results are presented in this section. The questionnaires were answered before 
(1st phase) and after (2nd and 3rd phase) the launch of the tested safety system. 
The first questionnaire received 236 responses from drivers, the overwhelming majority of which are 
male (95.7%). The mean age, years of experience as a professional driver and the estimation of 
kilometers driven within the previous year are found to be 47 years of age, 15 years of experience 
and 57K km driven last year. The highlights of the answers are summarised below: 
− 86% of drivers believe that LCs are in general moderately to completely dangerous for any 
driver. 
− Almost 45% do not feel safe while driving around LCs near Thessaloniki; 88% state that it is 
moderately to completely difficult to detect LCs or trains using the current road infrastructure. 
− More than 41% report that LC existing infrastructure in Thessaloniki assists them just slightly 
or not at all. 
− More than 81% point out that it is highly significant for them to be aware of both the distance 
and time of arrival of train to the LC. 
− 85% of them believe that it is considerably (17%) or completely (68%) important to use a 
smart in-vehicle system to increase safety around LCs. 
An interesting association was found amongst the answers of questions 5, 10, 11, 13, 14. Those 
were positive, moderately strong to strong correlations (r ranging from 0.25 to 0.83) with p-values < 
0.001. They indicate that the drivers who stated that they consider LCs dangerous, tend to also 
consider information of the train distance and time of arrival to LC highly important, and they feel that 
the on-board safety system will be helpful. 
Similar association exists among the answers of 6, 7, 8 and 9 with the strongest between 7 and 8 
(r=0.633, p-value < 0001). This implies that road users who do not feel safe driving at level crossings 
also tend to have difficulties in identifying a LC or an incoming train or, generally, a dangerous 
situation near a LC and they are also dissatisfied with the existing safety measures. 
The importance of knowing a train’s distance to LC is strongly correlated to knowing the time of its 
arrival (r=0.826, p-value < 0001). The answers of questions 10 and 11 are also moderately correlated 
to the ones of questions 13 and 14. 
The second questionnaire only received 56 responses, although exactly the same format and 
distribution method was used. For this second phase, the critical point was to receive user feedback 
for the tested system. As a result, the first introductory question was related to experience with the 
system and the respondents who had not used it were excluded from the following questions. From 
a total of 32 responses from drivers who had used the system, four were excluded as they did not 
contain answers for more than ten questions, further reducing the sample size to 28. The highlights 
of the answers are summarised below: 
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− 82% of drivers feel at least moderately safer using the system. 
− Half of them believe that the system integrates considerably or completely well with the 
existing LC safety measures in the area and less than 15% stated that it does not help them 
detect a LC and approaching trains. 
− 70% of drivers think that the system enhances the identification of previously unknown LCs 
− No driver would ignore the information provided from the system while 92.5% would not even 
consider taking risks at LCs after being warned by the system. 
− More than half of them believe that the system and provided info is considerably or completely 
reliable.  
− More than 40% of drivers stated very interested in using the alert system after the finalisation 
of the test period.    
The third phase questionnaire was answered by 88 drivers, however, 34 of them stated that they do 
not use the system and another 4 answers contained several empty responses to answers. The final 
sample size was therefore reduced to 50 responses. The main focus of this survey is on documenting 
drivers’ opinion with regards to the safety system’s potential and effect on other users. The highlights 
of the answers are summarised below: 
− The percentage of drivers who feel at least moderately safer using the system was increased 
from 82% in the second phase, to 92% in the third phase. 
− Three out of four believe that the system has a positive effect on the way the drivers approach 
LCs, and a similar percentage anticipates positive effects on other drivers as well. 
−  92% of drivers are considerably or completely positive that the system would assist 
vulnerable users, like new drivers, approach a LC in a safer way. 
− Nine out of ten drivers believe that a similar safety system should be integrated in the 
navigation system of modern vehicles. 
Naturalistic driving study 
Data Analysis 
Floating car data (FCD) recorded by CERTH were used to identify episodes containing LC traverses 
in the video data. The FCD file contained data of polygon contacts of the three vehicles with NDS 
boxes. These data were recorded between Dec 8th 2018 and Feb 4th 2019. The polygon contact  
timestamps from the FCD were listed and compared to the recording dates and times of the videos 
from each of the taxis to identify potentially relevant videos.  
The videos were then screened for actual LC traverses, using the GPS time displayed in the video. 
The numerical GPS data channel in the videos could not be used due to readout problems. The 
video sections containing LC episodes were annotated for a set of target variables (e.g. time of 
warning onsets, time of LC traverses, active search behaviour, signs of distraction, violations) by a 
trained rater using a standardised coding scheme and the ELAN software (Version 4.7.3, 
https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/, Wittenburg et al., 2006). The annotation data were then used 
to quantify and compare driver behaviour on approach to LCs in the baseline and the test phase. 
Results 
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The total number of LC traverses found in the videos amounted to 26 overall (n = 8 from the baseline 
phase, n = 18 from test phase). The number was comparatively small because the NDS system was 
mostly not activated at times when LCs were encountered and vice versa. Further, the number of 
evaluable videos was diminished by constraints to recording quality (e.g. by changes in camera 
focus and orientation, poor lighting conditions between 8 p.m. and 8 a.m.). In total, 16 evaluable 
traverses were identified at LCs that were part of the pilot. These traverses were analysed for active 
search behaviour on LC approach as a sign of enhanced attention paid to LCs. 
Active search behaviour was defined as observable head and/or eye movements (implying that the 
driver scanned the environment for trains), starting from the point in the video at which the first sign 
of the LC became visible, until the point at which the tracks were actually crossed. In six cases, the 
actual warning status could not be observed in the video, leaving 12 cases for analysis. In this small 
sample, the proportion of active search behaviour was slightly higher after a warning than without a 
warning (3 of 5 vs. 3 of 7 observations; see Table 32). No instances of critical distraction were 
observed after a warning. 
Table 32. Active search observed at LCs by warning condition. 
Warning 
Active  
search behavior 
No specific  
search behavior 
Total 
Yes 3 2 5 
No 3 4 7 
Total 6 6 12 
One rule violation was observed. It occurred during the baseline phase and shows a driver following 
other vehicles in traversing the LC instead of active warnings and a half-barrier that is already closed. 
3.6.4. Discussion 
Overall, no significant problems were encountered during the design and development of the safety 
system and the data collection infrastructure. However, the prolonged period of train data 
unavailability posed certain difficulties during the pre-launch testing of systems as most of the tests 
were conducted by simulating train itineraries utilising past data.  With fewer than expected number 
of GNSS monitored trains during the first months of the pilot, the number of dynamic message cases 
was limited.  
A less important issue regarding the FCD recording occurred while taxis were stopped inside two 
polygons while queuing up for customers. Those cases were detected in the historical dataset and 
a custom algorithm was developed to exclude them from the system’s safety impact analysis.  
After discussions with the taxi association during the assessment of the first pilot period, drivers’ 
comments about the safety alert system were predominantly encouraging. Feedback regarding the 
appropriateness of the audio and visual warnings was positive, as drivers reported that they clearly 
understood the reason for the generated alert without being annoyed by its severity. However, they 
also reported that in certain places, alerts were received near LCs although the vehicles were moving 
in an overpass or surrounding roads next to polygons (false positive events). The majority of false 
positives were present at the LC located at coordinates 40°39'45.7"N 22°53'49.3"E (Figure 67), 
where the distance between the LC and the right lane of the overpassing road, “Μοναστηρίου” street, 
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decreases up to approximately 30 meters. Analysis on raw data confirmed those events around the 
designated areas and revealed that they occurred when the vehicle geo-position sensing was slightly 
inaccurate, indicating that the vehicle entered the neighbouring polygon. Before the second pilot 
period, CERTH revised the boundaries of polygons where those false positives were detected, to 
further increase the distance from nearby road sections in order to avoid false alarms. 
 
Figure 67. LC at coordinates 40°39'45.7"N 22°53'49.3"E. Screenshot taken from Google Maps 
Application. 
In an attempt to further refine the system, the second and third questionnaires aimed at revealing 
potential flows of the app and its functionalities. The drivers were encouraged to propose their ideas 
on how the safety system could be improved and to comment on their experience with it in an open 
question, but no relevant comments were recorded. 
The pilot testing was implemented in real life conditions and in large scale, with hundreds of vehicles 
using and testing the system concurrently and continuously. There have been no major issues 
relevant to the scale of implementation. However, certain limitations regarding the system’s impact 
assessment are posed by external factors, primarily with regards to backend server logging. The 
processes of recording and transmitting data to the server, handled by the onboard tablets, is 
infeasible under certain circumstances, for example in the absence of internet connectivity or 
inaccurate/unavailable geolocation tracking. 
The infrastructure and hardware for this system classify it as low-cost solution. Nowadays, most train 
operators and taxi associations have already installed GNSS devices on their fleet for monitoring 
and navigation purposes. Even if the system is to be implemented on privately owned vehicles in the 
future, the application can be downloaded and installed in the owner’s smartphone or navigation 
device. The only costs for the end user are the data transmission charges issued by the 
telecommunications provider whenever the device enters a LC polygon. For the service provider, 
after the software development, the only expenditure is the server and its maintenance costs. 
The comparison of speed and acceleration time series, as recorded before and after activating the 
warning system, did not indicate a significant effect on the speed of vehicles approaching LCs. 
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However, the test vehicles were driven by professional taxi drivers with huge experience and 
knowledge of good practices for safe driving around LCs. The data analysis results support the 
hypothesis that drivers have adopted a stable behaviour prioritising safe decisions when 
approaching the potentially dangerous rail tracks. 
This is also supported by the outcome of the agglomerative clustering algorithm applied on the 
trajectory time-series data. The clustering failed to produce meaningful, distinct groups of similar 
vehicle speed profiles around the LCs, for instance a group of drivers who tend to brake late versus 
another group who brakes earlier when approaching a LC. Rather, there seems to exist a somewhat 
uniform distribution of LC approaching driving styles. 
Concerning the usage of the NDS system to get a look on drivers‘ actions and reactions at LCs and 
the suitability of an in-vehicle warning system to enhance safe behaviour, the results observed in the 
sample are consistent with the idea that warning systems can contribute to enhancing attention at 
LCs without causing undue distraction. The one instance of a rule violation observed occurred while 
the warning system was not yet active. However, the sample is very small and does not allow for a 
generalisable conclusion. Therefore, as a lessons learnt, closer monitoring of system settings and 
use is necessary to achieve a more representative sample of LC episodes to analyse. 
 Real rail environment (VTT) 
3.7.1. Additional warning light system at front of the locomotive 
The piloted measure is called as Additional warning light system at front of the locomotive. The 
principle of the warning system is shown in Figure 68. The warning system activates automatically 
at a set distance from the level crossing and shuts down when the level crossing has been passed. 
A level crossing database contains the location of the crossings as well as warning trigger point 
distances, light intensity limits and used patterns. Thus, every LC can be individually tuned for best 
performance and minimal disturbance. Additionally, the intensity of the warning light can be 
automatically adjusted to take account of ambient light conditions. 
 
Figure 68. Warning system principle. 
The operation principle is straightforward. First, the closest LC is searched from the LC database. 
That specific LC is selected if the direction of travel is towards the LC and distance is shortened. If 
the train is within the warning distance (distance from the trigger point to LC) the lights are active 
with the associated pattern and intensity. The additional warning lights are deactivated after the train 
front has passed the LC. 
The lights were installed to the train according to the prevailing regulations (e.g. below the head 
lights). The aim was to use similar installation as in the simulator study of DLR.  
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Test equipment is shown in Figure 69. It contained three high intensity LED lights and control unit. 
LED lights were high beam accessories and accepted to be used in road traffic. Each unit had 10,000 
lumen light intensity and beam range was up to 800 meters. Lights could be controlled separately. 
Intensity was not controllable. In Figure 69 lights are attached to the frame, but they could be easily 
removed and installed to the front of the locomotive at required distances. 
 
Figure 69. Prototype hardware. 
3.7.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
The additional warning light system was tested at real railway environment both from the viewpoint 
of road user and engine driver.  
The tests were conducted on 14th March in Sääksjärvi in Finland. The testing was done in main 
railway network and one of the three tracks was reserved for the tests. No official level crossing 
existed at the test site. However, it was a location where the road user camera could be easily 
installed (two meters from the track around 1.25 meter height).  
The rented railway vehicle was driven through the imaginary level crossings several times both in 
day time conditions and during darkness. The approach of the railway vehicle to the imaginary level 
crossing was video recorded both from the angle of the road user (from the roadside) and from the 
angle of the train driver. 
The variables included in the tests are presented in Table 33. The speed of the railway vehicles 
during the tests were 20 km/h. In addition, the possible annoyance of additional warning lights were 
estimated both from the road user and engine driver perspective. 
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Table 33. Variables investigated during the tests. 
Title Variable 
Time of day − Daylight (12:00–13:30) 
− Night (at 11 pm–1:30 am) 
Light configuration at 
daytime. Two runs 
for each scenario. 
− Reference with standard lights 
− 1 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 2 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 3 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 1 + 2 + 3 100 ms flash in every 2 seconds 
Light configuration at 
night time. One run 
for each scenario. 
− Reference with standard lights 
− 1 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 2 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 3 x 100 ms flash in every 2 second 
− 1 + 2 + 3 100 ms flash in every 2 seconds 
− Dimmed lights 2 x 100 ms flash in every 2 seconds  
− 5° tilt upwards 2 x 100 ms flash in every 2 seconds 
− 10° tilt upwards 2 x 100 ms flash in every 2 seconds 
Perspective − Road user 
− Engine driver 
The evaluation was carried out with a web-based questionnaire by rail and road safety experts 
connected to the SAFER-LC project. For comparison, the questionnaire was filled by non-experts. 
Three alternative light configurations were compared to the standardly used reference configuration, 
both in the day time and in the night time conditions. The reference configuration had standard train 
headlights: three continuous white lights, two on the bottom and one on the top. In the alternative 
configurations, additional blinking LED lights were installed below each of the headlights. The 
alternative configurations had different blinking patterns (Table 34). 
Table 34. Four configurations tested. 
Configuration/Number of blinks Description 
0 Reference system without strobe lights 
1 Single blink every 1 s 
2 Double blink every 2 s 
3 Triple blink every 3 s 
The questionnaire focused on the expert evaluation of the alternative configurations regarding safety, 
comfort and suitability for day and night time conditions, as well as on the ergonomical aspects 
visibility and glare. Benefits and drawbacks were also explicitly asked, along with the configuration 
the experts preferred. Additionally, we investigated if the blinking lights would make the approaching 
train appear faster or threatening, and thus influence the judgement of the last safe crossing times. 
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The questionnaire was based on the road user view videos filmed from the test site. In total, eight 
videos were used. Four in the day time conditions, demonstrating the reference system and the three 
alternative configurations, and similarly four in the night time conditions. The duration of videos was 
66–68 s for the day time videos, and 111–130 s for the night time videos. The night time videos were 
longer because we wanted the train to become visible in the beginning of the video, and in the night 
time this occurred earlier. 
First all four day time videos were presented and evaluated, followed by the four night time videos. 
The reference configuration without blinks (0) was always presented first. It was followed by 
configuration with two blinks (2), configuration with one blink (1), and finally configuration with three 
blinks (3).  
With the reference configuration, the participants were asked to watch the video and report when 
they would not anymore start crossing the rails. The minimum safe crossing margin was calculated 
as the remaining time before the train arrival, determined by one second accuracy as the time when 
the front of the train reached the right edge of the camera view.  
For all the alternative configurations, the participants reported similarly the crossing margin, but they 
were also asked if they saw any benefits or drawbacks with the alternative configuration compared 
to the reference configuration, and if they did, describe those. For each alternative configuration they 
were also asked to rate the alternative configuration on safety, comfort, suitability for day/night time 
conditions, visibility, and glare, using a 5 step Likert scale, where 1 = worse than the reference 
system, 3 = equivalent to the reference system, and 5 = better than the reference system. After going 
through all the four day/night time videos, the participants also reported which one they preferred 
and why. 
Finally, the questionnaire asked participants’ background information such as age, gender and self-
rated expertise on level crossing and road safety, as well as views in improving level crossing safety 
in general. 
Answering to the questionnaire was voluntary and anonymous. The experts’ questionnaire was sent 
via project email list whereas the non-experts’ questionnaire was sent to various email lists of the 
local university. In total, 18 expert and 16 non-expert responses were received and analysed. 
3.7.3. Evaluation results 
The distribution of the responses on the five dimensions (safety, comfort, suitability for day/night time 
conditions, visibility and glare) are shown in Figure 70. Overall, in the day time the alternative 
configurations were evaluated better than the reference configuration. The preference is clearest on 
the dimensions safety, suitability, and visibility. In the night time, the responses followed the similar 
pattern, but they were slightly less favourable for the alternative configuration. 
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Figure 70. Ratings of the alternative configurations (colour) compared to the reference: 1 = Worse 
than the reference system, 3 = Equivalent to the reference system, and 5 = Better than the 
reference system. 
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Benefits and drawbacks 
The above evaluation can be further interpreted by investigating the reported benefits and drawbacks 
of the configurations. The majority of the respondents saw benefits in the alternative configurations, 
both for the day time and night time conditions. Less than one fifth of the respondents saw drawbacks 
with the day time videos, and one third for the night time videos (Table 35). Majority of the comments 
regarding the benefits concerned increased visibility and detectability. Some responses mentioned 
that it was easier to judge the approach speed or that the train seemed faster with flashes. 
Drawbacks mentioned were disturbance and potential misinterpretations caused by blinking lights.  
Table 35. Benefits and drawbacks reported for the alternative configuration vs. reference system.  
Group Timing Configuration Benefits (%) Drawbacks (%) 
Experts 
Day 
1 blink 67 17 
2 blinks 78 17 
3 blinks 72 17 
Night 
1 blink 56 33 
2 blinks 72 28 
3 blinks 56 33 
Non-
experts 
Day 
1 blink 69 31 
2 blinks 81 44 
3 blinks 69 38 
Night 
1 blink 62 38 
2 blinks 88 38 
3 blinks 94 31 
 
Preference 
Respondents were also asked to choose which configuration they preferred. In the day time, the 
majority of expert respondents preferred the alternative configuration 3 with three blinks (Figure 71, 
left). Among non-experts, the same configuration was the most preferred, but also the configuration 
with two blinks was popular. In the night time, experts did not prefer any configuration over each 
other, but non-experts preferred configurations with two or three blinks (Figure 71, right). 
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Figure 71. Preferred configuration in the day time conditions (left) and in the night time conditions 
(right). 
Crossing margin 
Crossing margin distributions are shown in (Figure 72). Crossing margins were shorter in all daytime 
videos (Mdn = 22 s, M = 28 s, SD = 17 s) compared to the night time videos (Mdn = 84 s, M = 77 s, 
SD = 30 s). In the night time conditions, the crossing margins were more spread, but also the videos 
were longer (approximately 60 s vs 120 s). Experts had shorter crossing margins than non-experts 
(Mdn = 42 s, M = 46 s, SD = 34 s vs. Mdn = 59 s, M = 59 s, SD= 34 s). The main observation is that 
there were no clear differences between the configurations in the distribution of the time gaps. 
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Figure 72. Histogram of crossing margins with different configurations (rows) and in day/night time 
conditions (columns). Bin width used was 3 s. The time when train arrive is marked with a solid line, 
and the maximum possible crossing margin (the duration of the video) with a dashed line. 
3.7.4. Discussion 
Conclusions 
Both the experts and non-experts evaluated the alternative configurations as better than the 
reference configuration. Experts saw that the flashing light improved visibility and detectability. 
Probably for this reason, the experts rated the alternative configuration also safer. Potential 
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drawbacks were related to the flashing lights, which may be disturbing, and cause glare. Concerns 
on misinterpreting the flashing lights were also raised. The potential adverse effects of flashing lights 
should be further investigated. 
In day time conditions, the experts clearly preferred the configuration 3 with three consecutive blinks 
followed by 1 s break. In the night time, none of the configurations were clearly preferred. The results 
suggest that in the night time conditions, the flashing lights caused more glare or were more 
disturbing. Also, in the night time the train can be already easily detectable without flashing lights. 
The visual quality of the night time videos was not as good as in the day time, which may have 
influenced the ratings. Among non-experts, the configuration 3 was most preferred both in the day 
time and in the night time, but the configuration 2 was also popular.  
We were interested to see if the blinking lights would change the appearance of the approaching 
train (e.g. by making it look faster or more threatening), and thus influence the crossing margins (the 
time between the last safe crossing time and the arrival of the train). However, the results do not 
suggest any influence of blinking lights on the crossing margins. In the day time videos, crossing 
margins were somewhat concentrated around time when the movement of the train started to be 
clearly visible. In the night time videos, the responses were more evenly spread. It is possible that 
in the day time conditions the judgments are more based on the estimated arrival time, as the 
respondents have better visual cues about the speed and distance. Interestingly, non-experts 
reported larger crossing margins than experts did. This suggests that non-experts were more 
cautious in their judgements than experts were.  
In the experiment, we did not evaluate the videos filmed from the driver’s point of view. In the day 
time videos, the flashes were not clearly visible, and in the night time videos, they were pronouncedly 
visible, due to the limitations of the video camera. The main concern from the driver’s point of view 
would be the distraction and glare generated by the flashing lights, especially in the night time 
conditions. 
Based on the evaluation, the flashing lights appear to be a promising way to increase the detectability 
of approaching trains, especially in the day time conditions. In the night time conditions, the flashing 
lights can be potentially disturbing or misleading. Ways to address these, e.g. by focusing the lights 
and adapting them to the lighting conditions, should be investigated further. While flashing lights may 
improve detection of approaching trains, the results do clearly show any influence on the reported 
crossing margins.  
Lessons learned 
Figure 73 includes snapshots from the cabin before and during the flash of additional lights. Camera 
image shows the situation when the flash is brightest. Comparing the image what was seen by eyes, 
it is much brighter, probably the human eye cannot register such a short flash. The area in front of 
the vehicle was seen brighter, and the snow reflection increased the effect. Tilting the lights upwards 
reduced those reflections, which indicates that using narrow beam is better. In such cases, the light 
contacts the rail further and the reflection effect is mitigated. 
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Figure 73. Drivers view. Left using the normal lights, right during the flash. Below lights tilted 
upwards. 
On the other hand, the visibility of the tilted light from the virtual level crossing was not good. This 
implies also that disturbance caused to outsiders is rather small. Therefore, the recommendation is 
to use very narrow beam aimed to the direction of the tracks, and its angle should be adjusted so 
that the beam hits the ground somewhere between 500–600 metres away. 
From the on-site point of view the two-flash pattern appeared to be the best. One flash only seemed 
to be much dimmer and the three flashes did not seem to improve the visibility significantly when 
compared to two flashes. However, in the expert evaluation, three flashes was preferred over two 
flashes in the overall evaluation. Tilting lights upwards reduced the visibility. Test day was cloudy 
and the train lights were seen rather well. During darkness the train was seen already behind the 
curve.   
Some open questions and subjects to further tests are: 
− Flash colour. The white colour was used in the current tests. However, it could be also tested 
whether the orange colour has better or worse detectability than white. Cairney (2003) e.g. 
argued that regarding strobe lighting the white flashing lights are relatively ineffective during 
daylight. Instead of increasing the energy output of the strobe lights, it might be more effective 
to add a coloured filter to the lights, despite the energy loss entailed. In addition, Cairney 
(2003) highlighted that with regards to the testing of different colours, it is essential to ensure 
that there is no potential that these additional train lights could be confused with existing road 
and rail signalling.  
− Pattern. Investigation of the optimal light pattern. 
− Weather. Investigation of the influence of fog, rain or snowfall to reflection to driver and 
visibility to road user. 
− Investigation on whether the light pattern should change with speed and/or distance. 
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 Real rail environment (DLR) 
3.8.1. Piloted safety measures 
Two measures were piloted at a passive LC strongly frequented by vulnerable road users (VRU):  
• A message “ Is a train coming? →” written across the road pavement on LC approach  
• A blinking amber light with a train symbol, positioned at the side of the road ahead of the 
tracks. 
Both measures are designed to support safe road user behaviour at passive LCs and can be used 
to address vulnerable (VRU) as well as motorised road users (MRU). 
The major human factors problem observed at passive LCs is that road users often do not scan the 
tracks to the left and right for a train before crossing the tracks (Grippenkoven & Dietsch, 2015; 
Grippenkoven et al., 2016). This is probably caused by a combination of factors, including deficient 
knowledge of the rules and recommended behaviour at passive LCs, insufficient activation of such 
knowledge, low expectancy of a train occurring, and subjective effort of proactive scanning to the left 
and right (Ellinghaus et al., 2015).  
Message “ Is a train coming? →” 
The pavement message (see Figure 74) is expected to work by enhancing the probability that 
oncoming trains get detected by providing a reminder of the necessity to scan the tracks for a train 
and thus facilitating this target behaviour. The message is phrased as a question, not an instruction 
(e.g. “Look for a train!”), to enhance acceptance and evoke road users’ intrinsic interest in knowing 
whether a train is coming. The measure, as it was implemented, requires vision as well as basic 
reading and language skills from the road user to be effective. The message needs to be consciously 
processed and aims to elicit a voluntary visual search for a train. 
 
Figure 74. Implementation of the pavement message on approach to the LC. The German question 
“Kommt ein Zug?” translates to “Is a train coming?”. 
For the pilot, the message was applied to the road surface using removable paint (chalk spray) at 
around 35 m ahead of the LC. 
Blinking amber light with train symbol 
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The blinking train symbol just ahead of the LC is expected to enhance the probability that oncoming 
trains are detected by increasing road users’ awareness that a train might be approaching and thus 
increase the motivation to visually scan the tracks to the left and right. 
In the pilot, the amber light was implemented on the eastern side of the LC (Figure 75). The blinking 
was activated whenever a road user was detected approaching the LC from this side (cf. methods). 
 
a 
 
b 
Figure 75. Implementation of the amber light on approach to the LC. 
3.8.2. Method and data to evaluate the piloted measure 
Test site 
The pilot study took place at a passive LC situated in the north of Braunschweig (see Figure 76) 
mainly frequented by cyclists and pedestrians. The road is closed to four-wheelers, but can also be 
used by single-track motorised vehicles such as motorbikes, as well as other VRUs like horse riders, 
wheel-chair users, skaters etc. Leading through a surrounding of meadows and forest, it is used by 
numerous cyclists on their way to and from work and is also a popular route for leisure trips. 
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a 
 
b 
Figure 76. The test site: passive LC at Ottenroder Straße, Braunschweig (a - aerial view, b - 
western approach view). 
Equipment 
To examine the effects on road user behaviour, the DLR mobile traffic data acquisition system was 
installed at the LC. The system is part of the DLR test field AIM (Application Platform for Intelligent 
Mobility; Knake-Langhorst et al., 2016). The implementation used in the pilot consisted of a semi-
mobile pole on a concrete foundation, a sensor head, and a weather-proof cabinet, containing 
processing computers as well as devices to allow remote access by an LTE-connection and V2X-
ability (see Figure 77). The sensors used were a set of stereo-cameras, supported by an active 
infrared lighting system for artificial scene illumination to enable sensing during day and night time. 
The system fuses the sensor data and automatically processes them into trajectories of the moving 
traffic objects detected. The data contain information about the dimensions and classification (e.g. 
train, pedestrian, cyclist) of the object as well as its location, velocity and other dynamic state 
variables. The trajectories were tracked with a rate of 25Hz and automatically stored in a database. 
Moreover, the low-resolution scene videos that are the input to the computation of the trajectories 
were recorded in accordance with data protection regulations to allow the study of road user 
behaviour beyond kinematics. 
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a 
 
b 
Figure 77. The mobile traffic data acquisition system as used in the pilot: a – pole with sensor 
head and control cabinet, b – positioning of the system relative to the LC (viewed from rear). 
The traffic data acquisition system was also used to control the elicitation of the blinking in the amber 
light measure dependent on the approach of VRUs to the LC. For this, a geofencing algorithm was 
applied to the trajectory data in real time (see Figure 78). The target road segment started at 40 m 
ahead of the LC and ended at 6 m ahead of it. When a road user was detected entering it from the 
eastern side (right side in the figure), the blinking was triggered, continuing until the road user left 
the target area. If other road users entered while the amber light was still active, it remained active 
until the last one was out of the area. The blinking was only elicited by road users with west-bound 
trajectories; road users traveling in the opposite direction did not influence the amber light. 
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Figure 78. Geofencing for triggering the blinking of the amber light (see text for procedure). 
Design and procedure 
The pilot data were collected from mid-August to the end of September 2019. The pilot started with 
the assessment of baseline data at the LC with no additional measure applied (2 weeks), followed 
by a test period with the pavement message Is a train coming? (2 weeks). After a recovery phase 
without a test measure (1 week), the blinking amber light was implemented (2 weeks). 
3.8.3. Evaluation results 
Trajectory data 
Overall, the trajectory data of 18,529 VRUs on a west-bound trajectory were recorded during the  
baseline phase and the two test phases. The majority of these VRUs were bicyclists (n = 16,049). 
The number of pedestrians observed was 2,480. Table 36 shows the frequencies of the types of 
VRUs split by the three pilot phases. 
Table 36. Frequencies of VRU types observed during the test phases. 
  
Condition 
VRU type 
Bicyclists Pedestrians 
Baseline 4,598 618 
Message 6,362 861 
Amber light 5,089 1,001 
 
For slow-moving VRUs such as pedestrians, velocity choices were not expected to play a major role 
for their possibilities to come to a stop ahead of the LC in due time if necessary. Therefore, velocity 
ahead of the LC was only analysed as a safety indicator for the VRU group of bicyclists. Using 
daytime data (between 7:00 am to 7:00 pm), the mean velocity on the last 25 m ahead of the LC 
was computed for each bicyclist. Figure 79 shows the mean of this approach velocity by test 
condition. Bicyclists went 17.5 km/h on average in the baseline condition (SD = 5.58). The mean 
velocity observed in the condition with the Message  Is a train coming? → (M = 17.6, SD = 5.72) 
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does not statistically differ from this value, t(10958) =  -0.912, p = 0.361. However, in the Blinking 
amber light condition, bicyclists went significantly slower than in the baseline condition, with a mean 
velocity of 16.4 km/h (SD = 5.54), t(9685) =  9.912, p = 0.000, all p values Bonferroni-corrected). The 
mean difference of 1.1 km/h represents an effect of small size (Cohen’s d = 0.10). 
 
 
Figure 79. Mean velocity of bicyclists on the last 25 m ahead of the LC by test condition. 
Video Annotation Data 
To assess VRU behavior on approach to the LC, a sample of the low-resolution videos was 
annotated using the ELAN software (Version 4.7.3, https://tla.mpi.nl/tools/tla-tools/elan/, Wittenburg 
et al., 2006). Defined categories of target behaviour included lateral head movements to the left and 
right as an indicator of gaze direction, and visual distraction (e.g. VRU looks down, looks to other 
people). VRU features coded included gender, age group, and VRU type. For each of the three test 
conditions, the behaviour of 80 VRUs with west-bound trajectories was coded. Within each condition, 
an equal sample was taken from the first and last weekday of the respective phase, and within each 
of the sampled days, an equal sample was taken from each of the peak times starting at 7:30 a.m. 
and 5:00 p.m. The first 20 VRUs appearing in each of the defined timeslots were coded. The defined 
LC approach zone started at around 20 m ahead of the tracks and ended at around 1 m ahead of 
the tracks. The low-resolution videos did not allow observation of VRU behaviour ahead of this zone. 
Moreover, due to vegetation, VRUs were probably unable to see the track periphery much before 
entering this area. 
The resulting sample consisted of 240 VRUs (n = 133 male, n = 106 female, n = 1 not assigned). Of 
these, 157 were identified as adults (18–65 years), 37 as youngters (14–17 years), 34 as children 
(0–13 years), and 12 as seniors (> 65 years). The most frequent road user type observed was 
bicyclist (n = 214), the remaining VRUs were pedestrians (n = 20), motorcyclists (n = 2), horse riders 
(n = 1), and other VRUs (n = 3). 
To analyse the effects of the applied measures on active visual search for a train, we assessed how 
many of the observed VRUs turned their head in a given direction (left, right, both ways) at least 
once on LC approach, or turned their head neither way. Head turns that could be assigned to a 
distraction (e.g. VRU looked to other VRU) were not counted. The results are given in Table 37. 
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Table 37. Proportion of VRUs who turned their head in a given direction at least once on LC 
approach (excluding head turns due to distraction). 
Condition n 
% of VRU turning head on LC approach 
Left Right Both ways Neither way 
Baseline 80 87.5 90.0 82.5 3.8 
Message “Is a train coming?” 80 86.3 92.5 83.8 5.0 
Blinking amber light 80 95.0 93.8 90.0 1.3 
 
In the baseline condition, the most desirable behaviour from a safety perspective, turning one’s head 
both to the left and right, was performed by 83 % of VRUs on approach. Around 90 % of VRUs turned 
their head to at least one side, while 4 % did not turn their head at all. In the condition with the 
Message  Is a train coming? →, the observed proportions resemble the ones in the baseline. For 
the Blinking amber light, increases of around 8 % are observed for head turns to the left and both 
ways, and an increase of around 4% is observed for heads turns to the right. The proportion of VRU 
showing no head turn at all drops to 1 %. 
3.8.4. Discussion 
Lessons learned 
Two low-cost safety measures for passive LCs were tested at a LC exclusively frequented by VRUs: 
a message  Is a train coming? → written across the pavement on approach to the LC, and a 
blinking amber light showing a train symbol that was activated whenever a road user approached 
the LC. At passive LCs, the most relevant behaviour to be facilitated by a safety measure is for road 
users to look out to the left and right before crossing the tracks. Based on videos from a mobile traffic 
data acquisition system, VRUs’ head movements on approach to the LC were used as a measure 
of gaze behaviour to assess the effects of the two measures. Moreover, velocity data of fast-moving 
VRUs (bicyclists) were analysed. 
The results show a clear effect of the blinking amber light, increasing the rate of active visual search 
behaviour. No such effect was observed for the message written on the ground. Also, the mean 
velocity of bicyclists ahead of the LC was found to be slightly reduced when the amber light was 
applied, while it remained unchanged with the message on the ground. 
In the interpretation of these results, it is necessary to consider that the vast majority of road users 
who contributed to them were bicyclists. Especially from a bicyclist’s perspective (elevated viewpoint, 
moving relatively fast), the message on the ground was probably less salient than the amber light. 
Therefore, it could be that for pedestrians, who have more time to notice and process the message 
on the ground, the results look different. So far, we could not assess this due to the low number of 
pedestrians observed in the current sample. The video annotation will however be continued to 
answer this question in future research. 
It is interesting to see that the overall proportion of VRUs who checked the rails to the left and right 
obtained in the current study was relatively high compared to the results of other studies (e.g. 
Grippenkoven, & Dietsch, 2015; Grippenkoven et al., 2016). There are several potential reasons for 
this difference. For one thing, the road users analysed in the cited studies were car drivers, not 
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VRUs. As the designation implies, vulnerable road users might be more sensitive to the hazard of a 
collision and therefore more motivated to look out for a train. Another explanation could be seen in 
connection with the velocity at which road users move, as mentioned already, implying that a faster 
approach reduces the (subjective) time available to look any other direction than straight ahead. 
Finally, the assessment method used was different: The cited studies used eye-tracking as opposed 
to the evaluation of head movements applied in the current study. As the low resolution of the videos 
makes the distinction of the target behaviour difficult, the video annotator used a liberal criterion to 
code for head movements. Therefore, the absolute values obtained might overestimate the results 
that would be obtained with other measurement methods. However, the relative differences 
observed between the different conditions would likely remain the same. 
The current study relied on indicators derived from observation only. While behavioural observations 
have the advantage of a high face validity with regard to practical effects on traffic safety, they tell 
us relatively little about the inner views and understanding on the part of the road users. Therefore, 
it would be desirable for future studies to also include subjective assessments, e.g. to assess 
whether the measures were noticed and correctly understood by the road users, whether the 
measures motivated road users to behave safely and how the measures could be improved from a 
user perspective. 
Applicability of results to different circumstances and recommendations 
As mentioned before, the message on the ground might theoretically be more effective for slower-
moving road users such as pedestrians. If the velocity at which the writing is passed is indeed a 
critical factor, the measure in the tested form would not be useful for MRUs either. However, if the 
problem was that our pilot pavement writing was not salient enough to draw the attention of fast-
moving road users, this may be compensated for by enhancing its saliency, e.g. by making it bigger, 
brighter, and / or more colourful. 
Any road marking can only be applied on a paved road with an even surface. Thus, the message 
written on the road does not hold for road environments such as gravel roads, cobblestone, tracks 
etc. For these and other situations, a sign with the same message  Is a train coming? → is a viable 
alternative (cf. subchapter 3.1). 
The blinking amber light showing a train symbol proved effective in the current study. To work, it 
requires electricity, which is often not readily available at passive LCs. If no power connection is 
available, one possibility to design a self-supporting system could be to use batteries and solar cells 
for power supply (Liikennevirasto, 2015). Furthermore, an actuation of the blinking by the 
approaching road users themselves is certainly a useful feature, as the experience of eliciting an 
effect in the environment probably enhances the attention paid by the road user. In the study, the 
actuation was controlled via the mobile traffic data acquisition system, using wireless 
communication. This technical solution lent itself to the implementation as the system was to be 
applied for data acquisition anyway. The same effect could be achieved with easier technical 
solutions as well, e.g. by using a sensor in or near the road (Grippenkoven et al., 2016; Noyce & 
Fambro, 1998). Ultimately, a blinking light with a train symbol could also work steadily, independent 
of road users approaching.  
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4. SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The main safety related findings of each piloted measure are summarised in Table 38 and Table 39. 
Table 38 covers measures mainly concerning indirect safety effects, or measures that enable safe 
crossing of LCs, whereas Table 39 presents the main safety related findings of measures with direct 
safety effects. 
Table 38. Main safety related findings by piloted measure (mainly indirect safety effects). 
Measure Findings 
Smart Detection System ▪ System was able to detect 84% targeted cases (traffic 
disruptions on LC).  
▪ System was able to correctly classify 78.6% of the objects 
detected from a total of 341 objects evaluated (pedestrian, car, 
train and two wheel vehicles). 
Early train and hazard 
information warning by 
means of collective 
perception messaging 
(CPM) and drivers' warning 
▪ Intersection assist safety applications (collision warning safety 
applications) worked safely and reliably according to the 
standards and technical specification of the technology. No 
misbehaviour of the tested methods were detected.  
▪ Extended range train detection showed that by systematic use 
of the demonstrated method, the approaching train is safely 
detectable, warning road users from several kms away from 
the intersection. 
▪ Perception range extension by means of multi-hop 
Decentralized Environmental Notification Message (DENM) 
forwarding can provide another train detection method in LCs 
where no additional infrastructure is available for detection. 
The detection method relies on standard V2X methods. The 
detection accuracy depends on the number of available active 
V2X stations in LC vicinity. 
Smart Communication 
System 1 
(V2X communication) 
▪ The DENMs of all scenarios were well received.  
▪ Communication range: In the case of line-of-sight the 
maximum range is about 250 m. In case of ‘Non line-of-sight’ 
(NLOS), the maximum range in Aachen site (presence of 
trees, buildings etc.), was about 60 to 80 m. With the multi-hop 
solution (two vehicles were used), the maximum range was 
between 160 to 180 meters. 
Smart Communication 
System 2 
(Communication to control 
room) 
▪ Successful transfer of video file between the Smart Detection 
System (SDS) and roadside unit (RSU) using a VPN 
connection and a test RSU.  
▪ When the camera detected an event, the RSU uploaded it to 
the platform, and by clicking on the alert, the video files were 
aggregated, starting from the event detection until the end of 
the event. 
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
▪ The tested methods showed their effectiveness in detecting 
and quantifying a geometric evolution of LC. However, they 
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need to be improved and industrialised to be easily used by 
infrastructure managers. 
V2X messaging system 
between automated 
vehicles and passive level 
crossings 
▪ Enables the safe crossing of passive LCs by automated 
vehicles. 
▪ Accuracy of stopping at the correct point: The average 
stopping distance of the car was 4.22 meters from the virtual 
stop line (0.42 meters from the car front). 
▪ Average time taken for the vehicle to resume movement after 
the traffic light’s change of state was 908 milliseconds. 
Table 39. Main safety related findings by piloted measure (direct safety effects). 
Measure Findings 
Passive LC signs promoting correct behaviour and danger of LCs 
Sign ‘Look for train’ ▪ The sign ‘Look for train’ induced large increases in visual search 
for a train to the left side of the tracks, while search behaviour 
to the right side was hardly increased.  
▪ No effect on approach speed was observed. 
▪ The measure gained high ratings on perceived usefulness and 
ease-of-use dimensions. 
Road marking 
“ Is a train coming? →” 
▪ No change was observed in head turning behaviour on LC 
approach as an indicator of active visual search compared to 
the baseline in a VRU sample consisting mostly of bicyclists. 
▪ No change was observed in mean velocity on LC approach in a 
sample of bicyclists. 
Coloured road markings Results on this measure were very scattered: 
▪ For some, having this marking on the ground was a repetition 
of the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 panel) and was perceived to have 
the same meaning. 
▪ For others, the visual quality of the simulator disturbed them, 
some thought they saw a speed bump, some focused to read 
the text and were subsequently surprised to arrive so quickly at 
the LC.  
▪ Some interpreted the sign as a STOP and some perceived the 
painted arrow as an instruction to accelerate. 
Speed reduction measures 
Speed bumps and flashing 
posts 
▪ More than half of test subjects reacted to the speed bumps, 
leading to a deceleration of LC approach speeds. 
▪ The subjects understood that the speed bumps announce a 
danger, but few associated this with the LC.  
▪ It is noteworthy that very few subjects saw the side light 
beacons as they focused on the speed bumps. 
▪ Some subjects expressed their dislike of speed bumps 
because they considered them uncomfortable or dangerous for 
motorcycles.  
Funnel effect pylons ▪ 60% did not see the safety measure . 
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▪ 30% saw the safety measure but did not understand it. 
▪ Only 10% of subjects understood that there is a danger zone 
with a funnel effect and reacted on the sight on the pylons 
leading to speed reduction on the approach to the LC.  
Noise-producing pavement ▪ The noise-producing pavement did not increase visual search 
for a train, and had no effect on speed.  
▪ This measure gained moderate ratings concerning its 
perceived usefulness and low to moderate ratings concerning 
its ease of use. 
▪ Many of the participants gave the additional qualitative 
feedback that they did not relate the rumbling to the LC. 
Active warnings linked with approaching LC 
Proximity message via in-
car device 
▪ In total, 70% of subjects reacted when receiving a notification 
sound (beep) providing information of LC status (LC closed, 
road works at LC or LC in xx meters), allowing them to 
anticipate their speed on approach to the LC and to better 
prepare for the stop. 
▪ The majority of subjects understood that message was sent to 
anticipate situations demanding attention on approach to the 
LC.  
▪ In situations where the message was not received, the 
subjects resumed their typical behavior and were not worried 
about the lack of message. 
▪ Based on the interviews some subjects preferred to 
concentrate on their driving because receiving messages on a 
screen distracts them and forces them to take their eyes off the 
road, which they considered dangerous. 
Blinking amber light with 
train symbol 
▪ Increase by 4−8% observed in head turning behaviour on LC 
approach (left, right, both ways) as an indicator of active visual 
search compared to the baseline in a VRU sample consisting 
mostly of bicyclists. 
▪ Slight decrease (-1.1 km/h) observed in mean velocity on LC 
approach in a sample of bicyclists. 
Blinking lights drawing 
driver attention (Perilight) 
▪ The PeriLight induced large increases in visual search for a train 
both to the left and the right side of the tracks as well as a speed 
reduction on approach to the LC.  
▪ Significant decrease in speed on LC approach, starting at ~100 
m before LC with maximum at ~50 m before LC. 
▪ The measure gained high ratings on perceived usefulness and 
moderate to high ratings on the ease-of-use dimensions. 
Traffic lights Flashing orange light 
▪ All the participants slowed down at the sight of the flashing 
orange light, even those who misinterpreted it to indicate a 
road intersection. 
▪ The participants often reported being confused when meeting 
a flashing orange traffic light. Confusing elements included the 
orange color, the flashing itself, and the light’s position as the 
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lowest light. 
▪ An orange flashing light can be a source of distraction, leading 
to sudden or hard braking, or uncertainty over the risk of an 
approaching train. Moreover, it is possible that the participants 
habituate to the warning, slowing down only during the first 
times.  
Green light 
▪ The green light visibly reassures the participants. It 
encouraged them to cross the LC without precautions and at 
higher speeds. 
▪ In some cases the green light could cancel the caution induced 
by the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 panel) (lack of indication on the 
triggering of the LC). When participants see the green light, 
they trust that there will be no train and speed up. The four 
subjects who were aware of the contradiction between green 
light and the approaching LC pointed out the limits of this 
solution. 
Active warnings linked with approaching train 
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
▪ LCs usage: ~600 vehicles and more than 200k registered 
trajectories in ~6 months. 
▪ No significant differentiations in aggregated speed and 
acceleration profiles identified in the pre-post system 
comparison. 
▪ There are no indications of distinct and characteristic driving 
behaviors amongst the taxi drivers. 
▪ Disaggregated examination of trajectories reveal 
improvements in five safety related KPIs for the case when the 
barriers are open. “Safety checks” with the warning system 
enabled appear to be more frequent, longer and at safer 
spatial distance to the rail line. 
▪ The Artificial Neural Network predictive algorithm is capable of 
highly accurate predictions on the estimated time of train 
arrival to LC. 
▪ Encouraging feedback from the questionnaires answered by 
taxi drivers. Before deploying the piloted system, the majority 
stated that LC safety infrastructure in Thessaloniki is 
inadequate. After its deployment, most drivers reported that 
they felt safer and that they trust the provided information; 
many of them would be interested in using the system in the 
future.  
Rings ▪ Majority (90%) of the subjects interpreted this measure as a 
village entrance decoration unrelated to the LC. 
▪ Only 10% of the subjects understood that the rings indicated the 
approaching train and closure of the LC. 
▪ Some subjects were so focused on this safety measure that 
they missed some information such as the ‘LC ahead’ sign (A7 
panel) or the approaching LC and were surprised at the sight 
of the LC being closed. 
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▪ The subjects were often distracted by the rings and did not 
make the link with the LC. 
Measures improving detectability of train 
Additional warning light 
system at front of the 
locomotive 
▪ Auxiliary strobe lights were estimated to improve visibility and 
detectability of train as well as safety at LCs. 
▪ In daytime conditions, the experts clearly preferred the 
warnings lights with three consecutive blinks followed by 3 s 
break. In the night time condition, none of the configurations 
were clearly preferred. 
▪ Auxiliary strobe lights appear to be a promising way to 
increase the detectability of approaching trains, especially 
under daytime conditions. 
Improved train visibility 
using lights 
▪ The blinking train was detected earlier and more reliably than 
the normal train, induced earlier speed reduction. 
▪ This measure gained high subjective ratings on the usefulness 
and ease-of-use dimensions assessed. 
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5. ESTIMATION OF SAFETY POTENTIAL  
Due to the small-scale nature of the conducted pilot tests, it was not possible to calculate quantitative 
estimates on safety effects of the measures in terms of annual reductions in the number of LC 
fatalities and/or accidents based on the results of the pilots. However, since numerical estimates of 
safety effects are needed for the cost-benefit calculations (WP5 of the SAFER-LC project) the 
authors made an attempt to draw these estimates based on: i) existing statistics on LC safety 
(subchapter 5.1), and ii) existing studies on effects of LC safety measures (subchapter 5.2). 
Table 40 presents the overview of safety measures piloted in the SAFER-LC project and their short 
descriptions. The focus has now shifted from the pilot sites to the investigation of individual safety 
measures and their effects. Therefore, in Table 40 the similar measures and their descriptions have 
been combined.  
Table 40. Overview of safety measures piloted in the SAFER-LC project and their short descriptions. 
Type of measure Name of measure Short description 
Measures with mostly 
indirect safety effects 
Smart detection and 
communication system 
System (interfaced with a roadside unit) 
which sends information to cars, control 
room and trains about potentially 
dangerous situations detected at active LCs 
by cameras and/or V2X communication. 
V2X messaging system 
between automated 
vehicles (AVs) and 
passive LCs 
V2X messaging system enabling 
automated vehicles (AVs) to cross the 
passive LCs safety. 
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
System monitoring the condition of LCs and 
detecting potential problems with rail 
infrastructure (e.g. any deterioration) by 
using sensors on the track and road 
(seismic sensors, photogrammetric system 
and thermal infrared method).  
Passive LC signs 
promoting correct 
behaviour and danger 
of LCs 
Objective: improve 
detection of LC and 
assist in visual search 
for potentially 
approaching train 
Sign ‘Look for train’ Sign displaying a message and pictogram 
advising road users to look for a potentially 
approaching train.  
Road marking 
“ Is a train coming? →” 
Message on pavement reminding road user 
to scan the tracks for a potentially 
approaching train. 
Coloured road markings Painting of road leading to a LC with 
different colours combined with pavement 
marking with text: “train”. 
Speed reduction 
measures  
Objective: reduce LC 
approach speeds and 
Speed bumps and 
flashing posts 
Installation of an array of speed bumps 
(150, 100 and 50 m) before the LC. To 
increase effectiveness, the bumps are 
coupled with red flashing posts (equipped 
with red LED lights). 
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improve detection of 
LC. 
Funnel effect pylons Creating a funnel effect on approach to LC 
on straight roads. This effect is achievable 
by installing 10–15 pylons of different sizes 
covered with reflective stickers on both 
sides of the road from a distance of 2 
meters of the LC to 10 meters. Pylons are 
placed at an angle which generates the 
funnel effect. 
Noise-producing 
pavement 
Use of special road pavement, which 
passively produces noise and vibration as 
cars drive over it. 
Active warnings 
linked with 
approaching LC 
Objective: draw driver 
attention and increase 
the probability that road 
users detect the 
approaching LC and 
scan for potentially 
approaching trains. 
Proximity message via 
in-car device 
System provides information on LC status 
(LC closed, LC at 300 m etc.) to car drivers 
via in-vehicle device 
Blinking amber light with 
train symbol 
Blinking train symbol located just ahead of 
the LC, which activates whenever a road 
user is approaching a LC.  
Blinking lights drawing 
driver attention (Perilight) 
Blinking lights positioned in the peripheral 
vicinity of a LC (left and right), which 
activate whenever a road user is 
approaching a LC and support the visual 
scanning of tracks for potentially 
approaching trains.  
Traffic lights Use of traffic lights at LCs (instead of 
conventional LC lights) to support road 
users to respect the stop before the LC. 
Active warnings 
linked with 
approaching train  
Objective: improve 
detection of LC and 
provide up-to-date 
information on 
potentially approaching 
trains 
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
System informing car drivers about the 
presence of a LC through a dedicated pop-
up window and a short audio alert via in-
vehicle device on LC approach. The 
warning also includes the estimated time of 
arrival whenever and incoming train is 
expected to reach the LC within one 
minute.  
Rings Installation of two rings above the road 
before the LC (one 10 meters in before the 
LC and another one 150–200 meters before 
the LC). The rings are equipped with a set 
of LEDs and an orange light, which flash 
when train is approaching. 
Measures improving 
detectability of train 
Objective: improve the 
detection of a train 
Additional warning light 
system at front of the 
locomotive 
Installation of additional blinking lights on 
the locomotive to complement the regular 
triangular lights. The blinking lights activate 
when the train is arriving to the LC. 
Improved train visibility 
using lights 
Installation of additional blinking lights on 
the locomotive to complement the regular 
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triangular lights. The blinking lights activate 
when the train is arriving to the LC. 
 Definition of targeted LC accidents 
The identification of available information on LC accidents started by the review of the available 
European-wide LC accident statistics and the already collected and documented information on in-
depth analysis of LC accidents in selected countries which was conducted as part of deliverable 
D1.2 (Silla et al., 2017). Based on these reviews, the three most relevant variables related to LC 
accidents for the identification of the safety effects were selected:  
− Type of LC 
− Type of victim, and 
− Type of behaviour. 
The shares of LC accidents by type of LC used in our estimations of safety potential were taken from 
the ERAIL database (2019) sustained by the European Union Agency for Railways. This data 
includes information for all EU-28 countries. In our assessment, we used the accident data from 
2016 that was the most recent and most complete data reported to the ERAIL database. The 
breakdown of LC types according to the level of protection was applied from the categorisation used 
by the European Union Agency for Railways (see e.g. European Union Agency for Railways, 2017; 
ERAIL database, 2019): 
− Active LC with automatic user-side warning 
− Active LC with automatic user-side protection (and warning) 
− Active LC with automatic user-side protection and warning, and rail-side protection5  
− Active LC with manual user-side protection and/or warning 
− Passive LC 
The share of LC accidents by type of LC in 2016 in EU-28 is reported in Table 41. 
                                            
5  “Rail-side protected: A level crossing where a signal or other train protection system permits a train to 
proceed once the level crossing is fully user-side protected and is free from incursion” (EU DIRECTIVE 
2016/798). 
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Table 41. Share of LC accidents by type of LC in 2016 in EU-281 (n=369) (ERAIL database 2019). 
Type of LC Share 
Active LC 
with automatic user side warning 30.62% 
with automatic user-side protection (and warning) 22.22% 
with automatic user-side protection and warning, and rail-
side protection 
3.25% 
with manual user-side protection and/or warning 4.07% 
Passive LC 39.84% 
Total 100% 
1 Data from 2016 excluding CY, DK, FR and IT due to the incompleteness of the reported data. 
The ERAIL database also includes data on the total number of annually killed and seriously injured 
persons in LC accidents by country. If considering the same countries as for the dataset presented 
in Table 41 above, 213 persons were killed and 202 were seriously injured in LC accidents in 2016. 
The total number of LC accidents in 2016 was 369, and hence, based on the above numbers, we 
can assume that most of the LC accidents reported to the ERAIL database include serious injuries 
and/or fatalities. However, the number of killed and seriously injured persons is not presented by LC 
type and thus cannot be used in our assessment. 
The information on the share of LC accidents by type of victim was collected from one of the earlier 
deliverables (D1.2) produced in the SAFER-LC project (Silla et al., 2017). The shares of LC 
accidents by type of victim presented in Table 42 covers in-depth LC accident data from Greece 
(2012–2017), Finland (2006–2015), France (2012–2016), Italy (2011–2016), Norway (2012–2016), 
and Turkey (2012–2016). 
Table 42. Share of LC accident severities by type of victim (Silla et al., 2017). 
Type of victim Fatalities (%) Injuries (%) 
Car drivers & passengers 53.38% 75.92% 
Mopedists & motorcyclists 6.77% 4.63% 
Pedestrians & cyclists 37.22% 16.21% 
Other 2.63% 3.24% 
Total 100% (n=266) 100% (n=216) 
The information on type of victim was not available by LC type and thus the similar shares were 
assumed to both active and passive LCs. Furthermore, in our assessment, only the division of 
fatalities by victim type was used. This approach was chosen as most of the LC accidents contained 
within the ERAIL database include serious injuries and/or fatalities. In Silla et al. (2017) the variable 
‘Injuries’ included both serious and light injuries and thus the shares for the ‘Fatalities’ were 
considered more relevant for the safety potential estimation conducted as part of this study. 
Share of fatal LC accidents by type of behaviour resulting in the realisation of LC accidents and by 
type of LC are presented in Table 43. The categories for the behaviour were identified from two 
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sources: 1) An article written by Laapotti (2016), and 2) Deliverable D1.2 of this project (Silla et al., 
2017). Finally, the categories for the type of behaviour were adapted from Laapotti (2016). While 
Laapotti (2016) separated the ‘Situation awareness error’ into two separate categories: ‘Observation 
error’ and ‘Anticipation or evaluation error’, the two are combined in this study, since without detailed 
accident description the classification of behaviours to detailed categories was found challenging.  
Table 43. Share of fatal LC accidents by type of behaviour resulting in the realisation of LC 
accidents and by type of LC (Silla et al., 2017; Laapotti, 2016). 
Type of behaviour 
Active LC (%) 
(Silla et al. 2017) 
Passive LC (%) 
(Laapotti 2016) 
Situation awareness error 53.5% 93.5% 
Vehicle handling error 9.3% 2.8% 
Other human risk factors 34.9% 2.8% 
Vehicle risk factors 1.5% 0.9% 
Other 0.8% 0.0% 
Total 100% (n=129) 100% (n=107) 
Laapotti analysed fatal motor vehicle accidents at level crossings in Finland during the years 1991–
2011 (n=142). She compared accidents at passive and active railway level crossings, and both 
immediate and background risk factors were considered. The accidents analysed by Laapotti were 
originally investigated in detail by road accidents investigation teams. In total, 79% of investigated 
LC accidents in Finland occurred in passive LC and thus the findings from Laapotti were used for 
passive LCs. The information on different types of behaviours related to accidents at active LCs were 
applied from the French data reported in Silla et al. (2017). The French data covers the years 2012–
2016, and in France 87% of fatal LC accidents and 81% of LC accidents with injuries only occur at 
active LCs. To be consistent, the shares presented in Table 43 concern fatal LC accidents both in 
active and passive LCs. 
Targeted LC accidents by piloted safety measure according to the above categorisations are 
presented in Table 44.  
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Table 44. Definition of targeted LC accidents by safety measure. 
Measure 
Type of LC Type of victim Type of behaviour 
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Smart detection and 
communication system 
X X X   X X X (x) X X (x) X  
V2X messaging system 
between AVs and passive LCs 
    X X    X X (x) (x)  
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
No information available 
Sign ‘Look for train’     X X X X X X  (x)   
Road marking     X (x) X X X X  (x)   
Coloured road markings  X X   X (x) (x)  X     
Speed bump and flashing 
posts 
 X X   X (x)   X     
Funnel effect pylons  X X   X (x)   X     
Noise-producing pavement (x)    X X (x)   X  (x)   
Proximity message via in-car 
device 
 X X   X (x)   X     
Blinking amber light with train 
symbol 
    X X X X X X  (x)   
Blinking lights drawing driver 
attention (Perilight) 
    X X X X X X  (x)   
Traffic lights  X X   X (x) (x)  X     
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
(x) (x) (x) X X X (x)   X  (x)   
Rings  X X   X (x)   X     
Additional warning light system 
at front of the locomotive 
    X X (x) (x)  X     
Improved train visibility using 
lights 
(x) (x) (x) (x) X X X X X X  (x)   
The safety potential of each measure is presented in Table 45. This table includes an estimation on 
the share of potentially prevented LC accidents by measure. This estimate is calculated based on 
the markings included in the previous table (Table 44). The low value indicated the markings with 
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‘X’. The high value covers also the markings with ‘(x)’. If no markings with brackets exist, the low and 
high value are the same. 
Table 45. Share of potentially prevented LC accidents by measure (including a range from low to 
high). 
Measure 
Type of LC Type of victim 
Type of 
behaviour 
Total 
Low 
(%) 
High 
(%) 
Low 
(%) 
High 
(%) 
Low 
(%) 
High  
(%) 
Low 
(%) 
High 
(%) 
Smart detection and 
communication system 
56.1% 56.1% 97.4% 100.0% 64.3% 99.2% 35.1% 55.6% 
V2X messaging system 
between AVs and passive LCs 
39.8% 39.8% 53.4% 53.4% 96.3% 100.0% 20.5% 21.3% 
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
No information available 
Sign ‘Look for train’ 39.8% 39.8% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 96.3% 37.3% 38.4% 
Road marking 39.8% 39.8% 46.6% 100.0% 93.5% 96.3% 17.4% 38.4% 
Coloured road markings 25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 97.4% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 13.3% 
Speed bump and flashing 
posts 
25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 60.2% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 8.2% 
Funnel effect pylons 25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 60.2% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 8.2% 
Noise-producing pavement 39.8% 70.5% 53.4% 60.2% 93.5% 96.3% 19.9% 40.8% 
Proximity message via in-car 
device 
25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 60.2% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 8.2% 
Blinking amber light with train 
symbol 
39.8% 39.8% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 96.3% 37.3% 38.4% 
Blinking lights drawing driver 
attention (Perilight) 
39.8% 39.8% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 96.3% 37.3% 38.4% 
Traffic lights 25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 97.4% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 13.3% 
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
43.9% 100.0% 53.4% 60.2% 93.5% 96.3% 21.9% 57.9% 
Rings 25.5% 25.5% 53.4% 60.2% 53.5% 53.5% 7.3% 8.2% 
Additional warning light system 
at front of the locomotive 
39.8% 39.8% 53.4% 97.4% 93.5% 93.5% 19.9% 36.3% 
Improved train visibility using 
lights 
39.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 93.5% 96.3% 37.3% 96.3% 
 Effectiveness estimates 
The estimates on the effectiveness of LC safety measures were investigated to some extent as part 
of the literature review conducted in Task 2.1 and reported in deliverable D2.1 (SAFER-LC 
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Consortium, 2018c). This literature review covered 125 documents, which were collected from online 
scientific databases and web tools (e.g. RSSB Spark web tool), ResearchGate database, websites 
of related research projects and cited references listed in the bibliography of other publications. No 
limits were set to the geographic coverage or type of literature to be included. The Review Form 
used in Task 2.1 included a specific field to document information on safety measures investigated 
or discussed as part of the reviewed documents. However, only some of the safety measures piloted 
in the SAFER-LC project were covered in this literature review and hence additional information 
sources were needed.  
The main source for the effectiveness estimates used in this study was the study of Silla et al. (2015) 
on Survey and assessment of measures aiming to improve the safety of LCs. This study investigated 
the measures from a Finnish perspective. In total, the assessment included 15 criteria, of which the 
safety effects of the measure was most relevant for the assessment conducted as part of the SAFER-
LC project. Information on safety effects of each measure were primarily collected from Finnish level 
crossing related studies, and from the presentations of the biannual international level crossing 
symposiums (held since 2004). These sources were complemented with literature review and the 
studies indicated in the reference list of the above documents. The assessment included 37 safety 
measures. The list of measures selected for the assessment was rather comprehensive and included 
most measures that are known to be used in some countries or are estimated to be promising for 
the prevention of level crossing accidents. 
The estimates on safety effects in Silla et al. (2017) were mainly based on i) the findings from 
previous assessment studies, and ii) the estimates of safety effects used in the Finnish safety 
evaluation tool Tarva LC (for estimation of safety effects of level crossing improvements using impact 
coefficients) (Peltola et al., 2012; Peltola, 2012). Peltola et al. (2012) worked out the estimates of 
safety effects based on an extensive review of international literature. The final estimates in Peltola 
et al. (2012) were produced by a group of Finnish level crossing experts based on the first estimates 
of the effects collected from the literature.  
Numerical estimates in Silla et al. (2015) were only provided if quantitative estimates were available 
in previous assessment studies or in Peltola et al. (2012). The estimates were provided by using the 
following ranges: 
− < 5% 
− 5–20% 
− 20−50% 
− > 50% 
− No information (no estimates available) 
The estimated safety effects by piloted safety measure are listed in Table 46.  
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Table 46. Estimated safety effects by piloted safety measure. 
Measure Estimated effectiveness Reduction 
Smart detection and 
communication system 
▪ No direct safety effects. 
▪ Effectiveness depends on the action taken by 
the personnel in the control room, unless the 
information is automatically provided to engine 
drivers and/or car drivers. 
– 
V2X messaging system 
between AVs and passive 
LCs 
▪ No direct safety effects. 
▪ Enables the safety crossing of LCs by AVs. 
− 
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
▪ No direct safety effects. 
▪ Effectiveness depends on actions made based 
on detected problems. The main benefits are 
expected to be related to costs that can be 
avoided if infrastructure maintenance becomes 
more targeted. 
– 
Sign ‘Look for train’ 
▪ Estimate for ‘Traffic signs warning/informing 
road users of approaching LC’ could be applied 
to this measure (Silla et al., 2015). 
▪ In the pilot test, the fraction of road users who 
did not look for a train at a passive crossing was 
reduced by 1−15%, depending on the test 
condition (left / right). 
▪ The effectiveness estimate was chosen as <5% 
due to the following reasoning: i) The above 
reduction (1–15%) is limited to LC accidents 
due to observation error. ii) It is not possible to 
assume that all road users who look at the 
approaching train will also act appropriately to 
avoid an accident by action. iii) The pilot study 
did not cover behavioural adaptation (i.e. long-
term effects) which is rather likely with road user 
activated safety measures. 
<5% 
Road marking  
“ Is a train coming? →” 
▪ Estimate for ‘Road markings to highlight LC’ 
could be applied to this measure (Silla et al., 
2015). 
▪ In the pilot test, the fraction of road users who 
did not look for a train at a passive crossing was 
not reduced with this measure. 
<5% 
Coloured road markings 
▪ Estimate for ‘Road markings to highlight LC’ 
could be applied to this measure (Silla et al., 
2015). 
<5% 
Speed bumps and flashing 
posts 
▪ Estimate for ‘Speed bumps’ could be applied to 
this measure (Silla et al., 2015). 
5–20% 
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Funnel effect pylons 
▪ No numerical estimate available. 
▪ Effect was conservatively estimated to be 1/10 
of the effect with more 'intrusive’ speed 
reduction measures (speed bumps and noise-
producing pavement). 
0.5–2% 
(instead of 
5–20%) 
Noise-producing 
pavement 
▪ Estimate for ‘Speed bumps’ (Silla et al., 2015) 
could be used as a starting point. 
▪ Effect was estimated to be half of the effect of 
speed bumps since noise-producing pavement 
does not 'force' the driver to slow down the 
same way as the speed bumps do. 
▪ The results of the pilot reveal that subjects in the 
simulator study did not reliably relate this 
measure to the LC.  
2.5–10% 
(instead of 
5–20%) 
Proximity message via in-
car device 
▪ No numerical estimate available. 
▪ Effectiveness was estimated to be significantly 
smaller than in in-vehicle warning system since 
this system provides information on active LCs 
that are equipped with warning devices. 
▪ Some subjects in the simulator study indicated 
that they preferred to concentrate on their 
driving instead of the messages. This was 
because reading messages on a screen was 
considered distracting and dangerous, as it 
forced subjects to look elsewhere from the road. 
<5% 
Blinking amber light with 
train symbol 
▪ Estimate for ‘Active warning signs’ (Silla et al., 
2015) could be used as a starting point. 
▪ Estimate on active warning light includes both 
vehicle activated and train activated lights. 
Since this is vehicle activated sign the 
effectiveness was estimated to be closer to the 
low range of the estimate. 
▪ In the pilot test, the fraction of road users who 
did not look for a train at a passive crossing was 
reduced by 4 to 8%, depending on the test 
condition (left / right). 
5–10% 
(instead of 
5–20%) 
Blinking lights drawing 
driver attention (Perilight) 
▪ Estimate for ‘Active warning signs’ (Silla et al., 
2015) could be used as a starting point. 
▪ In the pilot test, the fraction of road users who 
did not look for a train at a passive crossing was 
reduced by 19% (both left and right). 
▪ This same measure was also piloted by 
Grippenkoven et al. (2016). They found out that 
the reduction of fraction of drivers who did not 
look was: 47% on the left, 23% on the right side 
in daytime; 59% on the left, 53% on the right 
side at night.  
5–20% 
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▪ The effectiveness estimate was chosen as 5–
20% due to following reasoning: i) The above 
reduction (23–59%) is limited to LC accidents 
due to observation error. ii) It is not possible to 
assume that all road users who look at the 
approaching train will also act appropriately to 
avoid an accident by action. iii) The focus 
should be on the reduction in daytime since 
based on deliverable D1.2 (Silla et al., 2017) 
most LC accidents occur during daytime. iv) The 
pilot study did not cover behavioural adaptation 
(i.e. long-term effects) which is rather likely with 
road user activated safety measures. 
Traffic lights 
▪ No information available. 
▪ Rather small safety effects are expected since 
this measure was installed to active LCs with 
barriers. 
<5% 
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
▪ No numerical estimate available. 
▪ Estimate for ‘Active warning signs’ could be 
applied to this measure (Silla et al., 2015) could 
be used as a starting point. 
▪ Estimate on active warning light includes both 
vehicle activated and train activated lights. 
Since in addition to vehicle activation this 
includes information on train arrival the 
effectiveness was estimated almost similar to 
train activated lights (which provide warning only 
when a train is approaching). 
10–15% 
(instead of 
5–20%) 
Rings 
▪ No numerical estimate available. 
▪ Estimate for ‘Train activated warning light at LC’ 
(Silla et al., 2015) could be used as a starting 
point. 
▪ Effectiveness was estimated to be smaller since 
the design of the warning does not directly link 
the warning to an approaching train. Majority 
(90%) of the subjects in the simulator study 
interpreted this measure as a village entrance 
decoration unrelated to the LC. 
2.5–10% 
(instead of 
5–20%) 
Additional warning light 
system at front of the 
locomotive 
▪ Mok & Savage (2005) analysed US LC accident 
data (1975–2001) using negative binomial 
regression analysis. The results show that use 
of ditch lights (additional lights on locomotives) 
reduced LC accidents by 29% and fatalities by 
44%. Despite LC safety gradually increasing 
over the time period, the data show a 
substantial 30% decrease in accidents from 
1994–1998, following an FRA mandate to install 
ditch lights on all trains. These reduction 
estimates were not directly applied to our study 
15–30% 
(instead of 
29–44%) 
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since the modelling exploited currently almost 
25 years old accident data. The European 
railway safety has improved from those days 
and thus the obtained effectiveness estimates 
cannot be applied as such to the current 
situation. In addition, the authors mentioned that 
the calculated reduction could also be 
influenced by general improvements in road 
safety and improvements in LC environments 
that could not be considered by the model. 
▪ In the pilot test, the fraction of road users who 
did not look for a train at a passive crossing was 
reduced 11−20%, depending on the test 
condition (left / right). 
▪ The findings of Grippenkoven et al. (2016) can 
also be considered relevant for the additional 
blinking lights at train front even though they 
were not directly applied to the effectiveness 
estimate (see reasoning used for Perilight). 
However, the difference here is that this 
measure is linked to the approaching train and 
hence no significant behavioural adaptation is 
expected. 
▪ Based on deliverable D1.2 (Silla et al., 2017) it 
is expected that the effectiveness of this 
measure is higher at passive LCs compared to 
the active ones due to a high share (34.9%) of 
LC accidents at active LCs that are due to other 
human risk factors (i.e. deliberate risk taking) 
which (most probably) cannot be prevented with 
this measure. The corresponding share at 
passive LCs is 2.8%. 
Improved train visibility 
using lights 
▪ See above (Additional warning light system at 
front of the locomotive). 
15–30% 
(instead of 
29–44%) 
The above effectiveness estimates were applied to the share of relevant LC accidents. Such 
estimates were performed separately for all safety measures. The challenge was that some of the 
measures were applied to different types of LCs than they were expected to be most effective in 
deliverable D2.3 (Dressler et al. 2018). Therefore, the calculation of the potential safety effects were 
conducted to targeted LC types identified in WP4 and in Dressler et al. (2018). The targeted LC 
types by safety measure are presented in Table 47 and the estimates of safety effects by measure 
are presented in Table 48. 
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Table 47. Targeted LC types by safety measure. 
Measure WP4 Dressler et al. 2018 
Smart detection and 
communication system 
Active LCs with automatic 
user-side warning and/or 
protection 
Active LCs with automatic user-
side protection 
V2X messaging system 
between AVs and passive 
LCs 
Passive LCs Not included 
Monitoring and remote 
maintenance 
All LC types Not included 
Sign ‘Look for train’ Passive LCs Passive LCs 
Written letters on ground Passive LCs Not directly included 
Coloured road markings 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
All types of LCs 
Speed bumps and flashing 
posts 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
Passive LCs 
Funnel effect pylons 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
Passive LCs 
Noise-producing pavement 
Passive LCs, (Active LCs 
with automatic user-side 
warning) 
Passive LCs 
Proximity message via in-
car device 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
Passive LCs 
(and all other LC types) 
Blinking amber light with 
train symbol 
Passive LCs Passive LCs 
Blinking lights drawing 
driver attention (PeriLight) 
Passive LCs Passive LCs 
Traffic lights 
Active LCs with user side 
protection (and warning) 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
In-vehicle train and LC 
proximity warning 
Passive LCs, Active LCs with 
manual user-side warning 
and/or protection, (all other 
LC types) 
Passive LCs 
(and all other LC types) 
Rings 
Active LCs with user-side 
protection (and warning) 
Passive LCs 
Additional warning light 
system at front of the 
locomotive 
Passive LCs 
 
All types of LCs 
Improved train visibility 
using lights 
Passive LCs 
(all other LC types) 
All types of LCs 
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Table 48. Estimates of safety effects by measure assuming 100% coverage (LCs, train and/or road 
users) in the implementation of each measure. 
Measure 
Estimated effectiveness 
WP4 Dressler et al. 2018 
Low High Low How 
Smart detection and communication 
system 
No direct safety effects expected 
V2X messaging system between AVs 
and passive LCs 
No direct safety effects expected 
Monitoring and remote maintenance No direct safety effects expected 
Sign ‘Look for train’ 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 2.0% 
Road marking 0.0% 2.0% Not included 
Coloured road markings 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 5.0% 
Speed bumps and flashing posts 1.3% 5.1% 2.0% 8.0% 
Funnel effect pylons 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.8% 
Noise-producing pavement 1.0% 7.1% 1.0% 4.0% 
Proximity message via in-car device 0.0% 1.3% Not included 
Blinking amber light with train symbol 2.0% 4.0% 2.0% 4.0% 
Blinking lights drawing driver attention 
(Perilight) 
2.0% 8.0% 2.0% 8.0% 
Traffic lights 0.0% 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% 
In-vehicle train and LC proximity 
warning 
4.4% 15.0% 4.0% 15.0% 
Rings 0.6% 2.6% 1.0% 4.0% 
Additional warning light system at 
front of the locomotive 
6.0% 12.0% 15.0% 30.0% 
Improved train visibility using lights 6.0% 30.0% 15.0% 30.0% 
The above safety estimates assume 100% coverage regarding the implementation of the measure. 
Specifically, this means that all relevant LCs, trains and/or road users would be equipped with the 
system.  In addition, the above estimates assume that the functionality and reliability of the system 
is 100% safe all the time and all the road users obey the provided information and/or warnings. In 
practice, these assumptions are unrealistic. This holds especially for the first assumption on 
penetration rate of each safety measure. It is not economically feasible and not necessarily even 
practical to equip all the LCs, trains and/or road users with the piloted safety measures.  
The connection between safety benefits and the penetration rate is not expected to be linear. For 
example, in case the implementation of piloted safety measure(s) start from the most accident prone 
LCs (with high road traffic volumes), high safety benefits can be expected even with low 
implementation rates. Therefore, in future exploitation phases, it would be useful to identify the LCs 
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with the higher marginal results for an efficient implementation. This has to satisfy the positive 
marginal utility aspect which means the safety measures should be applied in LCs that will introduce 
clear benefits to the users by avoiding fatalities, (severe and light) injuries, environmental damage, 
infrastructure damages (rail, road – vehicles included), and (primary and secondary) traffic delays. 
The benefits of the piloted safety measures will be estimated and presented in deliverable D5.3 
(Business models to deploy the SAFER-LC solutions). 
Furthermore, it is important to note that the estimates for safety effects vary significantly depending 
on the estimation in regards to targeted LC types. The measures with high effectiveness estimates 
in Table 48 are typically those that are estimated to be relevant for all types of LCs (see Table 47).  
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6. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The piloting of safety measures in WP4 was conducted in various level crossing environments and 
in different countries as described in deliverable D4.3 (Carrese et al., 2019). In some cases, the 
selected measures were not suitable for piloting in a real world experimental context and/or the 
implementation in real railway environment was not feasible, for example, due to financial resources, 
timing of our piloting period and/or lack of suitable pilot site(s). Therefore, pilot test sites in the 
SAFER-LC projects varied from simulation studies to controlled conditions and real railway 
environments. Some of the measures (‘In-vehicle warnings to driver’, and ‘Additional lights to train 
front’) were tested in two different environments to collect complementary information on their safety 
effects via two types of installation. 
As indicated in chapter 2.2 of this deliverable, it was recommended to the pilot test leaders to carry 
out an evaluation: (1) in a real experimental context (i.e. units are assigned randomly to a treated 
and untreated group to control the potentially confounding factors) and (2) by collecting evaluation 
data both in ‘before’ and ‘after’ conditions. Pilot test leaders were encouraged to collect control data 
whenever possible, especially, in before-after (baseline and after implementation) studies to allow 
the separation of the effects of the measure from other simultaneously affecting factors. In practice, 
the data collection for many of the pilots were short term. This was partly due to the nature of the 
piloting (simulator studies) and partly due to financial and time constraints. Many of the pilots 
included ‘before’ and ‘after’ data collection but the collection of control data was more limited. Since 
the time for the piloting was rather short in many of the pilots, the results did not allow any estimation 
on the long term effects of measures.  
Due to the nature of the conducted pilots (small-scale pilot tests), it was hardly possible to calculate 
any quantitative estimates for safety effects of the measures in terms of annual reductions in the 
number of LC fatalities and/or accidents based on the results of the pilots. However, since numerical 
estimates of safety effects are needed for cost-benefit calculations (WP5 of the SAFER-LC project), 
the authors made an attempt to draw these estimates based on the applicability of safety measures 
to different LC types, road users and behaviours leading to LC accidents (subchapter 5.1) based on 
pre-existing information on the effects of LC safety measures (subchapter 5.2). The authors 
acknowledge that many uncertainties are related to these estimates. However, the assumptions 
used in the calculations are clearly documented and hence the estimates can be easily updated if 
more detailed statistics or more information on safety effects become available. Therefore, a detailed 
documentation of LC accident data (information on additional variables and details) is highly 
recommended to enable drawing of these estimates. 
It should be noted that some of the piloted safety measures are somewhat different from the ones 
reported in the SAFER-LC deliverable D2.3 (Dressler et al., 2018). In Dressler et al. (2018) the safety 
measures were divided into three different groups: 1) Measures for passive level crossings, 2) 
Measures for level crossings with barriers, and 3) Measures for all kinds of level crossings. In our 
safety potential estimation the LC type groups were slightly different due to the classifications used 
in the railway accident database sustained by the European Union Agency for Railways (see e.g. 
European Union Agency for Railways 2017 and ERAIL database 2019). In this classification the 
main categories for the LC types include: 
− Active LC with automatic user-side warning 
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− Active LC with automatic user-side protection (and warning) 
− Active LC with automatic user-side protection and warning, and rail-side protection 
− Active LC with manual user-side protection and/or warning, and 
− Passive LC. 
In addition, there are some slight differences in the LC type applicability of safety measures reported 
in Dressler et al. (2018) and the ones piloted as part of WP4. For example, all the safety measures 
piloted in SNCF simulator were applied to active LCs with barriers. In Dressler et al. (2018) some of 
these measures (‘Funnel effect pylons’, ‘Rings’ and ‘Speed bump combined with flashing posts’) 
were estimated to be most effective in passive LCs. However, the selection of relevant LC types for 
the simulator study is understandable since in France most LCs are active with barriers and most 
LC accidents also occur at active LCs with barriers. Based on this decision, it is important to note 
that the estimated effectiveness of these safety measures would be higher if implemented to passive 
LCs instead of active LCs with barriers (see Table 48). 
Based on the safety potential calculations presented in chapter 5 the piloted measures that were 
estimated to have the highest safety benefits are:  
− Additional lights at the train front, covering measures ‘Additional warning light system at front 
of the locomotive (6.0–12.0%)’ and ‘Improved train visibility using lights (6.0–30.0%)’. This 
measure was estimated to have rather high effectiveness (prevention of 15–30% of relevant 
LC accidents) and target rather large share of LC accidents (19.9−96.3% depending on the 
approach). 
− In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning (4.4–15.0%). It is important to be noted that the 
effectiveness of this measure depends on the usage of the in-vehicle devices. In practice, 
the car driver needs to  install the application on a smart mobile device, and location tracking 
should be enabled on this device while driving. Furthermore, the driver needs to allow the 
application to run seamlessly on the background and also notice the visual or auditory 
warning in order to perform the required action on time (e.g. stop before the LC). However, 
these latter requirements are valid for all LC safety measures. 
− Speed bumps and flashing posts (2.0–8.0%). This accident reduction estimate concerns the 
situation where the measure is implemented to passive LCs (where the highest safety effects 
were expected in Dressler et al. 2018).   
− Blinking lights drawing driver attention (Perilight) (2.0–8.0%). This measure is targeted to 
passive LCs. 
Some concerns on applicability of piloted safety measures in different railway environments are listed 
below: 
− Written letters on ground and coloured road marking: Any road marking can only be applied 
on a paved road with an even surface. Thus, the message written on the road does not hold 
for road environments such as gravel roads, cobblestone, tracks etc. Furthermore, these 
measures are not perfectly suitable to countries with snow and long winter with darkness. 
− Noise-producing pavement and speed bumps: These measures are not well suited to gravel 
roads. In addition, these measures are not effective in case of snow. 
− Blinking amber light with train symbol and blinking lights drawing driver attention (Perilight): 
It is important to note that these measures are targeted to passive LCs and require power. 
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However, in practice many of passive LCs no mains power is available and thus other 
alternative power sources need to be investigated. The effectiveness of these measures was 
estimated somewhat lower than active LCs with sound and/or light warning since the warning 
in these measures is linked to LC approach and not to actual arrival of train. 
− In-vehicle train and LC proximity warning: This system may not operate satisfactory for LCs 
surrounded by roads on which Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) reception is poor. 
The safety effect results of the piloted measures are promising. Therefore, it is recommended that 
some of most promising measures will be tested in larger scale real world experiments with well-
planned research designs to obtain more information on their effects (also on long term) on road 
user behaviour and thus on road safety. This would also support the more exact numerical estimation 
of safety effects of the piloted measures. 
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ANNEX A: FIRST PHASE QUESTIONNAIRE (BEFORE LAUNCHING THE 
APPLICATION) TO TAXI DRIVERS TESTING THE “IN-VEHICLE TRAIN 
AND LC PROXIMITY WARNING” MEASURE. 
1. What is your age? 
 
……………………… 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 Male                                Female        
                       
3. How many years of experience do you have as a professional taxi driver?  
 
……………………..... 
 
4. How many km have you driven within the last year? 
 
………………………… 
 
5. How potentially dangerous are Level Crossings for a driver? 
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
6. How safe do you currently feel using the LCs in the Thessaloniki area? 
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
7. How easy is it to detect the presence of a LC or an approaching train based on the existing 
LC safety measures (e.g. signs)? 
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
8. How easy is it to identify LCs that you were not previously aware of or a possible danger at 
a LC based on the existing LC safety measures (e.g. signs)?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
9. To what extent do the current safety measures at LCs in Thessaloniki help you to know 
how to cross safely?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
10. How important is it for you to know how far away the train is from the LC?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
11. How important is it for you to know when the train will arrive at the LC?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
12. To what extent do you take risks at LCs (e.g. crossing after being alerted of an approaching 
train)?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
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13. How experienced are you driving with smart driver-assistance devices (e.g. GNSS, collision 
warning systems, over speeding warnings, etc.)?   
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
14. How important is the use of an in-vehicle alert system to increase safety at LCs?  
 1                                2                               3                               4                                5 
 
Comment Box  
(Here you can provide any additional feedback or clarifications you may have on the answers). 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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ANNEX B: SECOND PHASE QUESTIONNAIRE (AFTER LAUNCHING THE 
APPLICATION) TO TAXI DRIVERS TESTING THE “IN-VEHICLE TRAIN 
AND LC PROXIMITY WARNING” MEASURE. 
1. What is your age? 
 
……………………… 
 
2. What is your gender? 
€  Male                               €  Female        
 
3. How many years of experience do you have as a professional taxi driver?  
 
……………………..... 
 
4. How many km have you driven within the last year? 
 
………………………… 
 
5. To what extent do you feel safer using the in-car alert system? (feeling of safety/reliability, 
acceptance) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
6. How well does the in-car alert system complement the existing LC safety measures (e.g. 
signs) in the Thessaloniki area? (acceptance) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
7. How easy is it to detect a LC and approaching trains using the in-car alert system? 
(detectability) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
8. How easy is it to identify LCs that you were not previously aware of or a possible danger at 
a LC using the in-car alert system? (identification) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
9. To what extent does the in-car alert system help you to know how to cross LCs safely in 
Thessaloniki? (rule knowledge) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
10. How likely it is that you would ignore the information provided by the in-car alert system (e.g. 
crossing after being alerted to an approaching train)?(decision making) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
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11. To what extent do you take risks at LCs (e.g. crossing after being alerted to an approaching 
train)?(behavioural execution) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
12. How reliable do you think the information provided by the in-car alert system is? (reliability) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
13. To what extent do the following characteristics encourage you to use the LC detection 
application?  (usability) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
User friendly interface ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Ease of use ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
LC identification accuracy  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Cost ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Visual message 
appropriateness 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Visual message length ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Auditory message 
appropriateness 
☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Auditory message length ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Auditory message volume ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Other   …………………………...      
 
 
14. How interested would you be in using the in-vehicle alert system after the end of the test 
period? (acceptance) 
€  1                               €  2                              €  3                              €  4                          €  5 
 
 
Comment Box  
(Here you can provide any additional feedback or clarifications you may have on the answers). 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
 
 
